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Summary 
Section 38(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states that 
anyone acting in the public interest may approach a court for relief arising from the 
infringement or threatened infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights. This relaxed 
approach to locus standi permits litigants to act on behalf of sections of the public 
whose human rights have been infringed, whether or not the individual victims are 
aware of these violations or able to approach the court for relief themselves. A similar 
mechanism for approaching the courts in the public interest was introduced in India in 
the late 1970s, but this broadening of locus standi has over time extended beyond the 
objectives for which it was intended originally, with mixed results. 
After examining the history and background of the development of public interest 
standing in South Africa and India, the thesis proceeds to analyse the manner in which 
the courts have dealt with public interest standing in the respective jurisdictions. A 
study of case law, legislation and academic commentary dealing with this area of the 
law constitutes the basis for analysing the judicial management of public interest 
standing in these two jurisdictions. 
The thesis finds that South Africa has much to learn from both the advantages and 
pitfalls of the Indian experience of public interest standing. It concludes with 
recommendations on how public interest standing in South Africa could be 
strengthened, including identifying the most appropriate public interest representative, 
the management of public interest standing cases by the courts, the involvement of 
third parties, and potential legislative interventions.  
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Opsomming 
Artikel 38(d) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996, bepaal dat 
enigeen wat in die openbare belang optree, 'n hof kan nader vir gepaste regshulp 
indien daar aangevoer word dat daar of `n skending van `n reg in die Handves van 
Regte dreig, of reeds `n skending plaasgevind het. Hierdie breë benadering tot locus 
standi stel litigante in staat om op te tree namens dele van die publiek wie se 
menseregte geskend is, ongeag of individuele slagoffers bewus is van hierdie 
oordtredings, of nie in ‘n posisie is om self die hof vir gepaste regshulp te  kan nader 
nie. 'n Soortgelyke meganisme om die howe in die openbare belang te benader, is in 
die laat 1970's in Indië bekendgestel, maar hierdie uitbreiding van locus standi het met 
verloop van tyd verder uitgebrei, met gemengde resultate. 
 Nadat die geskiedenis en agtergrond van die ontwikkeling van locus standi in die 
openbare belang in Suid-Afrika en Indië ondersoek is, analiseer hierdie tesis die 
benadering van howe in die onderskeie jurisdiksies ten opsigte van locus standi in die 
openbare belang. 'n Studie van regspraak, wetgewing en akademiese kommentaar, 
vorm die basis vir die ontleding van die regterlike prosese rakende locus standi in die 
openbare belang. 
 Hierdie tesis bevind dat Suid-Afrika baie van die voordele en slaggate van die 
Indiese ervaring van locus standi in die openbare belang ervaar het. Dit sluit af met 
aanbevelings oor hoe locus standi in die openbare belang in Suid-Afrika versterk kan 
word, insluitende die identifisering van die mees toepaslike verteenwoordiger van die 
openbare belang, die bestuur van sake by die howe wat handel oor locus standi in die 
openbare belang, die betrokkenheid van derde partye en moontlike wetgewende 
ingrypings. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 1   Motivation and background for research 
Access to justice enables everyone to protect the human rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights, regardless of their socio-economic circumstances. It also aims to ensure that 
rights are enforced equally in society.1 Courts have a duty to interpret the law in a way 
that promotes social transformation and access to justice.2 One of the ways in which 
this is possible is a generous and creative approach to the rules of standing.3 
Section 38(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the South 
African Constitution”), states that anyone acting in the public interest may approach a 
court for relief arising from the infringement or threatened infringement of a right in the 
Bill of Rights.4 After the introduction of the South African Constitution, and as a result 
of uncertainty with how to deal with section 38(d), the South African Law Commission 
(“the SALC”) was given the task of making recommendations for public interest 
actions.5 The result was the proposed introduction of legislation that would regulate 
class and public interest actions.6 
The SALC defined a public interest action as “an action instituted by a 
representative in the interest of the public generally, or in the interests of a section of 
the public, but not necessarily in that representative’s own interest”.7 These actions 
therefore potentially offer a mechanism through which the violation of the rights of 
                                            
1 J R Midgeley “Access to Legal Services: A Need to Canvass Alternatives” (1992) 8 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 74 75.  
2 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 590. 
3 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 230; P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 568, 571. 
4 The predecessor of this provision was section 7(4)(b)(v) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (“the interim Constitution”). Section 7(4)(b)(v) of the interim Constitution is 
discussed in greater detail in parts 2 4 1 and 2 4 4 1 below. 
5 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 67. These are 
discussed in part 2 3 3 below. 
6 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998, including Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) 
in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
7 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 23 at 4.3.2. 
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large portions of the public can be challenged.8 This is especially pertinent in South 
Africa’s economic and social context, where many poor people are not afforded 
adequate access to justice.9  
However, despite the fact that the SALC expressly recommended that the 
promulgation of legislation regulating public interest actions10 would enable any 
person “to institute an action in court claiming relief by way of a public interest action”,11 
there is currently no legislation in force regulating public interest actions as proposed 
by the SALC.12 Accordingly, in developing public interest standing, the courts have 
had to look primarily to the South African Constitution for guidance. The judiciary has 
repeatedly identified the need for relaxed rules of standing for the enforcement of 
rights, and therefore welcomed the opportunity to develop section 38(d) of the South 
African Constitution. This has resulted in the establishment of a threshold test for 
determining whether an applicant may be granted standing in the public interest.13  
A purposive and creative interpretation of section 38(d) by the courts may facilitate 
access to justice.14 This method of interpretation, stemming from section 39 of the 
South African Constitution, focuses on the realisation of the values in the Constitution, 
and also gives content to the meaning of access to justice.15 However, in the absence 
of legislation, it is not only the South African Constitution that can be of assistance. 
Other jurisdictions where public interest standing is recognised can offer valuable 
guidance for South Africa. One such jurisdiction is India. A preliminary study of the 
role of public interest standing within the framework of public interest litigation in India 
                                            
8 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 89. 
9 Y Vawda “Access to Justice: From Legal Representation to Promotion of Equality and Social Justice 
– Addressing the Legal Isolation of the Poor” (2005) 26 Obiter 234 234. In this article, the author argues 
that the term “access to justice” needs to be redefined to promote equality and social justice of 
vulnerable groups in South Africa. 
10 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 23 at 4.3.2. 
11 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 4. 
12 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 69. 
13 See parts 2 4 3 and 2 4 5 below. 
14 N J Udombana “Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights in Emerging 
Democracies” (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 47 47. 
15 J Radebe “Address by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Mr Jeff Radebe on the 
occasion of Access to Justice Conference” (2011), Sandton <http://www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/20 
11/20110708_min_ajc.html>. 
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illustrates the potential for further development of public interest standing in Bill of 
Rights litigation in South Africa. 
1 2   Scope of thesis 
This thesis will focus on the development of public interest standing in South Africa 
and India. An examination of the manner in which the courts have dealt with public 
interest standing in South Africa and India will constitute the basis for formulating 
recommendations for the further development of public interest standing in South 
Africa to facilitate greater access to justice. 
1 3   Research questions, aims and hypotheses 
This research project focuses on two questions. The first question concerns the main 
problems, advantages and disadvantages of public interest standing in South African 
Bill of Rights litigation. The second question focuses on the extent to which the 
relaxation of standing in the Indian model of public interest litigation can inform the 
development of public interest standing in South African Bill of Rights litigation. This 
study has four research aims in answering the above-mentioned research questions. 
The first research aim is to analyse the incremental, casuistic development of public 
interest standing in South Africa, both prior and subsequent to the adoption of the 
South African Constitution, paying attention to both the advantages and 
disadvantages of this form of standing in the context of human rights-related litigation. 
It is hypothesised that the process of analysing the incremental, casuistic development 
of public interest standing in South Africa and India will clarify the areas of 
development required in Bill of Rights litigation under the South African Constitution. 
The second research aim is to analyse the development of public interest standing 
within the broader framework of public interest litigation (“PIL”) in India in order to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. In this regard, it is hypothesised that public 
interest standing within the Indian social action litigation experience model offers 
lessons for the development of public interest standing in South Africa, especially 
because of the number of similarities between South Africa and India.16 However, 
                                            
16 S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation in India: A Lesson for 
South Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 372. See part 1 4 below. 
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South African courts will need to be discerning when deciding what elements to adopt 
to avoid the problems that have arisen in India.17 
Thirdly, this research will aim to evaluate the possibilities for further interpretation 
and application of section 38(d) of the Constitution by drawing on detailed comparative 
research on the development of public interest standing in India. Broad rules of 
standing promote effective litigation in the public interest18 and contribute to increased 
access to justice in the Indian public interest litigation model. Therefore it is 
hypothesised that this mechanism can yield benefits that are valuable in South 
Africa.19  
The final research aim of this study will be to offer proposals for the development of 
public interest standing in South Africa that address key areas of consideration 
identified in this study. The hypothesis is that, apart from extending rights to all 
population groups, a broad but nuanced approach to public interest standing that 
incorporates lessons learned from the Indian public interest litigation model will 
contribute to increased access to justice in South Africa. 
1 4   Methodology 
There is a pressing need for purposive and creative interpretation of the Constitution 
in South Africa,20 which is why it is the primary method of interpretation proposed in 
this research. A purposive interpretation of section 38(d) of the South African 
Constitution helps to determine the primary intention of the constitutional drafters, 
regardless of what consequences the lawmaker may have foreseen.21 
                                            
17 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court – Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 435. See part 3 4 2 below. 
18 S Budlender, G Marcus and N M Ferreira Public Interest Litigation and Social Change in South Africa: 
Strategies, Tactics and Lessons (2014) 128. 
19 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court – Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 436. 
20 N J Udombana “Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights in Emerging 
Democracies” (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 47 47. 
21 L du Plessis “Interpretation” in S Woolman M and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 
ed (OS 6 2008) 32–18. 
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The South African Constitution is founded on abstract values and principles.22 As 
stated by the Constitutional Court in the case of S v Makwanyane (“Makwanyane”),23 
an interpretation of the Bill of Rights should be “generous and purposive” and 
demonstrate a commitment to the underlying constitutional values, as well as an 
understanding of the language used.24  
In order to answer the research questions of this study, it is necessary to incorporate 
a comparative methodology. The Court in Makwanyane noted that South Africa is not 
obliged to consider foreign constitutions25 but that, if consulted, they must be referred 
to with “due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances, and the 
structure and language of our own Constitution”.26 The Court in the case of K v Minister 
of Safety and Security27 held that it would seem “unduly parochial to consider that no 
guidance, whether positive or negative, could be drawn from other legal systems’ 
grappling with issues similar to those with which we are confronted”.28 Therefore, it is 
clear that consideration of the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions is necessary to add 
value to the interpretation of rights in South Africa. 
At this point, it is necessary to assess the value that comparative research will add 
to this thesis. If the study of other jurisdictions holds any potential at all, it must be 
consulted for the sake of any wisdom that can be gained.29 The literature on public 
interest standing in South Africa frequently looks to the jurisdiction of India. 
                                            
22 J Goldsworthy “Constitutional Interpretation” in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 689 705. 
23 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC). 
24 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 9. Reference must also be made here to section 39 
(the interpretation clause) of the Constitution. Section 39(1) states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
a court, tribunal, or forum –  
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law.” 
25 The wording of the predecessor of section 39 of the final Constitution was section 35 of the interim 
Constitution. Section 35(1) stated that, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts “may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law”. 
26 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) para 39.  
27 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
28 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 35. 
29 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 35. 
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Consequently, and for a number of other reasons discussed below, this thesis 
considers the development of public interest standing in India. 
India gained its independence on 15 August 1947 and, with it, a Constitution (“the 
Indian Constitution”) guaranteeing enforceable fundamental rights and setting out 
Directive Principles of State Policy to inform state governance aimed at the furtherance 
of social justice.30 However, the implementation of these rights remained largely 
unrealised in the wake of the colonial heritage of British rule. It was not until the late 
1970s that fundamental rights arguably gained life through the development of public 
interest litigation, and were no longer seen purely as academic.31  
When considering the Indian Constitution and Indian case law, it is important to note 
that the Indian Constitution is viewed by courts as a living and dynamic document, 
able to adapt and develop with time.32 Apart from also being a post-colonial democratic 
state, India is an ideal legal system to compare to South Africa for numerous reasons. 
According to Meer, the populations of South Africa and India both display diversity in 
race, religion, language and culture, as well as stark disparities between wealth and 
poverty.33 The history of colonialisation and its subsequent influence on the two 
jurisdictions will also facilitate clear assessments of similarities and differences 
between public interest standing in both India and South Africa.34 
Owing to the potential benefit to be derived from a study of public interest standing 
in India, an in-depth study of the Indian experience and the potential lessons it holds 
for the development of public interest standing in South Africa is justified. The research 
questions that this study will address were recognised and confronted approximately 
forty years ago in India.35 There are also clear parallels between the normative 
                                            
30 Constitution of India, 1949; S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation 
in India: A Lesson for South Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 358 – 359. 
Part 3 2 below provides greater detail on the Indian Constitution and judicial structure.  
31 S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation in India: A Lesson for 
South Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 359. 
32 J Goldsworthy “Constitutional Interpretation” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 689 705; T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in 
South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 590 601. 
33 S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation in India: A Lesson for 
South Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 372. 
34 C Rautenbach “Phenomenon of Personal Laws in India: Some Lessons for South Africa” (2006) 39 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 241 241 – 242. 
35 See part 1 3 for research questions. 
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frameworks of the constitutions of both South Africa and India and the respective 
social contexts.36 A comparative study of the two jurisdictions will therefore yield 
valuable insights.  
This research will be founded on a study and interpretation of section 38 – 
specifically, section 38(d) – of the South African Constitution in order to examine public 
interest standing in Bill of Rights litigation. Over and above critically analysing South 
African and Indian courts’ interpretation of public interest standing in constitutional 
cases, relevant journal articles, books and chapters in books, theses and dissertations, 
publications, addresses and reports will comprise valuable secondary sources.  
Much of the literature on the subject of this thesis relates to public interest litigation 
– especially in the context of India – and not always specifically to public interest 
standing. It will thus be necessary to guard against conflating the two concepts. Public 
interest standing in India is created by the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation 
of article 32 of the Indian Constitution,37 which, along with a relaxation in the procedure 
of approaching the courts, enables public interest litigation. Public interest standing in 
South Africa is explicitly mentioned in section 38(d) of the South African Constitution. 
As both jurisdictions have interpreted these provisions with the aim of increasing 
access to justice, it will be possible to draw parallels between case law and literature 
on public interest standing in South Africa and India and thus make pertinent remarks 
and offer relevant suggestions within the ambit of the research questions and aims.  
1 5   Overview of chapters 
1 5 1 Chapter 2: The history and evolution of public interest standing in South 
Africa 
This chapter will focus on the incremental, casuistic development of public interest 
standing in South Africa. Following a discussion of the history and context of public 
interest standing, this chapter will assess the recommendations proposed by the SALC 
and the potential for the implementation of its submissions regarding public interest 
actions. It will also discuss the merits and pitfalls of public interest standing as it is 
currently applied in South Africa. 
                                            
36 H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) para 32. 
37 See part 3 3 3 below for a detailed discussion of this development. 
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1 5 2   Chapter 3: The history and evolution of public interest standing in India 
This chapter will be constructed in a similar manner to the previous chapter, and will 
focus on the incremental, casuistic development of public interest standing in India. 
This will entail a study of the history and context of public interest standing in India, 
including an analysis of its pre-constitutional law and developments. A foundation of 
the development of public interest standing can then be utilised to identify the merits 
and pitfalls of public interest standing as currently applied in India. 
1 5 3 Chapter 4: The future development of public interest standing in South 
Africa 
This chapter will draw on insights gained from the advantages and disadvantages of 
public interest standing as currently applied in South Africa and India respectively in 
order to identify areas of greatest importance regarding the future development of 
public interest standing in South Africa. These observations will be incorporated into 
proposals for the further development of public interest standing in South Africa. 
1 5 4   Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The concluding chapter will summarise the key findings of this thesis and highlight 
important points to be taken into consideration in the development of public interest 
standing in future in South Africa. This will also be an opportunity to evaluate the 
fulfilment of the research aims, and highlight areas for potential further research. This 
chapter will conclude with final reflections on the significance of the research 
conducted. 
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Chapter 2: The history and evolution of public interest standing in South Africa  
2 1   Introduction 
Public interest standing was introduced to South African law by section 38(d) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). This 
constitutional provision institutes the broadest ground of standing of the five grounds 
contained in section 38. Subsection (d) displays a significant departure from the 
restricted common law rules of standing.1 The South African Law Commission (“the 
SALC”) duly made numerous recommendations and proposed the introduction of 
legislation that would regulate class and public interest actions.2 This legislation was 
not adopted, thus the development of public interest standing has been left to the 
courts.3 
This chapter will examine the incremental, casuistic development of public interest 
standing from Roman and Roman-Dutch law, to South African common law and finally 
under the Constitution. This will also include a discussion of the recommendations 
proposed by the SALC.4 
A holistic overview of public interest standing will facilitate an analysis of the main 
problems, advantages and disadvantages of public interest standing in South African 
Bill of Rights litigation and, in turn, enable proposals later in the study for the 
development of public interest standing in South Africa to address problems or 
deficiencies identified. 
2 2   Public interest standing under the common law   
2 2 1   Introduction 
Before the introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 
1993 (“the interim Constitution”), South African courts adopted a restrictive approach 
to the issue of standing. Litigants had to have the capacity to sue, as well as a 
                                            
1 Public interest standing under the common law is discussed under part 2 2 below. 
2 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998, including Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) 
in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
3 The role of the courts in the development of public interest standing is discussed in part 2 4 4 below. 
4 See part 2 3 below. 
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demonstrable legal interest in the matter, in order to seek relief in court.5 The common 
law restricted who was able to bring a matter before a court by requiring “personal, 
sufficient and direct”6 loss or damage to have been suffered by such party. Regardless 
of whether there was a direct impact on an interest of the public, the right on which the 
applicant based their claim for relief had to be enjoyed personally.7 This principle was 
reaffirmed by the Appellate Division as late as 1993.8 
Accordingly, if an applicant failed to show both that they had a personal interest in 
the matter and that they personally had been adversely affected by the wrong alleged, 
they were denied standing.9 This narrow approach sought to prevent flooding the gates 
with inappropriate or vexatious litigation and a consequent obstruction of the 
administration of justice.10 Actions in the public interest were therefore not recognised 
in South African law.11  
2 2 2   The actio popularis in Roman law 
Litigation in the public interest was permissible in certain circumstances under Roman 
penal law by means of the actio popularis (or “popular action”). The Digest described 
the actio popularis as “a popular action which looks to the public interest”.12 The 
purpose of the action was to serve the ius populi (the interest of the people) and it was 
                                            
5 L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 644. 
6 Standard General Insurance Co v Gutman NO 1981 2 SA 426 (C); Christian League of Southern Africa 
v Rall 1981 2 SA 821 (O); Cabinet of the Transitional Government for the Territory of South West Africa 
v Eins 1988 3 SA 369 (A); Cabinet for the Territory of South West Africa v Chikane and Another 1989 1 
SA 349 (A). 
7 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 591. For a classic example of this 
reasoning, see Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 392. 
8 Reckitt & Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v SC Johnson & Son SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 2 SA 307 (A) at 321. 
9 C Loots “Standing, Ripeness and Mootness” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (OS 2 2005) 7–2. See Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State 
Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) para 1059 E – 1060 A. 
10 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 65, 82. 
11 C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of 
Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 132. 
12 Dig. 47.23.1, translated in A Watson The Digest of Justinian, Volume IV (2011) 307; J A van der Vyver 
“Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and American 
Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 192. 
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thus a means by which a right of the people could be defended.13 There was no general 
action in the public interest by which this could be achieved, but rather a variety of 
actions.14 However, an actio popularis could only be brought for a closed list of 
causes.15  
Van der Keessel subdivided the list of possible actiones populares into three 
categories. The first category was for actions whereby rights could be claimed 
(actiones ordinariae). The second was for actions to safeguard traffic on public 
highways and navigation on public rivers, as well as a claim for the production of a free 
man being held in slavery (remedia possessoria). The third category comprised actions 
which could be instituted if tombs were violated or boundaries disturbed (the actio 
sephulchri violati and actio de termino moto respectively).16 
Any member of the public could institute this action,17 provided that they were 
competent to sue per edictum.18 In the event of more than one person coming forward 
to institute an actio popularis, it fell to the praetor to choose the most suitable plaintiff 
for the matter at hand.19 A plaintiff with a personal interest in the matter would be given 
preference.20 
                                            
13 J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South 
African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 192. 
14 J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South 
African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 192; C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the 
Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law 
Journal 131 146. 
15 G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 
38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 29. 
16 Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale 47.23.1; J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of 
Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 192. 
17 G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 
38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 29; J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares 
and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta 
Juridica 191 193. 
18 Dig. 47.23.4 reads as follows: “Popularis actio integrae personae permittitur, hoc est cui per edictum 
postulare licet.” This has been translated to English by Watson: “A popular action is granted to a 
competent person, that is, one whom the edict allows to bring proceedings”. See A Watson The Digest 
of Justinian, Volume IV (2011) 307. 
19 Dig. 47.23.2, translated in A Watson The Digest of Justinian, Volume IV (2011) 307; J A van der Vyver 
“Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and American 
Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 192. 
20 Dig. 47.23.3(1), translated in A Watson The Digest of Justinian, Volume IV (2011) 307; J A van der 
Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and 
American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 192. 
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2 2 3   The actio popularis in Roman-Dutch law 
The era of Roman-Dutch law quickly ushered out the actio popularis.21 According to 
the court in Bagnall v The Colonial Government (“Bagnall”), the action had become 
outdated in Dutch law due to its inconvenience and therefore never formed part of 
South African law.22 
This position was confirmed three years later in the case of Dalrymple v Colonial 
Treasurer (“Dalrymple”).23 According to the court, the actio popularis allowed Ministers 
of Parliament to be sued too easily for public acts, and therefore posed the threat of 
hampering the government’s execution of its duties.24 Accordingly, a private person 
could only sue and institute actions in their own right and “had no title to institute them 
in the interest of the public”.25 However, this did not preclude a body representing a 
number of people from having locus standi to represent those people.26 
There was one exception in Roman-Dutch law to the rule that a private person could 
pursue only his personal interests in a court action. The interdictum de libero homine 
exhibendo (comparable to the writ of habeas corpus in English law)27 enabled a plaintiff 
to sue on behalf of a person being kept under restraint without just cause.28 
                                            
21 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 65; J A van der 
Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and 
American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 193; G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical 
Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De 
Jure 28 29. 
22 Bagnall v The Colonial Government 1907 24 SC 240 474 – 476; G E Devenish “Locus Standi 
Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 38 of the South African 
Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 29. The courts continued to confirm this. See G E Devenish “Locus 
Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 38 of the South African 
Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 30. 
23 1910 TS 372. 
24 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 392. 
25 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 382. 
26 Transvaal Indian Congress v Land Tenure Advisory Board 1955 1 SA 85 (T); C Loots “Locus Standi 
to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of Legislation” (1987) 104 
South African Law Journal 131 135. 
27 J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South 
African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 193. 
28 Dig. 43.29, translated in A Watson The Digest of Justinian, Volume IV (2011) 130. 
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2 2 4 Public interest standing in South African law prior to the interim 
Constitution 
As already indicated, South African law did not recognise the Roman law actio 
popularis before the adoption of the interim Constitution. The one exception to the rule 
that required a direct and substantial interest to establish standing was in terms of the 
interdictum de libero homine exhibendo.29 This interdict was characterised as an actio 
popularis because it could be instituted by anyone.30 Prior to the adoption of the interim 
Constitution, it was the only remnant in South African law of the Roman law actiones 
populares.31  
 The cases discussed below illustrate the courts’ restrictive approach to public 
interest standing. Plaintiffs were consistently required to prove a direct interest in any 
given matter in order to be granted standing, even if seeking relief in the public interest. 
2 2 4 1  Bagnall v The Colonial Government 
In Bagnall,32 the plaintiff sought a declaration that the Customs Act33 bound the 
Treasurer-General to pay duties for the import of catalogues.34 Owing to the fact that 
the plaintiff was a taxpayer and parliamentary voter, as well as the secretary of the 
South African Manufacturers’ Association, he claimed to have an interest in the matter 
at hand.35 However, because the plaintiff could not prove that he either had already or 
would sustain any damage as a result of the Treasurer-General’s failure to observe the 
statute, he was not afforded standing to act in his own interest, let alone the interest of 
                                            
29 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 65. 
30 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 65 – 66; J A van 
der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African 
and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 193. It is presumed that women and children could only 
apply for the interdict if the detainee was related to them. 
31 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) 311at 294C–F; J A van 
der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African 
and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 195. 
32 1907 24 SC 240. 
33 1 of 1906. 
34 Bagnall v The Colonial Government 1907 24 SC 240 at 470, 471. 
35 Bagnall v The Colonial Government 1907 24 SC 240 at 471. 
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the public.36 Loots notes that this was the first South African case in which the court 
plainly denounced the idea of an action in the public interest.37 
2 2 4 2  Patz v Greene & Co. 
In the case of Patz v Greene & Co. (“Patz”),38 the applicant sought an interdict 
preventing further alleged illegal competition created by the respondents’ identical 
business. The applicant was a licensed general dealer, butcher and eating-house 
keeper, and claimed that he had suffered damage because of the proximity to his 
business in which the respondents operated.39 The court of first instance held that 
granting the applicant a right of action would allow any person in the Transvaal the 
same right of action if they could prove that they sustained damages in their businesses 
through illegal competition.40 The court consequently dismissed the application.  
On appeal, the Transvaal Supreme Court ruled that the applicant in casu had to 
prove that he had suffered loss through the respondents’ illegal trading in order to be 
entitled to compensation and an interdict restraining the respondents from carrying on 
their illegal trade.41 According to the court, granting an interdict without such proof 
could negatively impact the respondents’ trade.42  
The judgment in Patz was an adaptation of the English law on standing in public 
interest cases, for which there existed a “special damage” requirement.43 Special 
damage comprises “some peculiar injury beyond that which [the complainant] may be 
supposed to sustain in common with the rest of the Queen’s subjects by an 
infringement of the law”.44 Naturally, there are acts that affect the public that are 
prohibited by statute. However, simply infringing on such laws did not create a right for 
anyone to bring an action against such person. In order to have a right of action, a 
                                            
36 Bagnall v The Colonial Government 1907 24 SC 240 at 478. 
37 C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of 
Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 133. 
38 1907 TS 427; see also C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving 
the Enforcement of Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 133 – 134. 
39 Patz v Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 428. 
40 Patz v Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 433. 
41 Patz v Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 433 – 434. 
42 Patz v Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 438. 
43 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 591. 
44 Patz v Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 433. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
 
plaintiff had to prove that he or she suffered damage over and above the damage 
suffered by the community as a result of the prohibited act.45  
This judgment clearly exhibits the restrictive approach to standing in South African 
law before the introduction of the Constitution. The restrictive approach prevented 
anyone from approaching a court of law for relief in the public interest unless they were 
able to prove special damage resulting from an act in terms of a statute.46  
2 2 4 3  Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 
In Dalrymple,47 the applicants were residents of the Transvaal and members of the 
Legislative Council. They approached the court seeking an interdict preventing the 
Colonial Treasurer from making payments that were allegedly not statutorily 
authorised.48 Unlike the court in Patz, Innes CJ distinguished between English and 
South African law with regard to the interest that a plaintiff must have in order to enforce 
a public right.49 In England, the plaintiff would have to have some special interest or 
sustain some special damages greater than that enjoyed or sustained by ordinary 
members of the public.50 Under South African law, however, the court held that a 
plaintiff was entitled to enforce a public right irrespective of whether his right or injury 
were greater than other members of the public.51  
 The court found that the payments were illegal,52 but that the applicants lacked 
standing in the matter because they were unable to prove personal damage, the 
breach of a duty owed to them or an infringement of a right vested in them.53 The court 
reaffirmed the fact that a private person could only sue and institute actions in his own 
right and “had no title to institute them in the interest of the public”.54 Even at the risk 
                                            
45 Patz v Greene & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 433. 
46 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 65. 
47 1910 TS 372. 
48 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 373 – 374. 
49 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 379, 380 – 382; T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of 
Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting Social Justice” (2002) 18 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 590 592. 
50 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 380 – 381. 
51 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 380. 
52 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 378. 
53 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 396. 
54 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 382, 386 – 387.  
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of the breach of law going unchallenged, the court was not prepared to relax the rule 
that a remedy could only be claimed by a person with a legal right. The court felt it 
would be unjustified in “resuscitating the popularis actio … and … enlarging its scope” 
to cover matters which, even when it was in force, were beyond its ambit.55  
2 2 4 4  Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and Others 
The applicants in Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and Others56 
(“McCagie”) were candidates for the position of headmaster at certain high schools. 
The persons appointed to these positions did not possess the qualifications required 
by law, and the applicants accordingly sought to have the appointments declared 
void.57 One of the counter-arguments, however, was that the applicants had no locus 
standi because the statute merely regulated the appointment procedure and did not 
confer rights upon them of any kind.58  
The Appellate Division, with reference to Bagnall and Dalrymple, confirmed that the 
actio popularis was not recognised in South African procedural law and that a private 
individual could not institute an action on behalf of the public.59 However, the applicants 
in casu were candidates for positions governed by the legislation in question, which 
meant that they had a direct interest in the matter. The court consequently found that 
the applicants had the right to enforce the provisions of the statute.60 
2 2 4 5  Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 
The case of Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 
(“Roodepoort-Maraisburg”)61 concerned the occupation of property by coloured or 
Asian persons in contravention of the Traansvaal Act,62 which prohibited the 
occupation of property in certain areas by persons of these ethnic groups. The 
appellants approached the court to enforce the prohibition.  
                                            
55 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 386. 
56 1918 AD 616. 
57 Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and others 1918 AD 616 at 619. 
58 Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and others 1918 AD 616 at 621. 
59 Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and others 1918 AD 616 at 621; C Loots “Locus Standi 
to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of Legislation” (1987) 104 
South African Law Journal 131 135. 
60 Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie and others 1918 AD 616 at 622. 
61 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 1933 AD 87. 
62 35 of 1908. 
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According to the court, any member of the public who could show that they were 
adversely affected by non-compliance with a statute enacted in the public interest63 
would have locus standi to enforce that statute.64 In addition, the court held that: 
“Where it appears either from the reading of an enactment itself or from that plus a regard 
to surrounding circumstances that the Legislature has prohibited the doing of an act in 
the interest of any person or a class of persons, the intervention of the Court can be 
sought by any such person to enforce the prohibition without proof of special damage.”65  
On the facts, the court found that the prohibition in the legislation had been enacted 
for the benefit of the municipality. As the municipality owned property in the township 
concerned, it automatically had locus standi to enforce the statute.66 From this 
decision, it is clear that a person need not have suffered personal harm or damage as 
a consequence of conduct that is expressly prohibited by statute enacted in the public 
interest, in order to approach a court for a remedy.67  
2 2 5   Relaxation of the direct interest requirement 
For many years after Roodepoort-Maraisburg, there were no significant decisions 
concerning the issue of locus standi.68 However, in the later cases discussed below, 
the courts displayed a more liberal attitude to standing. 
2 2 5 1  Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 
The case of Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another (“Wood”)69 
presents an exception to the “personal damage” rule set out in Patz and is referred to 
by Devenish as “a locus classicus in South African jurisprudence in relation to 
                                            
63 It is disconcerting to note in retrospect that the enforcement of apartheid legislation was considered 
to be in the public interest. However, this skewed understanding of the public interest nevertheless 
contributed to the relaxation of standing. 
64 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 1933 AD 87 at 96. 
65 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 1933 AD 87 at 96. 
66 Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd 1933 AD 87 at 98. 
67 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 592. 
68 C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of 
Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 136. 
69 1975 2 SA 294 (A). 
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standing”.70 This decision is an example of a successful action in the public interest 
prior to the interim Constitution.  
 Wood, an Anglican bishop, approached the court for an interdict ordering the 
respondents to desist from administering corporal punishment to members of his 
church who were suspected of being members or sympathisers of either the 
Democratic Co-Operative Development Party or the South-West Africa People’s 
Organisation.71 The court a quo held that the applicants’ personal rights or interests 
were not affected because they were church leaders. Therefore, they lacked 
standing.72 
 On appeal, the Appellate Division held that courts should broadly interpret the 
interests of persons whose liberty is at stake.73 In cases of illegal deprivation of liberty, 
someone approaching the court would not be acting in the interests of the public but 
would rather be acting in the interest of the detainees who were unable to come to 
court themselves. The court found that the interest that a person may have in the liberty 
of another may arise not only through family relationship or personal friendship but also 
through the relationship that may bind the two persons by reason of an agreement, 
express or implied, relating to a matter of common interest, such as a partnership, a 
society, a church or a political party.74  
 Following this line of reasoning, any member of such a society or body would have 
an interest in the liberty of a co-member.75 Rumpff CJ even extended this principle to 
other cases where a third person seeks the intervention of a court of law for 
humanitarian reasons.76 However, courts had to be satisfied that the interested person 
on whose behalf the application was brought would have brought the application 
themselves if they were able to do so.77 
 Van der Vyver notes that the Appeal Court’s decision in Wood contributed to 
restoring the basic characteristic of the actiones populares in the interdictum de libero 
                                            
70 G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 
38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 32. 
71 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) paras 298G–H. 
72 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) para 305F. 
73 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) para 310F, G. 
74 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) paras 312D–H. 
75 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) para 312H. 
76 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) para 312H. 
77 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) para 311F. 
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homine exhibendo and other applications brought by third persons for humanitarian 
reasons.78 After this decision, it was unnecessary for applicants to show their personal 
interest in the matter at hand as either relations or friends.79 The court also held that 
the competency to bring such an application could reside in more than one person.80 
 The Wood decision created precedent for any third person to apply for an interdict 
to restrain human rights infringements by state authority if the applicant could show 
that the victims of such infringements were not in a position to bring the application 
themselves.81 As was the case with the actiones populares in Roman law, the 
competency to approach the courts in such matters was not dependent upon the 
applicant’s interest in the matter.82 Loots noted even before the interim Constitution 
was adopted that this decision proves that anyone should be able to bring an action in 
the public interest for issues of great importance to society.83 
2 2 5 2 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 
The case of Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary 
Services (“Bamford”)84 is noteworthy because the applicant claimed to be acting purely 
in the public interest.85 The applicant was a Member of Parliament and a resident of 
the suburb of Rondebosch in Cape Town, who approached the court to enforce the 
Rhodes’ Will (Groote Schuur Devolution) Act.86 This Act contained provisions aimed at 
preserving access to the park on Groote Schuur Estate in Rondebosch for the benefit 
                                            
78 J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South 
African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 197. 
79 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) para 311F. 
80 Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & Another 1975 2 SA 294 (A) paras 312D–F. 
81 J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South 
African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 198. 
82 J A van der Vyver “Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman, Roman-Dutch, South 
African and American Law” (1978) 3 Acta Juridica 191 198. 
83 C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of 
Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 146. 
84 1981 3 SA 1054 (C). 
85 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 66. 
86 9 of 1910; Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 
1054 (C) para 1054D. 
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of the public.87 The applicant, alleging that he had a right of access to the park as a 
member of the public, thus sought a permanent interdict preventing the respondent 
from erecting houses on the estate.88  
One of the grounds on which the respondent opposed the application was the 
applicant’s standing to bring the matter.89 The respondent argued in this regard that 
the applicant did not allege that he himself had ever exercised the right of access to 
the park, nor did he intend to do so in future.90 According to the Roodepoort-Maraisburg 
judgment, this meant that the applicant should therefore not be afforded standing.91  
However, in its decision, the court in casu noted that an important difference 
between Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Bamford was the purpose of the statutory 
provisions concerned. Unlike the statute in Roodepoort-Maraisburg, which prohibited 
certain actions, the statute in Bamford conferred a positive right of access to all 
members of the public.92 As a result, the court held that unlawful interference with such 
a right entitled any member of the public to seek relief without proof of special 
damages.93 
                                            
87 Clause 13 of the late Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes’s will became incorporated in the preamble 
of the Act. See Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 
1054 (C) paras1055H – 1056C. Clause 13(3) reads as follows: 
“13. I give my property following, that is to say, my residence known as De Groote Schuur situate 
near Mowbray in the Cape Division in the said Colony together with all furniture, plate, and other 
articles contained therein at the time of my death, and all other land belonging to me situated under 
Table Mountain, including my property known as Mosterts to my trustees hereinbefore named upon 
and subject to the conditions following, that is to say: … 
(3) The said residence and its gardens and grounds shall be retained for a residence for the Prime 
Minister for the time being of the said Federal Government of the States of South Africa to which I 
have referred in Clause 6 hereof, my intention being to provide a suitable official residence for the 
First Minister in that Government befitting the dignity of his position and until there shall be such a 
Federal Government may be used as a park for the people.” 
88 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) 
paras 1056C–D. 
89 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) para 
1059E. 
90 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) para 
1059G. 
91 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) 
paras 1059G–H. 
92 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 67. 
93 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) 
paras 1059H and 1060A. 
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In order to hand down an interim order, the court had to balance the relief sought by 
the applicant against the resultant harm that the respondent would suffer by the 
granting or refusal of the interim interdict. In doing so, the court took cognisance of the 
fact that the applicant brought the action “to vindicate the rights of the public”.94 The 
respondent was ordered to cease building, and was interdicted from continuing, 
pending the outcome in the trial court.95 It is clear from this decision that, against the 
backdrop of the public’s growing concern for the protection of the environment, private 
persons may have an interest in a general administrative action.96 
2 2 5 3 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 
In the case of Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and 
Others (“Veriava”),97 the South African Medical and Dental Council had made a 
decision not to investigate a complaint pertaining to improper and disgraceful conduct 
of certain registered professionals.98 This was allegedly a failure of a statutory duty on 
the part of the respondents.99 The applicants accordingly sought to have this decision 
reviewed and set aside, but the respondents argued that the applicants lacked locus 
standi because they had failed to show that they had personally suffered damage or 
injury.100 However, counsel for the respondents acknowledged that a breach of statute 
                                            
94 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) 
paras 1061B–H. As public interest standing was not recognised in South African law at this time, the 
applicant was not able to bring the action on behalf of the public. 
95 Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State Auxiliary Services 1981 3 SA 1054 (C) para 
1062C. 
96 G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 
38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 32. 
97 1985 2 SA 293 (T); B Mqingwana An Analysis of Locus Standi in Public Interest Litigation with Specific 
Reference to Environmental Law; a Comparative Study Between the Law of South Africa and the Law 
of the United States of America Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria (2011) 18 – 19. 
98 The Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act 56 of 1974 conferred upon 
the South African Medical and Dental Council (“the Council”) the power to deal with complaints of 
conduct against any person registered under the Medical and Dental Act that were allegedly damaging 
to the profession. See Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 
1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 311C. 
99 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) paras 
315G–H. 
100 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 
315B. 
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in question, which had been enacted in the interest of medical practitioners as a class 
of persons, would cause sustained damages for the class.101 
One of the aims of the statute in question was to protect members of the public in 
their dealings with members of the medical profession. However, at the same time, it 
was also aimed at protecting members of the medical profession.102 The court referred 
to both McCagie and Roodepoort-Maraisburg in its decision regarding the issue of 
locus standi.103 According to the court, in instances where a statutory provision 
prohibits an act in the interest of a class of persons, then any such person could 
approach the court to enforce the prohibition without having to prove special 
damage.104 The interest of the class can be determined from either the reading of a 
statute or from a combination of the statute and the surrounding circumstances.105 As 
a result, the court found that members of the medical profession had a real and direct 
interest in the prestige, status and dignity of their profession.106 
2 2 6   Conclusion 
This section started by noting the existence of the actio popularis in Roman law, which 
was available only in certain circumstances. Due to the inconvenience of the action, 
however, it quickly fell into misuse under Roman-Dutch law.107 
 The decision in Patz marked a re-emergence of the actio popularis.108 Building on 
this development, the Wood and Veriava matters demonstrated a willingness by the 
courts to adopt an increasingly liberal stance to the issue of locus standi. However, the 
special damage requirement remained in force and effectively limited who was able to 
approach courts seeking the enforcement of prohibitions of acts laid down by 
                                            
101 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 
315C. 
102 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 
316F. 
103 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 
315G. 
104 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 
315F. 
105 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) 
paras 315E–F. 
106 Veriava and Others v President, SA Medical and Dental Council, and Others 1985 2 SA 293 (T) para 
311B. 
107 Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 392. 
108 R G McKerron The Law of Delict 7 ed (1971) 283. 
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legislation. Individuals approaching a court were only entitled to claim appropriate relief 
that was in their personal, sufficient and direct interest.109 
 As public interest law expanded, this requirement needed to be amended.110 The 
issue of standing to claim relief in the public interest began receiving considerable 
attention in the 1970s when a number of legal academics around the world wrote on 
the subject and presented strong arguments for the relaxation of standing rules to 
accommodate this development.111 However, the position of the courts regarding 
public standing before the interim Constitution remained restrictive.  
 Even though the courts stood firm on the principle that the litigant must have a 
personal interest in a matter to have standing, the liberalisation of locus standi, seen 
in the cases of Wood and Bamford, finally resulted in the recognition of public interest 
standing in section 7(4) of the interim Constitution and, later, section 38 of the final 
Constitution.112 The following section will provide an overview of the South African Law 
Commission’s recommendations regarding the interpretation and development of 
public interest standing in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation. 
2 3   Report and recommendations by the South African Law Commission 
2 3 1   Introduction 
Soon after the interim Constitution came into effect, the SALC began investigating the 
need to introduce legislation to deal with class actions and public interest suits.113 The 
result was the proposed introduction in 1998 of legislation that would regulate class 
and public interest actions.114 In Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and 
Public Interest Actions in South African Law (sometimes referred to simply as “Project 
88”), the SALC notes that public interest actions were included in both the interim and 
final Constitutions, and could be seen as “part of the worldwide movement to make 
                                            
109 This requirement was confirmed by the court in Milani and Another v South African Medical and 
Dental Council and Another 1990 1 SA 899 (T). 
110 G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 
38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 36. 
111 South African Law Commission Working Paper 57: The Recognition of a Class Action in South 
African Law (1995) 8 at 2.3. 
112 See part 2 4 below. 
113 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 610. 
114 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
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access to justice a reality”.115 As the promulgation of section 38 of the Constitution 
envisions a notable departure from the common-law rules relating to standing, it is 
worth considering the recommendations of the SALC.116  
 The recommendations by the SALC address the need for a public interest action in 
South African law, and also propose a definition and requirements for such an action. 
Although the SALC made it clear that legislation would also be necessary to broaden 
the scope of public interest actions to non-Bill of Rights cases, the recommendations 
contained in Project 88 concern public interest standing to enforce constitutional 
rights.117 The development of public interest standing was something that the SALC 
felt should not be left solely to judicial development.118 
A study of these recommendations will reveal what the SALC deemed most 
important regarding the development of public interest standing in South Africa. This 
section will also assist in laying a foundation for proposals for the development of public 
interest standing in South Africa to address problems or deficiencies identified in 
relation to public interest standing. 
2 3 2   Background to the investigation  
In 1992, the former Minister of Justice requested that the SALC investigate the possible 
recognition of class actions. However, the Working Committee also included actions in 
the public interest in its investigation, with the aim of contributing to increased access 
to justice.119 
The SALC begins its report by providing background to the investigation it 
conducted on public interest actions. Here, it acknowledges the traditionally restrictive 
nature of the South African law of standing.120 The SALC also recognises that the 
                                            
115 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 1. 
116 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 67. 
117 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 14 at 3.3.3. 
118 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 15 at 3.4.1. 
119 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v paras 1, 4 at 1.3.1. 
120 See part 2 2 for the way in which public interest standing was approached by the courts prior to the 
introduction of the interim Constitution. 
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courts previously required a personal, sufficient and direct interest before a litigant 
would be afforded standing in court and that this has been problematic in public law.121 
For instance, the findings of Project 88 note that it was difficult for applicants to prove 
compliance with the personal interest requirement where interests of litigants were 
shared with the public,122 as was the case in Bamford.123 The requirement also resulted 
in representative organisations being denied standing if the organisations themselves 
lacked direct interest, even if their members did not.124 
An important factor leading to the investigation by the SALC was the use of public 
interest actions in foreign jurisdictions outside the scope of constitutional law. The 
report refers to some examples where public interest actions would find application 
outside the scope of Bill of Rights litigation. These include actions where a number of 
persons have the same or similar claims or defences; actions arising from a single 
event (“sudden mass disaster”); actions arising from a single cause but at different 
times and under different circumstances (“creeping disaster”); actions arising from 
consumer transactions (“consumer claims”); and actions arising from a common factor 
affecting a class (such as pregnant women, children, parents and the disabled).125 
These actions provided insight into the scope of public interest standing. 
2 3 3   The nature and function of public interest standing  
2 3 3 1  Distinction between public interest actions and class actions 
As Project 88 offers recommendations regarding both public interest actions and class 
actions, which are separate and distinct procedures, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the two.126 The SALC notes that the essential difference between these 
                                            
121 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 1 at 1.2.1. The SALC noted, however, that these problems were 
not exclusive to the realm of public law, but that they occurred less in matters of a private law nature. 
See part 2 2 above. 
122 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 1 at 1.2.1. 
123 See part 2 2 5 2 above for a discussion of this case. 
124 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 1 – 2 at 1.2.1. 
125 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 2–3 at 1.2.3. 
126 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 2. 
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actions is the binding nature of the judgment handed down. The judgment in a class 
action binds all members of the class, whereas the judgment in a public action does 
not bind the people in whose interest it is brought.127 
A class action is defined by the SALC as: 
“an action instituted by a representative on behalf of a class of persons in respect of 
whom the relief claimed and the issues involved are substantially similar in respect of all 
members of the class, and which action is certified as a class action in terms of the 
Act”.128 
In contrast, the SALC defines a public interest action as “an action instituted by a 
representative in the interest of the public generally, or in the interests of a section of 
the public, but not necessarily in that representative’s own interest”.129 This reflects the 
definition offered by Loots, who highlights that public interest actions are brought by 
plaintiffs seeking to benefit any portion of the public by the relief sought.130 These 
actions therefore potentially offer a mechanism through which the violation of the rights 
of large sections of the population can be challenged.131 This is an especially pertinent 
feature in South Africa’s economic and social context, where many poor people are 
not afforded adequate access to justice.132  
Both public interest and class actions are representative in nature, requiring a 
plaintiff to act on behalf of a number of people. However, whereas a litigant in a class 
action suit must have some interest in common with the other members of the class in 
question in order to be afforded standing, a public interest litigant need not have a 
personal or direct interest in the matter. In fact, such litigant should not be acting 
primarily in their own interest.133 Whether or not the interests of someone wishing to 
                                            
127 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 2. 
128 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 vi para 8. 
129 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 23 at 4.3.2.  
130 C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of 
Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 132. 
131 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 89. 
132 Y Vawda “Access to Justice: From Legal Representation to Promotion of Equality and Social Justice 
– Addressing the Legal Isolation of the Poor” (2005) 26 Obiter 234 234 (arguing that the term “access 
to justice” needs to be redefined to promote equality and social justice of vulnerable groups in South 
Africa). 
133 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 6 – 7 at 2.2 and 2.3. 
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be afforded standing in the public interest are affected, their primary desire must be to 
benefit the public. The SALC acknowledges that it may be difficult to find such a 
person.134 
2 3 3 2  The meaning of “in the public interest” 
The SALC included a discussion of the implications of the words “in the public interest”, 
for interpretation purposes.135 This is necessary to consider, especially as someone 
wishing to approach a court in the public interest may be representing a portion of the 
public or the public in general.  
 According to the SALC, this phrase can have one of two meanings. Firstly, it can 
mean that it is in the public interest to have a particular matter decided by a court. 
Secondly, it can allude to a benefit that would be shared by members of the public in 
the event of a successful outcome in a public interest action. The SALC does not 
indicate a preferable interpretation.136 The courts have therefore been required to 
provide an interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “in the public interest”.137  
2 3 3 3  The plaintiff in public interest actions 
The SALC deemed it important that anyone should be able to institute an action in the 
public interest, even without a direct interest in the relief claimed.138 However, courts 
would be able to limit unmeritorious public interest actions by requiring that the action 
be instituted in the interest of the public (whether a section of the public or the public 
as a whole) and on the condition of the presence of a suitably qualified 
representative.139 
                                            
134 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 6 at 2.2.2. 
135 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.5.2. The judiciary has been left to develop its own 
definition of the phrase.  
136 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.5.2. 
137 See part 4 3 5 1 below. 
138 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 4. 
139 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 25 at 4.4.4. This recommendation is discussed in greater detail 
under part 4 2 1 below. 
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 It was proposed that the person wishing to institute a public interest action need only 
identify the public interest action as such and to nominate themselves or any other 
suitable person as the representative plaintiff of those on whose behalf the relief would 
be claimed.140 Upon satisfaction that the action should proceed by way of a public 
interest action, the court would appoint a representative.141 
 This representative should be “suitably qualified” or “genuine” in his or her 
endeavours to represent the public interest.142 The requirement of promoting the “best 
interests” of the public also implies that the representative concerned should be 
independent of the defendant(s), and that there should be no apparent conflict of 
interest.143 
2 3 3 4  Proposed legislation to regulate public interest actions 
According to the SALC, subjecting public interest actions to “costly procedures and 
requirements” would be contrary to the spirit and purport of section 38 of the 
Constitution.144 No certification of public interest actions was to be required for this 
reason.145 However, in order to ensure greater access to justice, the SALC proposed 
legislation that would regulate public interest standing.146 Although both the interim and 
final Constitutions provide for public interest actions in a constitutional context, the 
SALC found that legislation would be necessary to give effect and meaning to the right 
to approach a court for relief in the public interest.147  
                                            
140 See part 4 2 1 below for a discussion of the importance of roles that public interest litigants and 
representatives play today. 
141 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 27 at 4.6.2. 
142 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 27 at 4.6.2 and 4.6.3. 
143 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 27 at 4.6.3. 
144 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 25 at 4.4.4. 
145 However, part 4 3 4 below re-assesses the recommendation against certification in light of lessons 
learned from the development of public interest standing in India. 
146 W L R de Vos “Reflections on the Introduction of a Class Action in South Africa” (1996) 4 Journal of 
South African Law 639 641. 
147 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 14 at 3.3.3. 
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The SALC identified the need to introduce legislation to compensate for the alleged 
failure of the courts to develop public interest actions up to that point.148 Looking to the 
future, the SALC feared that without legislation regulating public interest actions, 
development of public interest standing by the courts would take place without 
uniformity or consistency, if at all.149 In Working Paper 57: The Recognition of a Class 
Action in South African Law (“Working Paper 57”),150 the SALC explicitly proposed the 
regulation of public interest actions by way of an Act of Parliament and not rules of 
court. This recommendation was uncontested.151  
Accordingly, Project 88 contains a Draft Bill on Class Actions and Public Interest 
Suits (“the SALC’s draft Bill”).152 Chapter 2 of the SALC’s draft Bill concerns public 
interest actions and offers guidance regarding the institution of a public interest action, 
the representative in these actions and costs. This chapter is only one page in length 
and speaks primarily to the procedure entailed in public interest actions.153 Chapter 4 
of the Bill offers clarity regarding the appointment of commissioners to collect evidence 
and make recommendations;154 settlement, abandonment and discontinuance, and 
that none of these may occur without prior court approval;155 and designation of courts 
by the Minister, which simply enables the Minister to designate in which courts public 
interest actions can be brought.156 
                                            
148 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 22 at 4.2.4. 
149 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 15 at 3.4.1. 
150 South African Law Commission Working Paper 57: The Recognition of a Class Action in South 
African Law (1995) 12 at 2.11. 
151 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 12 at 3.1.3. 
152 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995, found in 
South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions 
in South African Law R 8/1998 87 – 104; G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical Evolution 
and Present Status in terms of Section 38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De Jure 28 46. 
153 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 90 – 91. 
154 See part 4 2 3 1 below. 
155 See the introduction to part 4 2 2 below. 
156 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 97 – 98. See part 4 2 2 1 below. 
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2 3 4   Conclusion 
In Project 88, the SALC highlighted a number of public interest standing-related 
problems that could arise without legislation regulating public interest actions. The 
SALC accordingly sought to introduce legislation to give content to section 38(d) of the 
Constitution. However, this draft Bill was not adopted.  
The courts’ approach to the development of public interest standing may have been 
criticised by the SALC in the publication of its report and recommendations in 1998, 
but much advancement has occurred since. The way the courts have dealt with issues 
of public interest standing during the era of constitutional democracy will be examined 
in the following section. 
2 4   Public interest standing under the South African Constitution   
2 4 1   Introduction 
The introduction of the interim Constitution caused the private law model of standing 
to be replaced by a flexible public law model.157 The common law position relating to 
standing has now been significantly broadened. Section 7(4)(b)(v) of the interim 
Constitution explicitly recognised public interest standing as a ground of locus standi 
by which to approach a court for relief in the event of an infringement or threat of 
infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights. The content of this provision was largely 
incorporated into section 38 of the final Constitution, which reads as follows:  
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a 
court are—  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;  
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;  
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and  
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.”158 
According to Loots, the need for this provision in the interim Constitution and, 
ultimately, the final Constitution, could be found in the practical barriers preventing 
                                            
157 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 602. 
158 Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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people from approaching a court for relief when their fundamental rights were 
infringed.159 The standing provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted in a 
manner that gives effect to the fundamental values of the Constitution, in order to 
promote social justice.160 
2 4 2   Public interest standing under section 38(d) of the 1996 Constitution 
It is trite that standing to bring a case before a court of law is a procedural precondition 
for a determination of the merits of such case.161 The existence of locus standi depends 
on the party wishing to bring such matter, as opposed to having any link to the issue 
in question.162 Public interest standing, specifically provided for in section 38(d) of the 
Constitution, creates the opportunity for any individual or group to approach a court if 
moved by a desire to benefit any portion of the public.163 
This broadened scope of standing is required for litigation of a public character, 
where the relief sought is generally forward-looking and general in its application.164 It 
also displays elements of the Roman law actio popularis (especially the actiones 
ordinariae)165 insofar as it also recognises each person’s interest in the due 
performance of government activities, and accordingly enables the validity of such 
actions to be challenged by anyone.166 
                                            
159 C Loots “Standing to Enforce Fundamental Rights” (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 
49 49. 
160 T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their Significance in Promoting 
Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 590 602. 
161 C Loots “Standing, Ripeness and Mootness” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2 2005) 7–2. 
162 C Loots “Standing, Ripeness and Mootness” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2 2005) 7–1. 
163 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 2.2.1; C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public 
Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 
132. The Constitutional Court has recently confirmed in Mokone v Tassos Properties CC and Another 
2017 5 SA 456 (CC) at para 17 that issues do not have to be important to all citizens to be deemed to 
be of general public importance; they need only be of importance to a “sufficiently large section of the 
public”. 
164 V Amar and M V Tushnet Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (2009) 10. However, the relief 
may also be retrospective, as would be the case of an interdict for unlawful behaviour, for example. 
165 See part 2 2 2 above for Van der Keessel’s categorisation of actiones populares. 
166 M Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) 275; G E Devenish “Locus Standi Revisited: Its Historical 
Evolution and Present Status in terms of Section 38 of the South African Constitution” (2005) 38 De 
Jure 28 42. See part 2 2 2 above. 
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Standing under section 38(d) of the Constitution is supported by the doctrine of the 
“ideological” or “non-Hohfeldian” plaintiff.167 Hohfeld suggests that plaintiffs in a court 
of law must either be seeking a determination of the existence of a right, privilege, 
immunity or power. It follows that a “non-Hohfeldian” plaintiff is a party who is granted 
standing without seeking to vindicate any fundamental legal right of their own.168 
Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking standing under section 38(d) of the Constitution of 
South Africa is not granted standing necessarily in order to vindicate a fundamental 
legal right of their own, but rather to institute an action for relief in the public interest.  
Section 38 of the Constitution therefore introduces a “radical departure”169 from the 
common-law rules that regulated the issue of standing, arguably most evident in 
section 38(d). This is because the applicant in a public interest action is not the direct 
bearer of the right concerned and need not have a direct interest in the remedy sought. 
The public interest standing provision found in the Constitution is a significant 
departure even from the old actiones populares found in Roman law, which only 
allowed an applicant to act in the public interest in specific instances.170 This makes it 
the most extensive of the five listed grounds enabling parties to seek enforcement of 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights.171  
The role of courts in a new constitutional democracy, as noted by O’Regan J in 
Ferreira v Levin NO (“Ferreira”),172 is to facilitate access to justice, which is not possible 
without a forward-thinking approach to the issue of standing.173 Furthermore, this role 
is not confined to the Constitutional Court, as held by the court in Beukes v Krugersdorp 
Transitional Local Council and Another.174 All courts should now adopt a broad 
                                            
167 C Loots “Standing, Ripeness and Mootness” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2 2005) 7–2. 
168 L L Jaffe “The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff” (1968) 
116 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1033 1033 – 1047. 
169 Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 1 SA 417 (CC) para 22. 
170 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 233. A Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (1953) defines actiones populares as 
“actions which can be brought by ‘any one among the people’. They are of praetorian origin and serve 
to protect public interest (ius populi).” 
171 C Loots “Standing, Ripeness and Mootness” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2 2005) Juta & Co Ltd 7–11. 
172 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
173 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 230. 
174 1996 3 SA 467 (W). 
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approach to standing when adjudicating constitutional issues.175 Standing should 
therefore not be granted only to those with a direct interest in the outcome of the case, 
especially where remedies may have far-reaching impacts for many people.176  
2 4 3   Requirements for invoking section 38(d)  
In order to invoke section 38 of the Constitution, there must be an infringement or 
threatened infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights and the applicant must fall within 
a category listed under section 38. However, an applicant alleging locus standi under 
section 38(d) and purporting to act in the public interest does not have to prove an 
infringement or threatened infringement of the public’s rights.177 They need only allege 
that the challenged rule or conduct is objectively in breach of a right enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights178 and that the public has a sufficient interest in the relief sought.179  
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut (“Prut”),180 the court held that the issue of 
whether a litigant will be accorded public interest standing, regardless of his or her own 
interest in the matter, depends on whether the matter is of purely academic interest or 
not.181 Public interest standing is also more likely to be granted if a decision in the 
matter may quash similar disputes.182 Thus, an allegation of an infringement of or threat 
to a right is necessary to confer standing, but the applicant need not necessarily be the 
holder of the right or rights in question. Melunsky J in Prut held further that courts 
should more readily allow standing in terms of section 38(d) where there “is a pressing 
                                            
175 Beukes v Krugersdorp Transitional Local Council and Another 1996 3 SA 467 (W) para 474E. 
176 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 230. 
177 C Loots “Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest in Matters Involving the Enforcement of 
Legislation” (1987) 104 South African Law Journal 131 132; South African Law Commission Project 88: 
The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26. Loots 
notes that a public right is a right enjoyed by all members of the public, and that it is possible for a plaintiff 
to bring an action based on a public right while seeking relief in his or her own interest. This must be 
distinguished from an action in the public interest. 
178 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 235. 
179 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 168. See also C Plasket “South Africa” (2009) 622 The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 256 262. The court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut 1996 4 SA 318 (E) has 
noted, however, that this requirement is difficult to prove. 
180 1996 4 SA 318 (E). 
181 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut 1996 4 SA 318 (E) at 325I. 
182 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut 1996 4 SA 318 (E) at 325E–F. 
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public interest that the decision be given soon”. However, public interest standing must 
not be confused with standing based on an “interested public” or a public opinion.183 
Additionally, the Constitutional Court has proposed that a focus on whether it is 
objectively in the interest of the public that a matter be heard would act as a safeguard 
against the abuse of public interest standing by “busybodies”.184 In his minority 
judgment Lawyers for Human Rights, Madala J reinforced the fact that cases should 
be examined carefully and individually,185 which will help to ensure that only cases 
genuinely in the public interest are heard. It is the view of the SALC that the relief 
sought by the litigant can be useful in determining their intent.186  
2 4 4   The role of the courts in the development of public interest standing 
The development of public interest law – and public interest standing – will depend on 
the legal issues brought to court by public interest litigants.187 The cases discussed 
below discuss the courts’ interpretation of section 38(d) of the Constitution. The 
judgments handed down by the courts will clarify the current position of public interest 
standing in South Africa. 
2 4 4 1  Ferreira v Levin NO 
2 4 4 1 1 Majority judgment 
In Ferreira,188 the Constitutional Court adopted a broad approach to section 7(4) of the 
interim Constitution.189 Section 417 of the former Companies Act (“the Companies 
                                            
183 M Du Plessis, G Penfold and J Brickhill Constitutional Litigation (2013) 47. See in this regard Glenister 
v President of Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 1 SA 287 (CC). 
184 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
185 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 68. 
186 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26. According to the SALC, the phrase “in the public interest” 
can mean either that it is in the interest of the public that a matter be heard or that every member of the 
public will benefit from a finding in their favour. 
187 Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Estate Stransham-Ford 2017 3 SA 152 (SCA) para 
24. 
188 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC). 
189 Section 7(4) of the interim Constitution was the predecessor to section 38 of the final Constitution. 
See part 2 4 1 above. 
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Act”)190 concerned the interrogation of persons in connection with the winding-up of 
companies unable to pay their debts. Both of the applicants in this case had been 
summoned in terms of subsection 471(1) and (2), which they submitted would compel 
them to answer self-incriminating questions. The matters were referred to the 
Constitutional Court to determine the consistency of the challenged provisions of the 
Act with the interim Constitution.  
The applicants sought to have section 417(2)(b) of the Companies Act declared 
unconstitutional and therefore invalid.191 However, the Court could only exercise its 
jurisdiction to do so if the applicants had the necessary standing. The applicants were 
neither “accused persons” for purposes of section 25(3) of the interim Constitution, nor 
was there any way to determine whether they would be in future.192 Consequently, 
there was no actual or threatened infringement of the applicants’ right to a fair criminal 
trial. However, Chaskalson P found that the applicants nevertheless had sufficient 
interest in the decision on the constitutionality of section 417(2)(b).193 
By the Court’s reasoning, the matter was technically rendered academic or 
hypothetical194 by the conundrum presented by section 7(4) of the interim Constitution, 
which requires actual or threatened infringement of a right contained in the Bill of 
Rights. However, in order to ensure that constitutional rights were given the full 
measure of protection they deserved, the Court adopted a broad approach to 
                                            
190 61 of 1973. Section 417 of the Companies Act deals with the summoning and examination of persons 
as to the affairs of a company in winding up proceedings. Subsections 417(1) and 417(2)(b) state in part 
as follows: 
“417. Summoning and examination of persons as to the affairs of the company 
(1) In any winding-up of a company unable to pay its debts, the Master of the Court may, at any time 
after a winding-up order has been made, summon before him or it any director or office of the 
company or person known or suspected to have in his possession any property of the company or 
believed to be indebted to the company, or any person whom the Master or the Court deems capable 
of giving information concerning the trade, dealings, affairs or property of the company”; and 
“(2) (b) Any such person may be required to answer any question put to him at the examination, 
notwithstanding that the answer might tend to incriminate him, and any answer given to any such 
question may be used as evidence against him.” 
191 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
paras 161 – 162. 
192 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 41. 
193 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 163. 
194 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 164. 
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standing.195 Whereas a narrow reading of section 7(4)(b) of the Constitution would not 
enable the applicants to challenge the impugned section of the Companies Act, the 
Court found that section 98(2) of the interim Constitution vested a jurisdiction in the 
Constitutional Court to “interpret, protect and enforce” constitutional provisions.196 A 
broad approach to standing enabled any of the persons listed under section 7(4)(b) to 
approach a court for relief in their own interest. The Court did not consider the 
possibility of the applicants acting in the public interest.  
2 4 4 1 2  Minority judgment of O’Regan J 
In contrast to the majority of the Court, O’Regan J held that there was no evidence on 
record before the Court that enabled the applicants to rely on own-interest standing.197 
However, she noted that even in the absence of an actual or threatened infringement 
of a right, the special circumstances of the case at hand warranted reliance on public 
interest standing.198 This ground of standing contained in section 7(4)(b)(v) was a new 
departure in South African law from common law.199  
Wider rules of standing are appropriate for constitutional litigation,200 as they ensure 
that it is not only persons with vested interests in the actual or threatened infringement 
of rights in the Bill of Rights who are granted standing. This approach helps ensure 
that such issues are heard by the courts.201 However, O’Regan J was cautious202 of 
affording applicants public interest standing because remedies sought in constitutional 
                                            
195 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 165. 
196 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 167. 
197 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 231. 
198 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 233. 
199 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 233. 
200 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 229. 
201 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 230. 
202 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. In O’Regan J’s words: “This court will be circumspect in affording applicants standing by way 
of section 7(4)(b)(v)”. This view is shared by Indian courts. See Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch 
vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2007 2 AWC 1113 para 9. This case is discussed in part 3 3 4 4 2 below. 
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challenges generally have a wider impact than private litigation.203 Consequently, 
public interest applicants are required to prove that they are acting genuinely in the 
public interest.204 O’Regan J then set out a list of factors to determine whether an 
applicant is acting genuinely in the public interest.205 These elements must be 
considered in the context of each case.206 They also function as safeguards to avoid 
abuse of public interest standing. The factors include: 
“whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the challenge can be 
brought; the nature of the relief sought, and the extent to which it is of general and 
prospective application; and the range of persons or groups who may be directly or indirectly 
affected by any order made by the court and the opportunity that those persons or groups 
have had to present evidence and argument to the court.”207 
O’Regan J concluded that public interest standing should be granted to the 
applicants in casu for a number of reasons: the impugned provision of the Companies 
Act was objectively in breach of the Bill of Rights; there would be a delay if the Court 
were forced to wait for other persons to bring the same challenge; the relief sought 
was within the Court’s jurisdiction, and of a general nature; there had been 
considerable input from amici curiae; and those directly interested in the 
constitutionality of section 417 had been afforded adequate opportunity to place their 
views before the Court.208 
2 4 4 2  Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 
In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs (“Lawyers for Human 
Rights”),209 the first applicant, a human rights non-governmental organisation, and 
second applicant, a foreign national, sought a declaration that certain provisions of the 
                                            
203 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
paras 229 – 230. 
204 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. 
205 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234.  
206 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. 
207 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. 
208 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 236. 
209 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC). 
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Immigration Act (“the Immigration Act”)210 were unconstitutional. The impugned 
provisions in section 34 of the Act211 concerned the treatment of “illegal foreigners” in 
South Africa.212 
Section 34(1) concerned the power of an immigration officer to arrest, detain and 
deport “illegal foreigners”. Sections 34(8) and (9) concern “illegal foreigners” at ports 
of entry. According to section 34(8), immigration officers are given the discretion to 
detain “illegal foreigners” on the vehicles used to enter South Africa. Section 34(2) 
stipulates that “illegal foreigners” must be released from detention within forty-eight 
hours if they are not to be deported. However, according to section 34(2), this provision 
does not extend to “illegal foreigners” detained on ships in terms of section 34(8).  
The Constitutional Court deemed this matter to be one of “immense public 
importance” for three reasons. Firstly, the impugned provisions restricted liberty and 
dignity of people classified as “illegal foreigners”.213 The Court held that it would be a 
blight on South Africa’s constitutional democracy if national integrity were secured at 
this cost.214 Secondly, the Court recognised that many of the people deemed to be 
“illegal foreigners” may lack financial resources and support of family and friends, as 
well as an understanding of South African law.215 This placed them in a weak position 
to seek redress in court for violations of their rights. Lastly, the Court acknowledged 
the fact that many of the ships on which “illegal foreigners” were detained do not remain 
in port for longer than a few days at most.216 This, too, was indicative of there being 
very little chance that the people affected would be able to approach a court to 
vindicate their rights.217  
                                            
210 13 of 2002. 
211 Subsections 1, 2, 8 and 9 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
212 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
paras 2 – 13. 
213 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 20. 
214 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 20. 
215 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 21. 
216 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 21. 
217 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 22. 
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In his majority judgment, Yacoob J noted that section 38 of the Constitution 
introduced a “radical departure” from standing under the common law.218 Public 
interest standing under section 38(d) is clearly intended to have a wider reach than 
standing to act on behalf of another person, as well as a class of persons. It must 
therefore be interpreted with this understanding.219 
As a point of departure, the Court referred to O’Regan J’s minority judgment in 
Ferreira to determine the reach of section 38(d) of the Constitution.220 The Court 
confirmed that, when dealing with standing under section 38(d), it is important to 
ascertain whether a person or organisation acts genuinely in the public interest.  The 
Court then endorsed the factors laid down by O’Regan to determine whether the 
applicant is acting genuinely in the public interest, and also reaffirmed the broad 
approach to standing advocated by the majority in Ferreira.  
As in O’Regan J’s minority judgment in Ferreira, two issues needed to be addressed 
before the applicant could be afforded public interest standing.221 These were distilled 
by the court as follows. Firstly, there must be an inquiry into the subjective position of 
the party claiming to act in the public interest. Secondly, there must be proof that it is 
objectively in the public interest for the matter to be brought before the court. A person 
or organisation alleging public interest standing will be permitted to proceed if these 
two requirements are met.222 
In its inquiry into the subjective position of the first applicant, the Court held that it is 
of primary importance that a litigant relying on public interest standing does so in good 
faith.223 The Court noted that Lawyers for Human Rights was a non-profit organisation 
with a principal objective to “promote, uphold, foster, strengthen and enforce in South 
                                            
218 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 14. 
219 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 15. 
220 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 17, referring to Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 
1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 234. 
221 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
222 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
223 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
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Africa all human rights”, and that this indicated that it was acting genuinely in the public 
interest.224 
Thereafter, the Court had to consider whether it was objectively in the public interest 
that the matter be heard. It noted obiter that the consideration of abstract matters, 
where no individuals could be said to have had their rights infringed or threatened,225 
may be deemed objectively in the public interest in certain circumstances.226 On the 
facts, the Court held that, due to a lack of “resources, knowledge, power or will to 
institute appropriate proceedings”, there was a remote chance that the provisions in 
question would be challenged by those affected by the impugned provisions of the 
Immigration Act.227 Failure of the Court to declare the challenged provisions 
unconstitutional would affect hundreds of immigrants detained illegally and facing 
removal from South Africa. Accordingly, the Court found that it was objectively in the 
public interest that the matter be heard.228 
As it was ascertained that Lawyers for Human Rights was acting genuinely in the 
public interest, it was found to have public interest standing. The Court did not deem it 
necessary to determine whether or not the second applicant had standing.229 
Madala J penned a minority judgment, which is also significant for the purposes of 
this thesis because it proposes the addition of a further factor to be taken into account 
when considering whether or not to grant public interest standing.230 He suggested that 
the egregiousness of the conduct complained of must also be considered.231  
                                            
224 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 22. Madala J (at para 78) concurs with this in his minority judgment. 
225 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 67. 
226 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
227 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 22. 
228 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 22. 
229 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 23. 
230 The consideration of this factor is additional to the other factors in the list proposed by O’Regan J in 
Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. 
231 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 73. 
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2 4 4 3  Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
The case of Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation232 concerns 
convicted prisoners and the issue of presidential pardon under section 84(2)(j) of the 
Constitution, and whether the victims of offences committed with a political motive were 
entitled to a hearing. The applicant, Mr Albutt, applied for leave to appeal directly to 
the Constitutional Court and for direct access to the Constitutional Court.233 
 In the High Court, a coalition of non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”)234 
launched an urgent application for an interdict preventing the President from granting 
any pardons until the finalisation of the main application.235 The NGOs relied on section 
38(b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution to litigate on behalf of victims of offences 
committed with political motive. The NGOs challenged the exclusion of victims from 
participating in the special dispensation process on the grounds that it was inconsistent 
with inter alia section 33 of the Constitution.236 The High Court found that the NGOs 
had standing to act on behalf of victims who could not act in their own name, in the 
interest of victims and also in the public interest.237 
 The issue of standing then had to be revisited by the Constitutional Court.238 The 
applicant contended that the NGOs were entitled to seek declaratory relief only, as 
opposed to an order preventing the President from granting the pardons.239 In this 
regard, the Court acknowledged the broad approach to standing adopted by the 
Constitution, especially regarding the violation of rights in the Bill of Rights, and most 
apparent in section 38(d).240 
The NGOs contended that their primary aim was to assist victims of political 
violence, and that they had an interest in upholding the rule of law and ensuring 
                                            
232 2010 3 SA 293 (CC). 
233 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 1. 
234 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Khulumani Support Group, International Centre 
for Transitional Justice, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, South African History Archives Trust, 
Human Rights Media Centre and Freedom of Expression Institute. 
235 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 9. 
236 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 9. 
237 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 10. 
238 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) paras 32 – 35. 
239 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 32. 
240 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 33. 
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compliance with the Constitution.241 As the matter concerned the exclusion of victims 
from participation in the special dispensation, they had an interest in fulfilling its 
objectives.242 The NGOs were granted public interest standing on the basis that the 
process followed by the President had to comply with the Constitution and the rule of 
law. The Court also noted that the victims of that process had been unable to seek 
relief themselves.243 The NGOs were accordingly afforded standing to seek an order 
preventing the President from granting the pardons without affording the victims of the 
offences an opportunity to be heard.  
2 4 4 4 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others 
In Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Others (“Democratic Alliance”),244 the Democratic Alliance (the “DA”) brought an 
application for an order reviewing, correcting and setting aside the decision of the then 
Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions to discontinue its prosecution of 
President Jacob Zuma on corruption charges, as well as a declaration that the decision 
was inconsistent with the Constitution. The High Court found that the DA did not have 
standing to bring the application.245  
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated the fact that the 
Constitution adopts a broad approach to standing, in particular, when it comes to the 
violation of rights in the Bill of Rights.246 The federal constitution of the DA recognised 
the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and displayed a commitment to protect 
South Africans from abuse of power.247 This showed bona fides on the part of the DA 
to act in the public interest. 
                                            
241 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 34. 
242 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 34. 
243 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 34. 
244 2012 3 SA 486 (SCA).  
245 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 11. 
246 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 42, citing Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 
293 (CC) paras 33–34. 
247 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 43. 
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The court held further that all political parties participating in parliament are 
representing the public.248 In addition, both political parties and the public necessarily 
have an interest in ensuring that public power is exercised in accordance with 
constitutional and legal prescripts and that the rule of law is upheld.249 This clearly 
includes the actions of the National Prosecuting Authority.250 However, the court noted 
that few South African citizens or political parties have the resources or ability to bring 
an application of this kind.251 
After its inquiry into the subjective position of the applicant’s claim to be acting in the 
public interest, as well as proof that it is objectively in the public interest for the matter 
to be brought before the court, the court was convinced that the DA was acting 
genuinely in the public interest and that it was in the public interest that the matter be 
heard.252 
2 4 5   Conclusion 
Before the adoption of the interim and final Constitutions, the courts enforced strict 
locus standi rules and did not afford applicants standing if applicants lacked a personal, 
sufficient and direct interest in the relief sought. Section 38(d) now allows anyone to 
approach a court in the public interest to seek relief for an infringement or threatened 
infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights. 
 The cases discussed in this section show the way the courts have handled this new 
and broad ground on which standing can be granted. It is clear from all of the 
jurisprudence on the subject that a person or organisation wanting to rely on public 
interest standing must be acting genuinely in the public interest. O’Regan J proposed 
a number of factors in Ferreira to aid in this determination. A further factor was added 
by Madala J in his minority judgment in Lawyers for Human Rights, but the list has not 
been expanded since. As well as ensuring that the applicant is acting genuinely in the 
                                            
248 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 44. 
249 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 44. 
250 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 44. 
251 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 44. 
252 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 45. 
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public interest, the court must be satisfied that it is objectively in the public interest that 
the matter be heard. This test is still applied by the courts today. 
  Public interest standing has been developed solely by the courts, without the aid of 
legislation. Whether or not a lack of statutory regulation has been the root cause of 
some of the pitfalls present in this area of the law today is a matter for speculation. 
There are also a number of merits regarding the status of public interest standing. The 
following section will aim to provide an evaluation of public interest standing as it is 
currently applied under the constitutional dispensation. 
2 5 Assessment of the status of public interest standing in South Africa at 
present 
2 5 1   Merits of public interest standing in South Africa 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa envisages a society built on social 
justice, equality, human dignity and respect for fundamental human rights and 
freedoms.253 In reality, however, South Africa is still an unequal society with high levels 
of poverty254 and a highly skewed income distribution.255 Public interest actions, 
although not traditionally brought as a matter of urgency,256 are an important 
mechanism through which systemic violations of socio-economic rights affecting a 
large section of the public can be challenged.257 
The generous approach to standing adopted by the courts helps to facilitate 
constitutional litigation on behalf of those who were denied basic rights under the 
apartheid regime and who today may remain unaware of their rights. The Constitutional 
Court has held that this is particularly important in South Africa.258 Public interest 
                                            
253 S Ngcobo “Probono.org and the Delivery of Access to Justice to All” (2011), Johannesburg 
<www.probono.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/CJ-Speech-15Apr.doc>. See also Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8. 
254 Statistics South Africa Poverty Trends in South Africa Report No. 03-10-06 (2017) 14. According this 
report, the number of South Africans living in poverty in 2011 was 27,3 million (53,2% of the population), 
which increased in 2015 to 30,4 million (55,5% of the population). The latest published statistics show 
that 13,8 million South Africans live below the food poverty line (R441 per month). 
255 Y Vawda “Access to Justice: From Legal Representation to Promotion of Equality and Social Justice 
– Addressing the Legal Isolation of the Poor” (2005) 26 Obiter 234 238. 
256 2017 3 SA 152 (SCA) para 76. 
257 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 89. 
258 Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 1 SA 417 (CC) para 23; Albutt v 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 33. 
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actions, in particular, offer a mechanism by which the violations of the rights of large 
portions of the public can be challenged.259 The Constitutional Court has even held 
that it may be in the public interest to hear abstract matters under certain 
circumstances.260 These elements contribute to making public interest standing a 
means of increasing access to justice for the poor and vulnerable. 
The Constitutional Court has laid down a number of factors to determine the 
genuineness of an applicant relying on section 38(d) for standing.261 This has helped 
to exclude busybodies and applicants acting for political or profit motives. As public 
interest standing also facilitates the crafting of structural, forward-looking and 
community-orientated remedies,262 it is helpful that the courts thus far have created a 
general standard for the suitable public interest litigant. 
Due to the fact that so many South Africans are not in a position to approach the 
courts for legal redress, as well as the technicality of legal procedures and the need 
for the opportunity to attain justice, section 38 the Constitution has specifically enabled 
“anyone” asserting a right in the Bill of Rights to approach a court.263 Section 38(d) 
enables plaintiffs to approach courts for relief in the public interest on behalf of those 
who, due to their circumstances, are unable to do so themselves.264 This inability to 
approach a court could be due to such people’s ignorance of their rights or enforcement 
thereof, their fear of the judicial process, or the trauma or cost of litigation.265 Having 
one person or organisation able to approach a court on behalf of all of those whose 
rights are infringed offers a solution to those unable to do so. This was virtually 
inconceivable under the common law.266 
                                            
259 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 89. 
260 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
261 See parts 2 4 4 1 2 and 2 4 4 2 above in this regard. 
262 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Public Interest Legal Services in South Africa: Project 
Report (2015) 52 – 53. 
263 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 
1194[6] B–C; C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in 
Constitutional Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 
72. 
264 S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation in India: A Lesson for 
South Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 362. 
265 C Loots “Standing to Enforce Fundamental Rights” (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 
49 49 – 50. 
266 See part 2 2 above. 
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Courts have shown sensitivity towards those who lack resources or support to 
approach a court for vindication of their rights. Public interest standing has allowed 
matters to be brought by persons or organisations with the ability and financial means 
on behalf of these people. In Lawyers for Human Rights, the Constitutional Court noted 
that circumstances may dictate the hearing of proceedings brought in the public 
interest without a live case.267 In such cases, the factors laid down by O’Regan would 
be useful in determining whether such abstract matters should be allowed to 
proceed.268 
 It is also worth noting that, despite a lack of legislation enacted to regulate public 
interest standing, some of the recommendations proposed by the SALC have been 
implemented by the courts. The courts have been hesitant to provide a definition of a 
public interest action,269 but have instead, as already noted, developed an inquiry to 
ascertain whether a matter is brought genuinely in the public interest. This involves an 
examination of the subjective position of the party claiming to act in the public interest, 
and proof that it is objectively in the public interest for the matter to be brought before 
the court.270 In this way, the courts have also laid down certain requirements for public 
interest actions, as recommended by the SALC.271 This has meant that section 38(d) 
has been given content by the courts and that public interest standing has indeed been 
developed to some extent, despite the fears of the SALC.272 
2 5 2   Pitfalls of public interest standing in South Africa 
The broader approach to standing envisaged by section 38(d) of the Constitution has 
enabled a wider spectrum of litigants to enforce rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 
However, public interest standing does not require meaningful interaction between the 
                                            
267 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
268 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
269 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 24 at 4.3.4. 
270 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 18. 
271 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. There are requirements for public interest actions 
suggested by the SALC that have not been implemented. These are incorporated into part 4 2 1 below. 
272 See part 2 3 1 above. 
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representatives who bring the public interest action and those directly affected by the 
litigation.273 There is thus the risk that those whose rights are directly affected will not 
be given an opportunity to be heard or to participate in the relevant litigation. In addition 
to this, there is no indication that the public interest representative is authorised to 
speak on behalf of those they seek to represent, nor that they share the victims’ goals 
or ideas.274 Consequently, there is the risk that those parties approaching the courts 
for relief in the public interest are not the most suitable representatives to act in the 
public interest in the given matter.275 
The Constitutional Court has attributed the difficulty of providing a set test for public 
interest standing to the fact that the phrase “in the public interest” is difficult to define.276 
In every situation, the court will have to determine this by carefully considering the 
impact of the rights violation on those concerned.277 However, even these 
considerations by the courts do not ensure that the representative is the most suitable 
representative as opposed to simply being a genuine one.278 
There are inherent risks involved in granting public interest standing if litigants do 
not act genuinely in the public interest. These include, inter alia, inefficient use of 
limited judicial resources,279 the possibility that courts could be flooded with claims 
brought by people with no real interest in the matters,280 as well as the possibility that 
public interest actions could constitute an abuse of process, and a mechanism for the 
furtherance of profit, political or popularity-seeking motives.281 This, in turn, presents 
                                            
273 K Schiemann “Locus Standi” (1990) Public Law 342 349. 
274 W J Aceves “Actio Popularis – The Class Action in International Law” (2003) 2003 University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 353 398 – 399. 
275 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 24–26 at 4.4.1 and 4.4.6. 
276 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 68. 
277 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 68, citing Ackermann J in the matter of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2002 2 SA 1 (CC). 
278 This problem is dealt with in part 4 2 1 below. 
279 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 35. 
280 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26. This was a concern even before the adoption of the interim 
Constitution and was consequently a factor in favour of the limitation of public interest standing, as 
confirmed by the court in the case of Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372. 
281 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 35–38. 
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the risk that judges admit cases on the basis that they concern popular issues in society 
as opposed to issues of systemic and isolated rights violations.282 
In contrast with the approach of the Indian Supreme Court to public interest 
actions,283 South African courts have exhibited what Fowkes terms “cautious 
minimalism”.284 This is a practice of refusing to hear cases that are not well developed 
or resourced, and most likely lack sufficient information and perspectives.285 A concern 
with this approach is that it precludes the Constitutional Court from providing lower 
courts, litigators and citizens with clear guidelines for how to proceed under such 
circumstances.286 Needless to say, this approach may be seen to impede the 
development of public interest standing. In contrast to cautious minimalism, however, 
there is a danger that public interest actions can encourage courts to disregard the 
doctrine of separation of powers and fulfil roles of executive and legislative branches 
of government.287   
2 6   Conclusion 
Under the common law, actions in the public interest were virtually unknown. However, 
there were a few reported cases that could have been said to have been brought in 
the public interest, despite not specifically being presented as such. 
 The requirements relating to standing under the common law have been significantly 
broadened by section 38 of the Constitution. Public interest standing, specifically 
                                            
282 Deva (2009) CJQ 36. See, however, a counter-consideration in this regard in Kesavnanda Bharathi 
v Union of India 1973 4 SCC 225, where the court held that:  
“The court is not chosen by the people and is not responsible to them in the sense in which the 
House of the People is. However, it will win for itself a permanent place in the hearts of the people 
and augment its moral authority if it can shift the focus of judicial review from the numerical concept 
of minority protection to the humanitarian concept of the protection of the weaker section of the 
people.” 
283 See parts 3 3 3 and 3 3 4 below. 
284 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 
27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 446 – 447. 
285 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 
27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 446. 
286 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 
27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 446. 
287 M P Jain “The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights” in S K Verma and K Kusum (eds) Fifty Years 
of the Supreme Court of India (2003) 1 86. The author cautions courts against using public interest 
litigation in a way that encroaches on the powers of the executive and the legislature, especially given 
the fact that the administration lacks a sense of accountability and responsibility. 
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provided for in section 38(d), now creates the opportunity for any individual or group to 
bring a case before a court if moved by a desire to benefit any portion of the public 
concerning the infringement or threatened infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights. 
 However, with no legislation governing section 38(d), as suggested by the SALC, 
the Constitution alone has had to provide the framework for courts within which public 
interest litigation framework is developed.288 This lack of legislation has exposed 
shortcomings that need to be addressed. These shortcomings were predicted by the 
SALC and include the need to regulate public interest standing by providing a definition 
for public interest actions,289 clear requirements for public interest standing by way of 
legislation,290 stipulation that a number of courts that should have jurisdiction to hear 
matters brought in the public interest291 and provision for financial support in the case 
of under-resourced litigants.292 If addressed, these areas will help to create greater 
legal certainty regarding public interest standing and can offer ways of navigating the 
pitfalls of public interest standing. 
 In order to determine how best to address these concerns, the following chapter will 
seek to determine to what extent public interest standing in India has developed and 
helped to advance access to justice, especially for the poor, and whether these lessons 
can be applied in a South African context. The findings from India in this regard can 
potentially offer much guidance for the enhanced realisation of improved access to 
justice in South Africa through the development of public interest standing. 
                                            
288 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 69. 
289 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 24 at 4.3.4. 
290 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. 
291 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 30 at 4.8.2. 
292 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 ix para 24. 
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Chapter 3: The history and evolution of public interest standing in India  
3 1   Introduction 
The issue of the liberalisation of standing rules was raised in India forty years ago, and 
has since given rise to the public interest litigation (often referred to simply as “PIL”) 
movement. This development in Indian law has provided ways of protecting the 
weaker sections of society, conserving public resources, and controlling the exercise 
of public power.1 Public interest standing has, however, also created much 
controversy because of the extent to which it can be abused by busybodies and 
ultimately hamper the administration of justice. The development of this area of Indian 
law is pertinent when assessing the extent to which Indian courts have contributed to 
improved access to justice for all citizens, especially as this was the motivation behind 
the creation of public interest litigation. 
This chapter will first provide an overview of the Constitution of India, 1949 (“the 
Indian Constitution”), as well as the judicial structure. With this foundation, it will be 
possible to discuss public interest standing as approached by the courts over the three 
broad phases of public interest litigation. An analysis of the development of public 
interest standing in India will facilitate an evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of 
public interest standing as currently applied in India. 
3 2   The Constitution of India and judicial structure   
3 2 1   Introduction 
The development of public interest standing in India must be understood against the 
background of the Constitution of India, 1949 (“the Indian Constitution”)2 and the 
Indian Supreme Court. This section will highlight only the most important elements of 
these two pillars in Indian society for purposes of this thesis. 
                                            
1 M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 42. 
2 Constitution of India, 1949. 
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3 2 2   The Indian Constitution 
India gained independence from Britain on 15 August 1947.3 The Constituent 
Assembly adopted a transformative constitution on 26 November 1949, which came 
into effect on 26 January 1950 and remains in force today.4 The Constituent Assembly, 
led by Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, comprised people from a variety of backgrounds, 
all of whom had made significant contributions in their respective and diverse fields.5 
The result of work on this project that began in December 1946 was – and still is – the 
longest and most detailed constitution in the world.6 
Although the Indian Constitution does not strictly apply the doctrine of separation of 
powers,7 it incorporates many checks and balances drawn from the American system, 
as well as a list of justiciable rights based on the American Bill of Rights.8 It is primarily, 
according to Austin, a “social document”: a tool designed to enable social revolution.9 
The preamble to the Indian Constitution articulates a commitment to secure justice, 
liberty, equality and fraternity for all Indian citizens.10 It reads: 
                                            
3 S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation in India: A Lesson for South 
Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 358. 
4 Preamble of the Indian Constitution; Article 394; R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian 
Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 1 26. 
5 A Govindjee “Lessons for South African Social Assistance Law from India: Part I – The Ties That Bind: 
The Indian Constitution and Reasons for Comparing South Africa With India” (2005) 3 Obiter 575 580. 
6 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 26; A Govindjee “Lessons for South 
African Social Assistance Law from India: Part I – The Ties That Bind: The Indian Constitution and 
Reasons for Comparing South Africa With India” (2005) 3 Obiter 575 580. 
7 A Govindjee “Lessons for South African Social Assistance Law from India: Part I – The Ties That Bind: 
The Indian Constitution and Reasons for Comparing South Africa With India” (2005) 3 Obiter 575 580. 
8 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 60; R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights 
in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 1 26; S Muralidhar “India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement 
of Social Rights” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence (2008) 102. 
9 G Austin The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (1972) 27, 55, 75. Austin records that a 
social revolution in this context meant (citing K Santhanam of the Constituent Assembly) “to get (India) 
out of the medievalism based on birth, religion, custom and community and reconstruct her social 
structure on modern foundations of law, individual merit, and social education”. See also A Govindjee 
“Lessons for South African Social Assistance Law from India: Part I – The Ties that Bind: The Indian 
Constitution and Reasons for Comparing South Africa with India” (2005) 3 Obiter 575 581; S Deva 
“Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 21. 
10 Preamble to the Indian Constitution. 
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“We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, 
secular, democratic republic and to secure to all citizens justice − social, economic and 
political; equality of status and of opportunity and to promote among them all fraternity 
assuring dignity of the individual, and the unity and integrity of the nation.”11 
Of particular interest to this study is the social justice that the Indian Constitution 
sought to facilitate. This was a significant motive of the drafters of the document.12 
Part III of the Indian Constitution guarantees a number of fundamental rights and 
obliges the State to take measures to improve the living conditions of the 
underprivileged. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is described as “a right to 
constitutional remedies” and has been made a fundamental right.13 It specifically 
grants the right to approach the High Court or Supreme Court for a remedy if a 
“fundamental right” in article 12 to 31 is infringed.14 Together, the fundamental rights 
and Directive Principles of State Policy (“the Directive Principles”) in Part IV, aim to 
achieve social revolution in India.15 
The Directive Principles are instrumental in assisting the court in deciding cases 
before it.16 These are non-justiciable “principles of policy” to be followed by the State.17 
However, the Directive Principles are still vital for governance of the country.18 Former 
Justice Bhagwati viewed the Directive Principles as the most important part of the 
Constitution.19 Among these is article 39A, which focuses the State’s efforts on 
securing equal justice and free legal aid “to ensure that opportunities for justice are 
not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities”.  
                                            
11 Preamble to the Indian Constitution. 
12 A M Rajsekhariah “The Indian Constitution and Socio-economic Justice: The Ambedkar Perspective” 
in Singh and Gadkar Social Development and Justice in India (1995) 230.   
13 P K Ghosh “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India” (2013) 1 Galgotias Journal of 
Legal Studies 77 81. 
14 P P Craig and S L Deshpande “Rights, Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation in India” 
(1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 356 357. 
15 G Austin The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (1972) 27; P K Ghosh “Judicial Activism 
and Public Interest Litigation in India” (2013) 1 Galgotias Journal of Legal Studies 77 81. 
16 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 62. 
17 Article 37 of the Indian Constitution. See R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian 
Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 1 32. 
18 Article 39 of the Indian Constitution. 
19 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 568. 
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According to Muraldihar, it appeared that the Directive Principles would be made 
enforceable in the early drafting phases of the Constitution.20 This proposal was 
ultimately not adopted. However, article 37 of the Indian Constitution prescribes that, 
although the Directive Principles are not judicially enforceable, they form an integral 
part of the governance of India and must be applied in the law-making process.21 They 
have also been utilised to give content to various fundamental rights.22 
3 2 3   The Indian Courts 
The Indian Constitution also introduced three branches of government and included a 
parliamentary system with a president and a prime minister.23 They play an important 
role in holding the Government accountable to the Constitution and the rule of law.24 
The Supreme Court is the apex court and also the only federal court, and seats 
twenty-six justices appointed from the High Courts around the country.25 It has become 
tradition that the longest-serving justice serves as the Chief Justice.26 The Supreme 
Court of India has original jurisdiction over all cases concerning fundamental rights,27 
as well as extensive appellate jurisdiction.28 It also has advisory jurisdiction on any 
dispute between the central and state governments and between state governments.29 
                                            
20 S Muralidhar “India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence (2008) 103. 
21 Article 37 of the Indian Constitution. 
22 P K Ghosh “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India” (2013) 1 Galgotias Journal of 
Legal Studies 77 83. See part 3 3 4 2 4 below, which notes the role of the Directive Principles of State 
Policy in the development of public interest standing. 
23 Articles 52, 74(1), 75(1), 79; S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of 
Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 60. 
24 S Muralidhar “India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights” in 
Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence (2008) 102. 
25 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 60. The Supreme Court initially seated five 
justices, but now, by constitutional amendment in 1986, seats twenty-six. 
26 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 60 – 61. 
27 Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. 
28 Articles 131 – 134 of the Indian Constitution set out the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; S D Susman 
“Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1994) 
13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 61. 
29 S Shankar and P B Mehta “Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India” in V Gauri and D M Brinks 
(eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World (2008) 146 148. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
 
However, it has no control over its docket, which has contributed towards its high case 
load.30 This, in conjunction with the fact that the Supreme Court judges preside over 
cases in small panels and serve terms of one to six years, has slowly resulted in 
discrepancies in its decisions.31  
Like the Supreme Court, the High Courts also have original jurisdiction to enforce 
fundamental and other rights.32 However, the roll in High Courts comprises mostly 
appeals from district courts and summons and petitions in terms of article 226 of the 
Indian Constitution.33 A typical High Court judge handles between seventy and one 
hundred cases each day.34 Each state of India has a High Court at the top of its own 
hierarchy of courts.35 These courts, in turn, each seat a Chief Justice and a varying 
number of additional judges appointed by the president.36 High Court judges are fit to 
be appointed to serve on the bench of the Supreme Court after five years.37 
Fundamental rights are only enforceable against the State.38 Articles 32 and 226 of 
the Indian Constitution provide a remedy for the violations of rights and against 
unlawful legislative and executive act by giving the Supreme Court and High Courts 
power in the nature of judicial review.39 This essentially means that the validity of the 
                                            
30 S Shankar and P B Mehta “Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India” in V Gauri and D M Brinks 
(eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World (2008) 146 148. 
31 S Shankar and P B Mehta “Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India” in V Gauri and D M Brinks 
(eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World (2008) 146 149. 
32 Article 226 of the Indian Constitution; A Grover “India” (1996) 1 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental 
Law 86 86. 
33 Anonymous “High Courts in India” (2013) IndiaNetzone. Available at: <http://www.indianezone.\com 
/3/high_courts_india.htm>. 
34 S Shankar and P B Mehta “Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India” in V Gauri and D M Brinks 
(eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World (2008) 146 149. 
35 Articles 214, 216, 217(1) of the Indian Constitution; S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of 
India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 57 60. 
36 Articles 216 and 217 of the Indian Constitution. 
37 Article 124(3)(a) of the Indian Constitution.  
38 Article 12 of the Indian Constitution includes in its definition of “the State”:  
“… the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the 
States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the 
Government of India.” 
39 A Grover “India” (1996) 1 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 86 86. 
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decisions of government can be challenged in the High Courts, as well as the Supreme 
Court.40 
 As will be shown in the course of this chapter, the Supreme Court of India has 
displayed judicial activism in the way that it has converted constitutional litigation into 
public interest litigation. The basic mandate given by the Directive Principles regarding 
the governance of India gave rise to this creative interpretation exhibited by many 
justices of the Supreme Court.41 This activism was aimed primarily at realising social 
justice for all and indeed went a long way to affording the Supreme Court the status of 
a “people’s court”,42 but consequently the Court has also faced criticism for its 
unorthodox methods.43 
3 3   The evolution of public interest standing 
3 3 1   Introduction 
A relaxation of the rules of standing found in article 32 of the Indian Constitution 
function as one of the primary mechanisms enabling public interest litigation (or “PIL”) 
in India.44 This section will examine the Indian courts’ traditional approach to standing, 
as well as document the transformation of the rules pertaining to standing, which 
facilitated the development of public interest litigation in India, and how these changes 
were applied in case law. 
                                            
40 S Muralidhar “India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights” in 
Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence (2008) 102. 
41 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 568. 
42 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 302–303. 
43 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 567, 569. Bhagwati describes justices of the Supreme Court exercising judicial 
power “explosively” in order to aid the disadvantaged. 
44 Indian public interest litigation is in no way related to the American model of public interest litigation, 
which is why many authors refer to it rather as social action litigation. See P Singh “Protection of Human 
Rights Through Public Interest Litigation in India” (2000) 42 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 263 263; 
U Baxi “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” (1985) 4 
Third World Legal Studies 107 108. 
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3 3 2   Traditional approach to standing 
One of the ways in which the British rule left its mark on India could be seen in the 
model of adjudication.45 This Anglo-Saxon model required compliance with procedural 
technicalities such as locus standi, as well as adherence to an adversarial system of 
litigation.46 Under the common law system, the main function of the court was to give 
remedies to persons whose legal rights were affected.47 
A person could only bring an action for judicial redress if they personally 
experienced a threat or violation of their legal rights or interests by the State.48 Thus, 
only the holder of the right could sue for actual or threatened violation of the right.49 It 
was inconceivable that anyone would be able to approach the court for relief without 
being personally affected by the rights violation.50 Furthermore, the courts were 
accessible only to those who could afford to approach them.51 Marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups were consequently denied access to the courts and remained 
unable to enforce their basic human rights due to a lack of resources.52  
 Article 32 of the Indian Constitution specifically grants the right to approach the 
Supreme Court for a remedy if a fundamental right in article 12 to 31 is infringed.53 It 
reads as follows:  
“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part  
                                            
45 P Singh “Protection of Human Rights through Public Interest Litigation in India” (2000) 42 Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute 263 264. 
46 Forward Construction Co. v Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) 1986 1 SCC 100, 104. 
47 M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 44. Former Justice Krishna Iyer called this common law approach 
“the traditional individualism of locus standi” in Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand AIR 1980 SC 
1622 at 1623. 
48 Charanjit Lal v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41; P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest 
Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 561 570. 
49 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 570 – 571. 
50 M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 44. 
51 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 63. 
52 P Singh “Protection of Human Rights through Public Interest Litigation in India” (2000) 42 Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute 263 264. 
53 P P Craig and S L Deshpande “Rights, Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation in India” 
(1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 356 357. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
 
(a) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.  
(b) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of 
any rights conferred by this Part. 
(c) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) 
and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the 
local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme 
Court under clause (2). 
(d) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise 
provided for by this Constitution.”54 
In cases where the complaint is of a legal wrong, article 226 grants standing to the 
plaintiff to approach the High Court.55 In addition to articles 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution, section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a public-spirited 
citizen to approach a Magistrate’s Court for removal of a nuisance by filing a petition.56 
 At the time of its adoption, article 32 of the Indian Constitution was narrowly 
construed.57 As was the approach under the common law, only petitioners with a direct 
interest in the disputed law could petition the court to redress violations of the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.58 This strict approach to 
standing was not absolute and evolved to allow for various exceptions.59 However, 
even such decisions did not revolutionise the concept of standing in the way that public 
interest litigation has done, according to Chaturvedi.60 
                                            
54 Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.  
55 Article 226(1) allows anyone to approach the High Court “for the enforcement of any of the rights 
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose”. See J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public Interest 
Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?” (1989) 37 American Journal or Comparative Law 495 
498. 
56 Section 133 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, Act 2 of 1974; P K Ghosh “Judicial Activism and 
Public Interest Litigation in India” (2013) 1 Galgotias Journal of Legal Studies 77 79. 
57 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 34. 
58 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 34. 
59 R v Paddington Valuation Officer, ex parte Peachey Property Corpn. Ltd. [1966] 1 QB 380; Municipal 
Corporation v Govind Laxman Savant AIR 1949 Bom 229; KR Shenoy v Udipi Municipality AIR 1974 
SC 2177; Allahabad University Teachers’ Association v Chancellor, Allahabad University AIR 1982 All 
343; VR Sreerama Rao v Telugudesam AIR 1983 AP 96. 
60 M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 46 – 48. 
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3 3 3   The introduction of public interest litigation 
3 3 3 1  The 1975 – 1977 state of emergency 
Following her conviction for election fraud in the general elections and calls for her 
resignation, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency in India in 
June of 1975, allowing her and the Indian National Congress Party to rule by executive 
decree.61 In an attempt to remain in power during this time, four constitutional 
amendments were passed. These were attempts by the Prime Minister to restrict civil 
liberties and freedom of the press, and to manipulate the judiciary.62 The most notable 
of these attempts were contained in the Forty-second Amendment.63 The primary 
effects of this particular piece of legislation were the disqualification of election 
disputes from judicial review, the transferral of certain state government powers to 
central government, and the conferral of unfettered power to Parliament to amend the 
Constitution and pass any law in line with a Directive Principle.64  
 The state of emergency ended in March 1977, soon after which the Janata Party 
won the elections. The Janata Party quickly repealed the controversial constitutional 
amendments by passing the Forty-third and Forty-fourth Amendments.65 However, the 
emergency period and its accompanying constitutional amendments had undermined 
the Supreme Court’s legitimacy by limiting its powers. The Supreme Court responded 
to this problem by expanding its jurisdiction and making the judicial process more 
accessible and participatory.66 This expansion was achieved by consistently 
                                            
61 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 37. See Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 
1975 SC 2299, which followed Indira Gandhi’s corrupt practices in her election campaign.  
62 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 38. 
63 The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
64 M Mate “The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and 
Preventative Detention Cases” (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 216 234. 
65 M Mate “The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and 
Preventative Detention Cases” (2010) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 216 244, as referred to 
by R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 38. 
66 Z Holladay “Public Interest Litigation in India as a Paradigm for Developing Nations” (2012) 19 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 555 559; S Shankar and P B Mehta “Courts and Socioeconomic Rights 
in India” in V Gauri and D M Brinks (eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (2008) 146 149. By doing so, the Supreme Court could better 
prevent a repeat of the undermining of civil liberties that occurred during the emergency period. 
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confirming that the Directive Principles were justiciable under article 21 (the right to 
life).67 The Supreme Court applied and evolved the basic structure doctrine to interpret 
the status of Directive Principles and fundamental rights.68 The Court has justified the 
enumeration of many additional rights to those explicitly in the Constitution, by 
interpreting the right to life as entailing a right to livelihood.69 Article 21 has since been 
expanded further by a number of judgments, which contributed to the inclusion of its 
interpretation the right to equality under article 14 and freedom under article 19,70 the 
right to education,71 the right to food72 and the right to shelter,73 to name a few. 
3 3 3 2  The need for public interest litigation 
The economy of India was in depression during the 1960s as a result of political 
uncertainty and corruption.74 The emergency period of 1975–1977 was a time of “state 
repression and governmental lawlessness”.75 During this time, thousands of innocent 
people including political opponents were sent to jail and there was complete 
deprivation of civil and political rights.76 
Against this background, the Supreme Court noted aptly that the bulk of the Indian 
population was living in abject poverty, which sapped its faith in the existing social and 
                                            
67 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 39. The ambit of article 21 saw its first 
notable development in the decision in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 2 SCR 621. The words 
“personal liberty” were expanded by the Supreme Court to include the right to travel abroad. 
68 Minerva Mills Ltd. V Union of India 1981 1 SCR 206 208, 209. Here, the Supreme Court held that:  
“The significance of the perception that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of commitment 
to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution is to be traced to a 
deep understanding of the scheme of the Indian Constitution. … [The] harmony and balance 
between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of 
the Constitution.” 
69 Z Holladay “Public Interest Litigation in India as a Paradigm for Developing Nations” (2012) 19 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 555 567. 
70 Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 2 SCR 621. 
71 Unni Krishnan v State of A.P. 1993 1 SCR 594. 
72 PUCL v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001). 
73 Tellis v Bombay Mun. Corp. 1985 2 SCR Supp. 51. 
74 A Govindjee “Lessons for South African Social Assistance Law from India: Part I – The Ties that Bind: 
The Indian Constitution and Reasons for Comparing South Africa with India” (2005) 3 Obiter 575 589. 
75 P Singh “Enforcing Social Rights through Public Interest Litigation: An Overview of the Indian 
Experience” in S Deva (ed) Socio-Economic Rights in Emerging Free Markets: Comparative Insights 
from India and China (2015) 101 104. 
76 P Singh “Protection of Human Rights through Public Interest Litigation in India” (2000) 42 Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute 263 264. 
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economic system.77 With little hope of restructuring this system in order to make 
fundamental rights meaningful to these large sections of society, there was a 
desperate need for a “rescue plan”.78 The post-emergency period provided an 
occasion for the judges of the Supreme Court to challenge the obstacles to the 
provision of access to justice for the poor.79  
According to former Justice Bhagwati of the Supreme Court, the traditional 
approach to standing in fundamental rights matters in India posed the greatest barrier 
to access to justice for the poor.80 The Supreme Court has consequently noted that 
these common law locus standi rules are socially and culturally inappropriate to 
India.81 The Court’s early cases may have imposed strict standing requirements. 
However, article 32 does not require this restrictive approach, as it sets forth the right 
of individual citizens to petition the Supreme Court via “appropriate proceedings” to 
enforce fundamental rights.82 The rescue plan had materialised in the form of public 
interest litigation, which sought to facilitate access to justice for the “lowly and the lost” 
by relaxing the rules of locus standi.83 
3 3 3 3  The role of the judiciary in the introduction of public interest litigation 
Aware of what a deviation from the strict approach to standing could help to achieve 
in India, the Supreme Court began utilising a range of techniques of judicial activism84 
to convert much of constitutional litigation into public interest litigation, with the 
                                            
77 1982 AIR 1473 3. 
78 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India 1982 AIR 1473 3. 
79 P Singh “Protection of Human Rights through Public Interest Litigation in India” (2000) 42 Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute 263 264; U Baxi “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the 
Supreme Court of India” (1985) 4 Third World Legal Studies 107 108. 
80 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 570. 
81 Forward Construction Co. v Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) 1986 1 SCC 100, 104. 
82 R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of 
Legitimacy” (2014) 39 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1 43. 
83 Forward Construction Co. v Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) 1986 1 SCC 100, 104; A M Sood “Gender Justice 
Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 833 839. Public interest litigation is enabled primarily by a departure from the 
traditional rules of standing. 
84 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 563 – 566. Bhagwati discusses “technical activism”, “juristic activism” and “social 
activism” as three main forms that judicial activism can take. 
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intention of making social justice a reality for all.85 In order to do so, the Court relied 
on epistolary jurisdiction which allowed it to treat letters as writ petitions and thereby 
do away with many of the procedural hurdles traditionally involved in litigation.86 
Public interest litigation can therefore be said to be led – and even encouraged – 
by judges in India.87 Correctly approached, public interest litigation offers the state an 
opportunity to right a wrong or redress injustice.88 The challenge to make these 
changes was levelled at the judiciary by Justice Bhagwati, who believed that judges 
have the potential to play an active role in law-making.89 
The Indian Constitution does not make open reference to the doctrine of separation 
of powers, although it still creates checks and balances for the different branches of 
government.90 Consequently, there is the danger that courts disregard their 
constitutional role and compromise their autonomy from the other branches of 
government in seeking to vindicate the rights of those who lack access to justice. 
However, there are those who believe that judicial activism is a necessary reaction to 
state lawlessness.91 
                                            
85 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 567; S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 19 23. Deva notes that the groundwork for public interest litigation in India was set by 
Bhagwati and Iyer JJ in the 1970s and 1980s. This included modifying the traditional requirements of 
locus standi, liberalising the procedure to file writ petitions, creating or expanding fundamental rights, 
overcoming evidentiary problems, and evolving innovative remedies. 
86 M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 49. 
87 U Baxi “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” (1985) 4 
Third World Legal Studies 107 111. Here, Baxi observes that “on and off the bench” many Justices 
promoted judicial activism to achieve social justice. 
88 L Seth “Social Action Litigation in India” in S Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a 
Gender Perspective (1995) 97 100; People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India 1982 AIR 
1473 3. 
89 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 563. 
90 Singh N and Vijay A “Separation of Powers: Constitutional Plan and Practice” (2013) 3 International 
Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 1 1. 
91 P Singh “Public Interest Litigation” (2005) 41 Annual Survey of Indian Law 537 539. 
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3 3 3 4  Relaxed standing as a mechanism to launch public interest litigation 
One of the main factors impeding the effective use of the law and the judicial system 
by the disadvantaged was access to justice.92 The Supreme Court discovered that a 
greater number of people could be afforded access to justice if the traditional rules of 
standing were relaxed.93  
The famous case of SP Gupta v Union of India (known as the Judges Transfer case) 
is a prominent example of the Supreme Court’s observation that the rules of standing 
needed to be liberalised to accommodate public interest standing.94 In support of this 
departure from the traditional approach to standing, the Court referred to Cappelletti’s 
work concerning diffuse rights.95 Diffuse or “meta-individual” rights and interests are 
thus named because of their collective and fragmented nature, and are interests held 
by the public as opposed to any one individual.96 The infringement of such interests 
traditionally could not be remedied because no one person could prove a sufficient 
interest in the remedy or, more simply, no one had the right to seek a remedy.97 
Cappelletti and Garth believed that greater access to justice could be achieved if the 
rules of standing were relaxed to allow for the vindication of diffuse rights in court.98  
Article 32 contains the right to constitutional remedies. This is a fundamental right 
to approach the Supreme Court for a writ order99 where someone’s fundamental rights 
                                            
92 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 570. 
93 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 570. 
94 SP Gupta v President of India 1982 2 SCR 365 para 20; M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement 
of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 43. See part 3 
3 4 2 2 below for a case discussion. 
95 SP Gupta v President of India 1982 2 SCR 365 para 20; Cappelletti M “Vindicating the Public Interest 
Through the Courts: A Comparativist’s Contribution” in M Cappelletti and B Garth (eds) Access to 
Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective: A General Report Vol III (1979) 520 – 522. 
96 M Cappelletti and B Garth “Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make 
Rights Effective” (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181 194, 239. 
97 M Cappelletti and B Garth “Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make 
Rights Effective” (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181 194, 209. 
98 M Cappelletti and B Garth “Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make 
Rights Effective” (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 181 216. 
99 Article 32(2) of the Indian Constitution lists examples, which include “writs in the nature of habeas 
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari”. See part 3 3 2 above for the full content 
of Article 32. See also: A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from 
India” (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833 843 – 844. Sood notes that this list is not 
a numerus clausus. 
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have been infringed.100 It is, essentially, a fundamental right that can be used to protect 
other fundamental rights.101 The Supreme Court has held that interpretation of article 
32 must be in line with the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, the fundamental rights 
and the Directive Principles of State Policy.102 Creative interpretation of article 32 by 
the judiciary has allowed many other rights (other than the fundamental rights 
contained in articles 12 to 31 of the Indian Constitution) to be enforced.103 
Bearing in mind that public interest litigation was devised to address rights violations 
of those who could not afford to approach the courts themselves, the importance of 
locus standi becomes clear. The relaxed rules of standing are considered a sine qua 
non of public interest litigation.104 
3 3 4   Development of public interest standing by the courts 
3 3 4 1  Overview 
Since its inception, public interest litigation in India has evolved over three broad 
phases.105 This section will discuss the development of public interest standing within 
public interest litigation by the courts according to this timeline. Deva notes that these 
phases are distinguishable based on who initiated the proceedings, what the focus of 
the matters were, the parties against whom relief was sought, and the judiciary’s 
responses.106  
3 3 4 2  The first phase 
As early as 1976, the Indian Supreme Court declared that, where there is an 
infringement of a “community interest”, locus standi rules should not prevent an 
                                            
100 Article 32(1) of the Indian Constitution. 
101 N B Rakshit “Right to Constitutional Remedy: Significance of Article 32” (1999) 34 Economic and 
Political Weekly 2379 2380. 
102 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67 70. 
103 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 567; S Meer “Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights and Social Action Litigation 
in India: A Lesson for South Africa” (1993) 9 South African Journal on Human Rights 358 366 – 369. 
These include the right to a speedy trial, the right to human dignity, the right to be free from exploitation, 
the right to livelihood, the right to be protected from industrial hazards and environmental pollution, and 
the right to legal aid. 
104 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19, 24. 
105 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 27 
– 29. 
106 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 27. 
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interested party from claiming relief.107 The first phase of public interest litigation, which 
began early in the same decade and continued into the 1980s, mostly concerned 
cases relating to disadvantaged sections of society.108 Relief sought in these cases 
arose predominantly from actions or omissions of government, which resulted in 
violations of fundamental rights, and public interest litigation suits were generally filed 
by public-spirited persons.109 
3 3 4 2 1 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v Union of India 
(a) Majority judgment 
In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v Union of India (“Fertilizer Corporation 
Kamgar Union”),110 workers along with a union of workers of the Sindri Fertilizer 
Factory approached the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Indian Constitution. 
The petitioners sought a writ voiding a government company’s suspicious sale of the 
steel plant where the workers were employed. This, they claimed, caused the public 
exchequer a huge loss that, in turn, affected the citizenry of the country.111  
The petitioners alleged that the sale was arbitrary and unfair because of the tender 
process followed, and that the sale therefore violated article 14 of the Indian 
Constitution. They also claimed that the sale would violate their right to carry on their 
occupation as industrial workers under article 19 of the Indian Constitution. 
Consequently, the petitioners approached the Court to prevent the sale by the 
respondents and to declare that the decision to sell the plant was unconstitutional.112 
 The Court held that the right to approach a court for a constitutional remedy under 
article 32 remained vested in those whose rights had been directly affected. On the 
facts and with this strict approach to locus standi, the Court did not find that any rights 
of the petitioners had been, or would be, violated by the sale of the steel plant. Their 
right to carry on any occupation, trade or business would not be affected because, 
firstly, they would not be left jobless even if they had to be deployed to other plants 
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and that, secondly, article 19 in any event did not include the right to hold a particular 
job or occupy a specific post.113 
 The arbitrariness and unfairness of the sale was attributed by the petitioners to a 
significant difference between the bidding price for the plant and the amount finally 
agreed upon for the sale. The petitioners argued that the bid had been restricted to a 
select group of persons, and that re-advertising the sale after the material variation in 
the terms of the sale would have resulted in a higher sale price. However, the Court 
was convinced by evidence led by the respondents that this would not be the case. 
The respondents proved that the plant had become outdated, unsafe and 
uneconomical to run, and that the reduction of the tender price was a necessary and 
fair consequence of the reduction of goods included in the sale.114 
None of the petitioners’ rights were found to have been violated. The petition was 
therefore dismissed. Nevertheless, the Court noted that, had the sale of the plant been 
found to be unjust, unfair or mala fide, the workers may well have been entitled to 
relief.115 
(b) Minority judgment of Iyer J 
Justice Iyer offered a separate concurring judgment with Justice Bhagwati in the case 
of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, in which he dealt primarily with the issue of 
standing. He was not personally convinced that the arguments of the respondents 
disproved allegations of the sale of an obsolescent steel plant for junk price, which 
had parts that could still have been salvaged. Iyer J also observed that the employment 
arrangement offered to the workers in the wake of the sale would probably only be 
temporary, or at least not sufficient to ensure the steady public sector employment 
owed by a government company under article 14 of the Indian Constitution.116 In light 
of a different understanding to the majority of the Court about what interpretation of 
the facts would give rise to the most equitable outcome, Iyer J proceeded to deliver 
his shared minority judgment. Due to the need to develop the rules of standing and 
explore who might be able to challenge State maladministration and when, Iyer J took 
the stance of assuming that the State company had acted mala fide. He noted as a 
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point of departure that there is a distinction between the fundamental right under article 
32 to enforce fundamental rights and the interest sufficient to claim relief under article 
226. Unlike article 32, there is nothing in the provision of article 226 to define “person 
aggrieved”, “standing” or “interest” that gives access to the Court to seek redress.  
Iyer J was of the view that in a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy, broad 
approach to standing is necessary, even if it poses some risks. Furthermore, a fear 
that all and sundry will waste time and money pursuing frivolous cases would prevent 
the creation of opportunities for public-minded citizens to be able to rely on the legal 
process. In his judgment, he pointed out that if a citizen is a member of an organisation 
with a particular interest in the issue at hand, such person cannot be denied 
standing.117 According to the learned judge: 
“In simple terms, locus standi must be liberalised to meet the challenges of the time. Ubi 
jus ibi remedium must be enlarged to embrace all interests of public-minded citizens or 
organisations with serious concern for conservation of public resources and the direction 
and correction of public power so as to promote justice in its triune facets.”118 
In summary, this minority decision sets out four reasons for the liberalisation of the 
rules of locus standi. Firstly, relaxed standing is necessary to protect individuals’ rights 
from an abuse of state power. Secondly, social justice requires judicial review of 
administrative action. Thirdly, it would encourage a healthy system of administrative 
action. Finally, it enables citizens to play a part in securing justice whenever the State 
acts beyond its powers.119 
3 3 4 2 2 SP Gupta v Union of India 
Another of the earliest judgments that contributed to the transformation of standing in 
Indian law was the Judges Transfer case,120 in which the Supreme Court of India noted 
the importance of “the initiative and zeal” of public-minded persons and organizations 
in the enforcement of public duties and the protection of social, collective, diffused 
rights.121 The Supreme Court recognised that in order for this to be made possible, 
these persons and organisations needed to be allowed to approach the Court even if 
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their own rights were not directly affected. It has also made it clear that access to the 
legal system should not be limited to “men with long purses”.122 
 The petitioners in this case approached the Supreme Court to challenge a letter 
addressed by the Law Minister of the Government of India to the Governor of Punjab 
and the Chief Ministers of the other States, and thereafter circulated to the Chief 
Justices of the High Courts.123 The letter effectively called for the transfer of High Court 
judges to ensure that at least one third of judges serving at a particular High Court 
should be from outside that state. It also set down the procedure for handling the 
transfers. According to the petitioners, the letter was intended as an attack on the 
independence of the judiciary.124 
The Court noted that diffuse interests could not be properly protected without 
allowing people to approach the Court in the public interest.125 The Court expanded 
on Cappelletti and Garth’s work126 by giving three reasons for the liberalisation of 
standing rules.127 Firstly, a relaxed approach to locus standi is necessary to secure 
fundamental rights of the poor people of the country. Secondly, it is important in a 
modern welfare state for any member of the public to be able to seek legal redress for 
an act or omission by the State in respect of a public duty it owes. Finally, relaxed 
rules of standing are necessary to curb state power and prevent violations of law.128  
These, according to the Supreme Court, were adequate reasons to alter the status 
quo regarding the rules of standing.129 The decision to do so was also fuelled by the 
need to uphold the rule of law, which the Court recognised would be undermined 
should no one be accorded standing to challenge cases of public wrong or public 
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injury.130 Thus, any member of the public acting bona fide and having a “sufficient 
interest”131 in the matter has a right to access the Court to redress a legal wrong. This 
right of access carries even more weight when the plaintiff may be suffering from a 
disability or when the violation of collective diffuse rights is at stake.132  
On the matter of locus standi, it was necessary to take into account that the 
petitioners were practising advocates. The Court was thus convinced that the 
petitioners would certainly be interested in challenging the constitutionality of any 
action by the State or public authority which undermined the independence of the 
judiciary.133 In connection with this, the Court referred to lawyers as “priests of the 
temple of justice” as an illustration of their essential and integral part of the judicial 
system.134 
The Court therefore concluded that lawyers have a special interest in preserving 
the integrity and independence of the judicial system.135 The petitioners, being 
lawyers, had sufficient interest to challenge the constitutionality of the circular letter 
and they were therefore entitled to file the writ petition as public interest litigation. They 
clearly had a concern deeper than that of a busybody. 
3 3 4 2 3 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha is a non-governmental organisation aimed at ending bonded 
labour in India. After conducting surveys regarding working conditions on stone 
quarries near Delhi, the petitioner organisation addressed a letter to Chief Justice 
Bhagwati relaying the allegedly inhumane conditions under which a large number of 
bonded labourers there worked. The petitioner argued that this violated article 23 of 
the Indian Constitution, which prohibits forced labour. Consequently, it sought the 
proper implementation of existing social welfare legislation by the government on 
behalf of these workers.136 
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 The government’s counter-argument was that bonded labour did not violate any 
fundamental rights.137 The government also questioned the locus standi of the 
petitioner. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed these arguments and relied on 
the Judges Transfer decision to entrench a relaxed approach to standing. The Court 
held that if fundamental rights of a person or group of persons have been violated and 
these victims are unable to approach the Court as a result of their socio-economically 
disadvantaged position, any bona fide member of the public can approach the Court 
under article 32 or 226 of the Indian Constitution seeking vindication of those rights.138 
This is so that fundamental rights are made a reality for all.139 The right to life (under 
article 21 of the Indian Constitution) protected the right to live with dignity. A reading 
of a number of directive principles supported the fact that the right to live with dignity 
included the right to live free from exploitation.140 
 According to the Court, the purpose of the proceeding was to enforce a fundamental 
right. As article 32 does not limit the kind of proceeding by which such an action can 
be brought, only stipulating that proceedings be “appropriate”, the Court held, 
significantly, that writing a letter to the Court would be a sufficient proceeding to seek 
relief in this case.141 Bandhua Mukti Morcha was afforded standing to act in the public 
interest and was granted the relief it sought.  
3 3 4 2 4 Trends identified from the first phase 
It is clear from the early cases dealing with public interest standing that certain judges 
on the bench of the Supreme Court were active in declaring that the rules governing 
locus standi developed by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence were unsuited to the social and 
cultural setting of India.142 The Supreme Court began recognising public interest as a 
means of achieving the ends of justice.143 The traditional rules pertaining to locus 
standi in India were relaxed by interpreting articles 32 and 226 in line with other 
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fundamental rights and the Directives Principles. This enabled the Court to entertain 
letters as writ petitions.144  
 The Supreme Court prioritised the protection of the vulnerable by enabling public 
interest petitioners to represent those who were unable to represent themselves, 
ignorant of their rights or scared of the judicial process. Relaxed standing thus became 
a crucial part of the mechanism of public interest litigation, enabling courts to tackle 
issues such as social justice, labour conditions and the environment.145 The petitioners 
in the cases discussed above all acted bona fide in the public interest and displayed 
a sufficient interest in the matter before the court. 
 Despite its commitment to broadening access to justice, the Supreme Court 
maintained deference for administrative processes, as seen in Bihar Legal Support 
Society v Chief Justice of India.146 However, it did not forfeit opportunities to advocate 
for an interpretation of locus standi rules that favoured those who could not afford to 
approach the courts for judicial redress of the violation or threatened violation of their 
fundamental rights by the State. 
3 3 4 3  The second phase 
The second phase of public interest litigation in India, which occurred during the 
1990s, saw an expansion in the range of issues raised.147 Issues for which public 
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interest litigation were filed now included pollution of rivers,148 the right to education,149 
sexual harassment in the workplace,150 relocation of industries151 and the right to 
health,152 to name a few.153 Relief was claimed not only from government but also 
against private individuals in relation to policy matters.  
The response of the judiciary in this phase was bold.154 The courts broke new 
ground during this time and expanded greatly upon the initial objective of public 
interest litigation. However, during the course of the development of case law in this 
phase, standing rules had relaxed to the extent that the mechanism of public interest 
litigation became open to abuse.155 
3 3 4 3 1 MC Mehta v Union of India and Others 
The case of MC Mehta v Union of India and Others156 concerned a petition brought by 
an individual interested in protecting the lives of the people of the city of Kanpur who 
used water from the Ganga River.157 This related to pollution of the river by tanneries. 
Despite statutory duties imposed on government for the prevention and control of 
water pollution, evidence showed that the discharge of sewage water into the river, as 
well as an absence of systematic cleaning plans, had resulted in sickness, infectious 
diseases and death of people using the river water.158 
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Under common law, the tanneries’ actions could have been challenged by a riparian 
owner. However, the petitioner in this case was not such an owner and could therefore 
not be said to be directly affected. He was seeking relief on behalf of those people 
who used the water.159 The Court held that the pollution was a public nuisance, which 
is widespread, and any person purporting to act in the public interest should 
accordingly be afforded standing.160 The petitioner was thus allowed to seek 
enforcement of statutory provisions imposing duties on the municipal authorities to 
prevent the water pollution.161 In its judgment, the Supreme Court dealt with a range 
of possible interventions to both solve the problem of water pollution in the Ganga 
River and prevent the problem from re-occurring. 
3 3 4 3 2 Vishaka v State of Rajasthan 
In Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (“Vishaka”),162 Vishaka and other women groups 
approached the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Indian Constitution for 
enforcement of the fundamental rights of all working women. The rights in question 
were the right to equality (article 14), the right to freedom (article 19), which includes 
the right to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business, 
and the right to life (article 21). The petitioners also sought suitable methods for 
realisation of the concept of “gender justice”, prevention of sexual harassment of 
women in all work places through judicial process, as well as legislation to this effect. 
The Court relied on article 32 of the Indian Constitution to grant standing to the 
petitioners seeking to vindicate the fundamental rights of working women.163 In its 
judgment, the Court laid down elaborate guidelines to ensure the prevention of sexual 
harassment of women. These guidelines had been developed during the course of the 
hearings which took place.  
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Even though these guidelines were pronounced only to be of force and effect until 
legislation was enacted to replace them, the Supreme Court had effectively used its 
jurisdiction under article 32 to fulfil the function of lawmaker.164 Over and above this, 
Deva notes that the Vishaka decision is an example of symbolic justice, and that the 
judgment handed down by the Court did little to curb sexual harassment of women in 
the workplace in reality.165 
3 3 4 3 3 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India 
Another case worth noting is Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India 
(“Vellore”).166 This concerned a public interest petition under article 32 of the Indian 
Constitution filed by the Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum against the state for pollution 
being caused by over 900 tanneries in the state of Tamil Nadu.167   
The Supreme Court relied on article 21 (the right to life) in conjunction with articles 
47, 48A and 51A(g) of the Indian Constitution (which address duties of the State 
concerning public health, protection and improvement of the environment and natural 
environment respectively), to set out its constitutional mandate to protect and improve 
the environment. In view of a number of statutes enacted in line with the constitutional 
mandate to protect and improve the environment, as well as evidence to show the 
threats of widespread pollution and disease in the event that the tanneries continued 
operations as normal, the Supreme Court found it necessary to direct the government 
to take action under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. It also issued “pollution 
fines” to all of the tanneries in the five provinces of Tamil Nadu. These were to be 
deposited in an “Environment Protection Fund”, which would be used to compensate 
aggrieved persons identified by the authorities and to restore the environment. The 
Court also suspended closure orders of certain tanneries and set out conditions for 
their re-opening.168 
3 3 4 3 4 Trends identified from the second phase 
The second broad phase of public interest litigation differs significantly from the first. 
The cases discussed above, as well as Deva’s observations regarding public interest 
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actions launched during this time,169 reveal changes in attitude to public interest 
litigation by petitioners, and in approach by the courts.  
 During the second phase of public interest litigation, there was an increase in the 
number of lawyers and organisations relying on public interest standing in the 
courts.170 The relief these litigants sought on behalf of the public tended away 
vindication of the fundamental rights of the poor and socio-economically vulnerable, 
and gradually became more middle-class focused. The broader range of issues 
brought to the courts for relief in the public interest required more creative remedies 
from the courts.171 No longer was public interest standing a mechanism for holding the 
state accountable for its actions and omissions in relation to its duties owed to the 
public. Relief was sought against private individuals for policy matters.172 
Courts responded to these claims by extending the protection of fundamental rights. 
Former Chief Justice Bhagwati firmly believes that judges play an important part in 
making law and do not merely interpret the law.173 This appears to be justified by the 
Supreme Court by the broad interpretation given to fundamental rights. However, the 
judiciary also traversed from purely interpreting the law to the law-making arena,174 a 
role fulfilled in the cases of Vishaka and Vellore, for example. Courts increased their 
oversight and follow-up of their orders. Despite the generous approach to standing 
and interpretation of constitutional norms, Shankar and Mehta observe that courts 
often gave weak remedies, like setting up committees and negotiation channels.175 
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The cases discussed above display the Supreme Court’s commitment to serving 
the public interest in a wide range of issues.176 However, the relaxation in the 
interpretation of articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution opened the gates for 
frivolous and mala fide petitioners to claim relief under the guise of public interest 
litigation. 
3 3 4 4  The third phase 
There are a handful of decisions handed down recently that pertain specifically to 
public interest litigation and locus standi. The judgments discussed below demonstrate 
the courts’ approach to these inseparable issues. They also provide insight to the 
public interest-related problems experienced by the Indian courts in recent years. 
3 3 4 4 1 Vivek Srivastava v Union of India 
The petitioner in Vivek Srivastava v Union of India (“Vivek Srivastava”)177 was a 
resident of the city of Allahabad wishing to contest the proposed development of 22,77 
acres of open ground that had allegedly acted as “lungs” for the city for one hundred 
years.178 The cause of action arose from the military authorities’ plan to construct a 
residential duplex complex. The petitioner claimed to have no ulterior motive in 
bringing this petition in the public interest, and wished only to prevent damage to the 
ecology and environment of the city that he alleged would be the result of the 
construction.179  
The first, third and fourth respondents (“the respondents”) argued that the petitioner 
lacked locus standi to bring the matter and was disguising it as public interest litigation. 
This, they contended, was because he had neither shown himself to be a 
representative of the public interest nor had he proved to have an interest in the land. 
A further counter-argument was that no public interest was involved and no 
fundamental rights were threatened or raised. The respondents also contended that 
the land was categorised as “Defence Land”, that the proposed development formed 
part of the Marriage Accommodation Project which was an exclusive army matter, and 
that the construction would not disturb the environment. A number of other counter 
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affidavits were filed by second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents in 
support of the construction and claims.180 
The court therefore had to consider whether the petitioner had locus standi to raise 
issues of ecology and environmental protection on behalf of the citizens of the city 
under article 226 of the Indian Constitution.181 The court acknowledged that 
entertaining writ petitions was a crucial way of providing access to justice to many 
people who are denied basic human rights.182 However, only a person acting in good 
faith with a sufficient interest in the proceedings, and who is not a busybody or 
meddlesome interloper, will be afforded locus standi to approach a court for the 
vindication of fundamental rights.183 The “public interest”, according to the court, will 
be matters in which the community at large has either a pecuniary interest or an 
interest by which their legal rights or abilities are affected.184 
 The Allahabad High Court found that the right to life under article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution included the right of every citizen “to breathe clean and pure air”.185 Over 
and above this, article 48A of the Indian Constitution instructs the State to strive to 
protect and improve the environment, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy.186 
Article 51A of the Indian Constitution contains a duty for citizens to endeavour to 
protect the natural environment.187 According to the court, these considerations made 
the matter one of public importance.188 The matter was found to be brought to enforce 
the fundamental right of people unable to approach a court, and was not in pursuance 
of a grudge or other private motive.189 The court reaffirmed the fact that anything 
endangering quality of life in derogation of laws should enable any person to entreat 
the court to prevent the damage that could be caused. The Supreme Court has 
confirmed the need for every locality to be provided with green spaces for recreation 
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and fresh air.190 In this case, the court found that the lungs of the city needed to be 
protected and thus afforded the petitioner standing.191 Ultimately, the respondents 
were given three months in which to restore the land to its original condition.192 
3 3 4 4 2 Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch v State of Uttar Pradesh  
In Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch vs State of Uttar Pradesh (“Mahanagar 
Ghaziabad Chetna Munch”),193 the petitioners launched writ proceedings to cease and 
prevent further construction of the proposed “Haj House”, which was a meeting place 
for Haj pilgrims.194 The government agreed to lease the land to Haj Samiti (the Haj 
Committee of Uttar Pradesh) for thirty years, but construction of Haj House would be 
paid for by the state of Uttar Pradesh. The reasons given for the relief sought were 
that the construction was a misuse of the national treasury, that it would interfere with 
the construction of a national highway, a major gas pipeline and air force activities, as 
well as that Haj House would “destroy communal harmony”.195  
 One of the central counter-arguments of the respondents was that the writ should 
be dismissed because the petitioners lacked locus standi to bring the matter before 
the court. Before making a finding, the court embarked on a thorough review of locus 
standi in public interest actions. The court began this discussion by acknowledging the 
need for checks and balances concerning the filing of writ petitions in the public 
interest. In this regard, there are two requirements developed by the courts and still 
applicable today, which are that the petitioner must be acting bona fide and must also 
have a sufficient interest in the proceedings.196  
The court elaborates by stating that: “[a] writ petitioner who comes to the court for 
relief in the public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ 
petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective”.197 By setting 
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the standard this high for public interest petitioners, the court intends to exclude those 
wishing to meddle with judicial process, gain publicity, seek personal gain or private 
profit, and those acting with a political motive.198 The courts must thoroughly examine 
every case brought in the public interest in order to uphold public interest standing as 
a means for securing social justice.199 
 Although this judgment does not display a novel approach to public interest 
litigation, many courts still entertain frivolous and mala fide petitions, which waste the 
judiciary’s resources.200 This may, in part, be due to the fact that public interest 
standing is no longer only granted to petitioners who can show a genuine grievance 
to a fundamental right caused by state conduct, but to petitioners who prove a 
sufficient interest in the matter.201  
 Irrespective of the cause of courts being flooded with matters merely disguised as 
public interest cases, the court states that this situation needs to be stopped.202 The 
modern approach to public interest litigation may be “towards freer movement both in 
nature of litigation and approach of the courts”,203 but this must enable public-spirited 
citizens to bring genuine cases to court rather than granting standing to litigants 
“whose bonafides [sic] and credentials are in doubt”.204 Courts must focus on the 
issues of locus standi and “cleanness” of the petitioners before deciding any matter 
brought in the public interest.205 
 In its finding, the court held that the land on which Haj House was to be built had 
been obtained lawfully. Additionally, the court found that the purpose of the 
construction of Haj House was to protect the interests of pilgrims as members of the 
secular state by providing them with a meeting place, and that it accordingly did not 
constitute the promotion of a particular religion by the state for purposes of article 27 
of the Indian Constitution, nor could it be considered an abuse of the public exchequer. 
The state of Uttar Pradesh was therefore not getting “mixed up with religion” and found 
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to be protecting its citizens.206 The court also found that the contention that communal 
harmony would be ruined was unfounded. It is important that majority religions and 
faiths exercise greater patience towards followers of minority religions, as the Indian 
mantra “unity in diversity” provides.207  
In addition to these findings, it came to light that the first petitioner was not a 
registered organisation despite alleging the contrary. A certain Mahesh Kumar Ahuja 
was found to be an office bearer of this “registered organisation” and had filed a similar 
petition on the same cause of action as the present one, which was rejected by the 
civil court. The petitioners withheld this information from the High Court in the present 
case.208  
The petitioners were unable to prove that they were acting bona fide and that they 
had a sufficient interest in the proceedings.209 The petition was therefore dismissed. 
3 3 4 4 3 Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v State of Maharashtra 
In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v State of Maharashtra,210 the State of Maharashtra 
issued a caste certificate stating that the appellant belonged to a scheduled tribe. 
Thereafter, the appellant was able to fill a position as senior clerk in a municipal 
corporation, reserved for persons of scheduled tribes. The fifth respondent then filed 
a complaint nine years later, challenging the validity of the appellant’s certificate on 
the grounds that the appellant could not belong to a scheduled tribe because he was 
a professing Muslim. The appellant denied this allegation. The fifth respondent filed a 
writ petition challenging the Scrutiny Committee’s rejection of the application to review 
and recall the caste validity certificate, after which the matter was referred to the 
Scrutiny Committee again. In the present appeal, the appellant argued that the fifth 
respondent lacked locus standi to challenge his certificate.211  
 On the facts, the Supreme Court found on the facts that the fifth respondent had 
acted mala fide, with the sole intention of harassing the appellant. In this regard, it held 
that the High Court should have denied the fifth respondent standing in the first 
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place.212 The Supreme Court revisited the issue of locus standi in public interest 
litigation and confirmed that a third person with no interest in the matter at hand cannot 
claim to have standing to raise “any grievance whatsoever”.213 However, if aggrieved 
persons are unable to approach the court because of ignorance, illiteracy or a lack of 
resources, an independent third party may approach a court of law on their behalf in 
the public interest.214 This independent third party can be anyone, provided they do 
not have no right whatsoever “to post or property”.215  
Significantly, the Court held that it is possible that certain issues may need to be 
considered even if the petitioner’s good faith is doubted.216 In such cases, the court 
should proceed suo motu.217 This, according to the Court, will only be the case in 
exceptional circumstances, which ultimately this matter was not. The original petitioner 
(referred to as “respondent 5” in the judgment) was thus found to lack standing and 
had abused the process of the Court. 218  
3 3 4 4 4 Trends identified from the third phase 
The third phase is a period in which the scope of public interest litigation widened even 
further. It has even been suggested that anyone is able to launch public interest 
litigation proceedings for almost anything.219 There are also increasingly examples in 
case law that go so far as to be labelled “blatant misuse of the process of PIL”.220  
 Notable examples of this abuse of public interest litigation include petitions to 
reschedule power cuts and load shedding that were to be implemented during cricket 
telecast hours,221 to relocate the wild monkeys in Delhi,222 and to seek a ban on 
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publication of allegedly “obscene and nude” photographs in newspapers.223 According 
to Fowkes and upon observation of the judgments discussed in this section, most 
instances today appear to raise issues of concern to the middle class.224   
It is submitted that not all cases which constitute an abuse of public interest standing 
by commentators necessarily waste judicial resources by being heard. Many of these 
matters may also be matters that are interesting to the public.225 However, the courts 
consistently repeat that petitioners wishing to invoke public interest standing will only 
be able to do so for matters in which the community at large has either a pecuniary 
interest or an interest by which their legal rights or abilities are affected. Clearly, cases 
brought by mala fide petitioners with no sufficient interest must not be entertained. 
 Despite misuses of public interest litigation, there are also examples of individuals 
taking matters to the courts for the vindication of fundamental rights.226 For instance, 
in Tarak Singh v Jyoti Basu,227 an individual brought a case of judicial misconduct to 
the Supreme Court in the form of public interest litigation.228 A judge had used his 
position to obtain an allotment of government land.229 The Court found that a private 
interest cannot be elevated above a public interest.230 Accordingly, the procurement 
of the land grant was found to be an abuse of position, and was consequently 
cancelled.231  
The Annual Survey of Indian Law has published reports in 2005232 and 2013,233 
which provide helpful overviews of the more recent development of public interest 
standing within public interest litigation. Singh confirms Deva’s observations regarding 
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the scope of public interest litigation in recent years, and notes that public interest 
standing has been utilised to raise predominantly middle class and political 
governance issues, as opposed to further “social empowerment”.234 The concept of 
justiciability has been expanded to allow the constitutional validity of a wide range of 
laws to be challenged by invoking article 32, even for political and private gain.235 In 
summary, the author maintains that PIL now includes “any matter for the enforcement 
of public interest”.236 
However, the position confirmed by the courts in the cases above shows a 
commitment to reigning in the scope of public interest standing. The judiciary 
continues to confirm that meddlesome bystanders should not be granted standing to 
act on behalf of the public.237 In this regard, a quote by the Allahabad High Court bears 
repeating: 
“A time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest 
litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that courts are flooded 
with a large number of so-called public interest litigations where even a miniscule 
percentage can legitimately be called public interest litigations.”238 
3 3 5   The PIL petitioner 
Indian public interest litigation is made possible by an expansive approach to 
standing.239 Today, any member of the public or a social action group acting bona fide 
can bring an application in a High Court or the Supreme Court seeking relief on behalf 
of persons unable to approach the court themselves for vindication of their legal 
rights.240 However, only petitioners found to meet the requirements laid down by the 
courts will be allowed to launch proceedings in the courts to vindicate fundamental 
rights and challenge the infraction of statutory provisions.241 
According to the Madras High Court, not only must the petitioner be acting 
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genuinely in the public interest, but the proceedings they seek to launch must also be 
aimed at redressing genuine public wrongs and injuries.242 There is recent evidence 
that the courts are revisiting the original objective of the relaxation of public interest 
standing. 
The PIL petitioner will not be afforded standing to approach the courts in the public 
interest, however, if such party is “a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper”, or 
lacks “a sufficient interest in the proceeding”.243 Any citizen who has a sufficient 
interest in any matter of public interest and a person who takes a genuine concern in 
the plight of an oppressed group will invariably be deemed to have a sufficient interest 
in their relief just for that reason.244 However, irrespective of how genuine a cause 
brought before a court by a public interest litigant may be, the court must dismiss 
matters brought by those whose motives and credentials are in doubt.245 
In a determination of standing in any given matter, the courts will first ascertain 
whether there is anyone who would have standing under the traditional rules to 
approach a court for relief.246 In the absence of such a person, the courts will allow the 
action to be brought by anyone “acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause 
of justice” and without a profit-making or political motive.247 The greater the 
fundamental right infringements, the more willing the courts are to enable the 
enforcement of rights.248 However, no one can be compelled by the courts to launch 
a public interest action.249  
                                            
242 Thol. Thirumavalavanedii v Home Secretary 2013 5 CTC 113; A Hingorani “Public Interest Litigation” 
(2013) 49 Annual Survey of Indian Law 969 993. 
243 SP Gupta v President of India 1982 2 SCR 365. 
244 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 438. 
245 Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2007 2 AWC 1113 para 17, quoting 
TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v Union of India and Ors. 2006 5 SCC 28. 
246 Fertilizer Corp. Kamagar Union v Union of India 1981 AIR 344. 
247 SP Gupta v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149 para 17. Plaintiffs will, accordingly, be refused standing 
when they raise private issues or raise issues for personal gain or profit. In this regard, see Raunaq 
International Ltd v IVR Construction Ltd 1999 AIR SC 393 para 12 – 14; TN Godavarman Thirumulpad 
v Union of India 2006 AIR 1774 SC para 23. 
248 As examples, see the judgments discussed in parts 3 3 4 3 1 and 3 3 4 4 3 above. 
249 Gouriet v Union of the Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 at 96; M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing 
the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
42 44. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
Jain and Jain classify petitioners into three general categories of standing.250 The 
first category comprises petitioners who have a direct interest in the outcome of the 
case as a result of an infringement of their legal rights. Such persons clearly have 
standing according to the traditional rule. The second category comprises petitioners 
who claim injury as members of the public. Their rights and interests are those enjoyed 
by every member of the public. These persons are afforded standing if they have a 
sufficient interest in the matter. The third category consists of persons who are total 
strangers (what the court has called “meddlesome interlopers”).251 According to the 
courts’ approach to public interest standing, persons falling under this category clearly 
should not have standing.252  
The second category of petitioners is the group that is affected by the liberalisation 
of standing rules discussed in this thesis. They are the public-spirited persons and 
organisations whose “initiative” and “zeal” must be utilised for social collective rights 
to be protected.253 Whether or not a member of the public has a sufficient interest in 
order to be afforded standing to bring a PIL has to be determined by the court on a 
case by case basis, as it is not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule for 
determination.254 
Roughly four-fifths of public interest actions are filed by individuals and a very small 
percentage of actions brought in the public interest are brought by non-governmental 
organisations.255 Fowkes notes that this is a direct correlation with the success rate of 
advantaged litigants since 1990, which has steadily increased.256 Gauri notes that the 
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success rate of public interest claims brought by disadvantaged litigants concerning 
Fundamental Rights has declined drastically.257 
3 3 6   Conclusion 
The first phase of public interest litigation contributed to realising the type of social 
revolution that the founders had expected to achieve through the Constitution.258 Due 
to relaxed rules of standing, judges have been forced to engage with the problem of 
access to courts and to cater for those who are most vulnerable in society. The 
judiciary addressed these issues by recognising the rights of the underprivileged and 
handing down orders to government to make amends for the alleged violations.259 
Public interest litigation on behalf of such groups has been permitted, even 
encouraged, so as to enable the protection and enforcement of basic rights in the 
Indian Constitution.260 
The second phase saw cases brought in the public interest becoming more 
institutionalised in that several specialised NGOs and lawyers started bringing matters 
of public interest to the court on a more regular basis.261 The judiciary’s response 
became bolder than the initial phase, something which Deva attributes to the fact that 
the courts began to make law and not just interpret it.262 The misuse of the relaxed 
rules of standing also increased dramatically.263 This phase has thus been criticised 
for starting to move beyond the objective of the relaxation of standing rules. 
The third phase has seen a development of public interest litigation to the point 
where it is time for judicial introspection and review of what courts have tried to achieve 
through PIL.264 The attitude of the judiciary towards PIL over these three phases 
seems to have been influenced by, according to Deva, “the issues in vogue”. However, 
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the courts have maintained a commitment in their judgments to serving the initial 
purpose of allowing public interest standing, and to deterring petitioners who do not 
approach the courts with clean hands, hearts, minds and objectives.265 
The case discussions and trends identified from the three phases of public interest 
litigation in India make it possible to identify merits and pitfalls of public interest 
standing. The following section will therefore aim to assess the status of public interest 
standing in India at present. 
3 4 Assessment of the status of public interest standing in India  
3 4 1   Merits of public interest standing in India 
Public interest standing in India has been liberated from restrictive rules and now 
enables engagement with contentious social issues, ranging from children’s rights to 
preservation of the environment.266 Supreme Court judges like Krishna Iyer and PN 
Bhagwati liberalised rules of locus standi and simplified the appeals process through 
the introduction of public interest litigation. The PIL system allows any member of the 
public (be they individuals or NGOs) to champion public interest causes simply by 
sending a letter or petition to the Supreme Court or High Courts.267 This relaxation of 
standing rules has led to the courts hearing issues they had never had to deal with 
before.268 In turn, this has aided India in the quest to provide access to justice to all 
citizens.269  
As already stated, only those acting genuinely in the public interest are permitted to 
approach courts for relief in public interest litigation.270 Common to all three phases of 
development of public interest litigation is the courts’ commitment to determining the 
public interest and to enforcing fundamental rights. Despite the flood of vexatious and 
frivolous petitions, the courts have not allowed matters of public interest to be heard 
at the request of unsuitable public interest petitioners. The courts have also instituted 
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guidelines to help them deal with the immense number of cases purportedly brought 
in the public interest.271 
Punitive cost orders have been identified as a way to manage the misuse of public 
interest standing, which can serve as a deterrent for mala fide petitioners.272 Over and 
above this, the Supreme Court has advised against litigants approaching the court in 
the public interest in areas wherein they have little or insufficient knowledge or 
expertise.273 Such caution is taken to ensure that the public or specifically affected 
group is not poorly represented or unduly disadvantaged as a result of the outcome of 
the case. 
A driving force behind the liberalisation of public interest standing rules in India has 
been to enable the voices of the poor and disadvantaged to be heard in the courts. 
This “conceptual latitudinarianism”, as the Supreme Court has termed it, allows 
plaintiffs to approach courts for remedies shared by many others,274 and serves to 
achieve greater social justice by increasing access to courts.275 The Supreme Court 
of India has noted that, without granting third parties standing to approach the courts 
and raise issues affecting the public at large, economic and social justice would not 
be realised.276 In addition to this, those oppressed by injustices would remain 
estranged and application of the constitutional Directive Principles would be limited.277 
Public interest litigation is seen by some lawyers, journalists and others in civil 
service as unnecessarily adding to the burdens of the administration of justice that is 
already sorely stretched.278 While it is true that there is an immense backlog of cases, 
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this is no reason for denying the poor and vulnerable access to justice.279 However, 
Fowkes notes that many impactful public interest cases consist of “ordinary judicial 
responses to ordinary kinds of state defaults”, as opposed to inventive remedies.280 
This is why the author contends that the vast number of public interest cases has given 
the courts more opportunities to build precedent.281  
For the reasons discussed above, it is easy to see why former Justice Bhagwati 
held fast to the belief that public interest litigation is “one of the most powerful weapons 
invented by the court for the purpose of delivering distributive justice to disadvantaged 
groups of people.”282 Public interest standing, in conjunction with the procedural 
innovation in public interest litigation that enables public-spirited persons to seek 
judicial redress for the violation of fundamental rights by merely writing a letter to a 
court or judge,283 still has the capacity theoretically to render justice to the poor, 
deprived and illiterate, to women and children, to the unorganised labour sector, to 
those handicapped by ignorance, indigence and illiteracy and to other downtrodden 
persons.284 
3 4 2   Pitfalls of public interest standing in India 
The liberalisation of the rules regulating locus standi may have promised much for the 
people of India and the vindication of their fundamental rights, but Sudarshan argues 
that this has yet to change the lives of the poor and disadvantaged in reality.285 This 
may be attributed, in part, to the fact that public interest litigation addresses a variety 
of issues, which do not always relate to violation of fundamental rights.286 Another 
                                            
279 L Seth “Social Action Litigation in India” in S Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from 
a Gender Perspective (1995) 97 100; People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India 1982 AIR 
1473. 
280 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court – Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 446. 
281 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court – Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 446. 
282 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 577. 
283 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67. 
284 Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2007 2 AWC 1113 para 18. 
285 R Sudarshan “Courts and Social Transformation in India” in P Domingo, R Gargarella and T Roux 
(eds) Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? (2006) 
161. 
286 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 33. 
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cause may be sheer size of the population and the consequent extent of systemic 
injustice that has been left unaddressed. 
Unfortunately, even though well-meaning bystanders seeking public interest 
standing are allowed to approach courts on behalf of those who are unable to, such 
plaintiffs are often not well or personally acquainted with the facts.287 This leaves much 
fact-finding to be conducted by the courts.288 It also means that courts often entertain 
frivolous petitions, which they may discover only once the matter is in the process of 
being adjudicated. This can cause delays, and result in more urgent issues remaining 
pending for extended periods of time. 
A further shortcoming of public interest standing is that it enables representatives 
to litigate on behalf of those directly affected without the latter’s meaningful 
participation. Courts risk being considered paternalistic by granting remedies in such 
cases.289 It is worth noting here, however, that the very purpose of relaxing the rules 
of locus standi in India was to enable those unable to address the court directly to 
procure enforcement of their rights.290 Rakshit believes that the legal significance of 
article 32 for all people is undermined by the financial inability of most to approach the 
court for a remedy.291  
According to Meer, petitioners who act spontaneously when approaching courts in 
the public interest are at risk of a lack of commitment and may lose interest in the 
litigation.292 This leaves the courts to monitor the implementation of their orders in 
order to ensure compliance.293 Compounding this difficulty, and due to the relaxed 
rules of standing, courts have had to hear cases without the well-developed arguments 
                                            
287 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 816, and People’s Union for Democratic Rights 
v Union of India 1982 AIR 1473. 
288 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 80. 
289 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 84. 
290 SP Gupta v President of India 1982 2 SCR 210; Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v Union of 
India 1981 AIR 584. 
291 N B Rakshit “Right to Constitutional Remedy: Significance of Article 32” (1999) 34 Economic and 
Political Weekly 2379 2380. 
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presented by parties in adversarial proceedings in order to enforce fundamental 
rights.294 
The relaxed test for public interest standing has placed great strain on judicial 
resources due to the expedited fashion in which cases are expected to be heard.295 
This has not been aided by the vast number of matters disguised as public interest 
issues that have flooded the courts.296 Consequently, one of the greatest challenges 
facing Indian courts is the determination of cases that are brought legitimately in the 
public interest and those that are not.297 The current sifting process required to 
distinguish between these two categories, too, places a strain on judicial resources. 
Thus, when dealing with public interest cases, the courts have attempted to define the 
public interest, as well as which persons are permitted to raise this interest.298 The 
term “public interest” has, however, become so broadly construed by the courts that it 
can arguably be used by petitioners to raise any issue broadly related to 
governance.299 
Before the introduction of public interest litigation, the rules of standing had been 
an effective gatekeeper for the courts.300 Now, however, the extent of the relaxation of 
the rules regulating public interest standing has caused the courts in India to be 
flooded with litigation allegedly brought in the public interest. The judiciary in India has 
expressed concerns regarding the volume of cases brought in the public interest and 
had to adjust its proceedings accordingly.301 Over and above these challenges, the 
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expansive approach to standing adopted in India has put pressure on courts to 
develop theories of justiciability by which to sift out issues that are unsuitable to 
resolution.302 This, in turn, creates the danger that courts overstep the limits of their 
judicial function.303 
Despite the capability of public interest standing to aid public interest litigation in 
achieving greater access to justice in India, Gauri argues that this original objective of 
public interest litigation is no longer paramount.304 There are two factors on which this 
claim is based. Firstly, the middle classes have the resources to mobilise more easily 
than the poor, and also possess the funds to approach courts, which in turn enable 
more benefits from public interest actions.305 Secondly, Indian judgments have been 
criticised for exhibiting “urban and middle class bias”, which demonstrate judges’ 
personal ideologies and world views.306 
3 5   Conclusion 
This chapter has documented the conditions in which public interest litigation arose in 
India during the 1970s and 1980s, and the subsequent role of the courts in promoting 
social justice. The Supreme Court facilitated this process by instituting procedural 
changes, which allowed and encouraged public interest organisations to file petitions 
on behalf of disadvantaged portions of the population aimed at holding the government 
accountable for large-scale violations of fundamental rights.307 
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Over forty years since its inception, the Indian jurisprudence concerning public 
interest standing raises a number of pertinent questions. On the one hand, public 
interest standing potentially makes litigation and legal relief more accessible to the 
poor, as it has enabled courts to fashion creative remedies. On the other hand, the 
Indian approach to public interest standing has also been criticised for the burdens it 
places on the judiciary, the potential detachment of plaintiffs from the issues they bring 
to court, and the fact that those affected by the outcome of the case more often than 
not have no role to play in these decisions.  
The value of the findings in this chapter regarding public interest standing in India 
will become evident in the following chapter, when they are utilised to offer guidance 
to the development of public interest standing in Bill of Rights litigation in South Africa. 
Chapter Four will build on the similarities and differences in the evolution of public 
interest standing in South Africa and India by identifying important considerations for 
the further development of public interest standing in South Africa. 
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Chapter 4: The future development of public interest standing in South Africa  
4 1   Introduction 
The introduction of public interest standing in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) was a welcome departure from the strict rules of 
standing under the common law.1 By doing away with the direct interest requirement, 
section 38(d) of the Constitution now makes provision for anyone to approach a court 
seeking relief in the public interest for an infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights. 
In 1998, the South African Law Commission (“the SALC”) explicitly recommended 
legislation regulating actions brought in the public interest to prevent public interest 
standing from being developed haphazardly, or not at all.2 This was proposed in the 
form of recommendations and a Bill.3 The Bill sought to regulate public interest 
standing, which was introduced into South African law by the Constitution. However, 
the Bill was not passed and the development of public interest standing in South Africa 
over the past twenty odd years has remained the responsibility of the judiciary. 
The absence of promulgated legislation has left the courts to give content to section 
38(d). They have developed public interest standing consistently and, in so doing, 
have evaded fears of the SALC. The landmark judgments of Ferreira v Levin NO and 
Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (“Ferreira”)4 and Lawyers for 
Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (“Lawyers for 
Human Rights”)5 currently still provide relatively clear guidance. 
This judicially developed guidance calls into question the need for and applicability 
of the SALC’s Bill today. The very purpose for which the legislation was proposed has 
been arguably rendered moot. The courts have developed public interest standing 
without the adoption of legislation, and also maintained a level of uniformity in this 
development for the meaning and content of section 38 to be sufficiently clear today. 
However, an assessment of the development of public interest standing in India 
reveals the need to revisit some recommendations made by the SALC that have not 
                                            
1 See Chapter 2 above. 
2 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 15 at 3.4.1. 
3 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
4 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
5 2004 4 SA 125 (CC). 
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yet been addressed adequately by the courts in South Africa. Three in particular would 
have a notable bearing on the further development of public interest standing in South 
Africa. These pertain to the need for, firstly, an appropriate public interest 
representative in public interest matters; secondly, careful management of public 
interest standing cases by the courts; and, thirdly, the involvement of third parties to 
assist in cases brought in the public interest. Once these areas of potential further 
development have been explored, this chapter will proceed to examine ways in which 
the recommendations offered in this chapter could be implemented.  
4 2 Key considerations for the development of public interest standing in 
South Africa 
4 2 1   An appropriate public interest representative 
Section 38(d) of the Constitution explicitly makes provision for any person to institute 
an action in court claiming relief by way of a public interest action. However, it must 
be noted that the public interest applicant need not be the representative in the public 
interest action proceedings. It may well be the case that the person wishing to seek 
relief in the public interest is not the best or most appropriate representative for the 
matter. This distinction has not been dealt with explicitly in case law. It will therefore 
be addressed below.  
4 2 1 1  The public interest applicant 
According to the SALC’s recommendations, any person or organisation is entitled to 
launch an action in the public interest. Applicants need not have any direct, indirect or 
personal interest in the relief they seek.6 The SALC recommended further that the 
person claiming relief should identify the action as one being brought in the public 
interest and nominate a suitable person to act as a public representative in the matter.7 
In Lawyers for Human Rights, the Constitutional Court noted that South Africans 
are becoming increasingly aware of their constitutional rights and infringements 
                                            
6 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. See part 2 3 3 3 above for a discussion on the 
plaintiff in public interest actions. 
7 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. 
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thereof.8 The courts have confirmed that an applicant approaching the courts in terms 
of section 38(d) need only show an infringement or threat to a right in the Bill of Rights 
in order to claim relief in the public interest. It has been noted that the public will usually 
have an interest in the enforcement of rights generally.9 In theory, therefore, it should 
not be difficult for a prospective public interest applicant to prove this objective 
requirement for invoking public interest standing. 
However, the objective requirement for public interest standing must be 
complemented by a subjective inquiry into the genuineness of the applicant.10 
Essential to the nature of public interest standing is that the applicant must be 
motivated by a primary desire to benefit the public – whether at large or in part – and 
not themselves.11 As section 38(d) is the ground for standing with the widest reach, it 
is fitting that this is a preliminary concern. In determining whether an applicant is acting 
genuinely in the public interest, South African courts have been given considerations 
to take into account in light of the facts and circumstances of each case. These were 
laid down by O’Regan J in her minority judgment in Ferreira and later confirmed and 
expanded on by the majority in Lawyers for Human Rights, as well as a minority 
judgment by Madala J.12  
O’Regan J referred to the factors she proposed in Ferreira as “considerations”, 
denoting flexibility in the approach taken by the courts.13 At the same time, however, 
her judgment states that courts must be “circumspect” in affording public interest 
standing.14 This displays the courts’ commitment to ensuring that matters brought in 
the public interest be treated with care. Judges need to apply their minds to the two-
legged threshold test in order to prevent applicants from pretending that actions are 
being brought in the public interest with a political or profit motive. This test entails an 
inquiry into the subjective position of the party claiming to act in the public interest, as 
                                            
8 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 71. 
9 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 235. 
10 See part 2 4 4 2 above. 
11 See part 2 3 3 1 above. 
12 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. See part 2 4 4 1 above. 
13 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234. 
14 See Chapter 2, footnote 202.  
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well as proof that it is objectively in the public interest for the matter to be brought 
before the court. 
The Indian courts have developed a similar, yet simpler, preliminary inquiry for 
public interest actions. All that is required of a public interest petitioner is that they act 
bona fide and demonstrate a sufficient interest in the relief sought.15 The Supreme 
Court has explicitly refrained from developing rules or detailed factors to determine the 
genuineness of applicants, stating that matters need to be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis.16 Whether directly because of a lack of a more rigorous threshold test for 
potential public interest or not, public interest standing consequently been abused by 
mala fide applicants in the Indian courts.  
Jurisprudence from India shows a motivation to make justice accessible to the 
poorest of the poor. This led to the Supreme Court accepting letters addressed to it by 
any member of the public alleging a violation of a fundamental right.17 Based on an 
overview of the phases of the evolution of public interest standing in India,18 it is 
submitted that much of the misuse of public interest litigation that occurred could have 
been prevented by a more cautious approach to relaxed rules of standing. The 
formulation of a test, or at least a more detailed set of factors, to help courts determine 
the genuineness of public interest litigants would not have compromised the Supreme 
Court’s commitment to providing access to justice. Instead, it is submitted that some 
form of threshold test for potential litigants would have helped to prevent public interest 
standing being invoked by busybodies and meddlesome interlopers. 
4 2 1 2  The public interest litigant as representative 
In most of the South African case law and literature on public interest standing, the 
terms public interest “applicant”, “litigant” and “representative” are used 
synonymously. A public interest applicant is someone wishing to approach the courts 
and launch proceedings in the public interest.19 However, according to the SALC’s 
recommendations, such person or organisation is not expected to be the 
                                            
15 See part 3 4 4 above. 
16 SP Gupta v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149 para 20. 
17 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67. 
18 See parts 3 3 4 and 3 4 above. 
19 See part 4 2 1 1 above. 
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representative, or litigant, once the proceedings have been launched.20 What is 
certain, however, is that the representative will be the public interest litigant, whether 
or not they brought the application. 
4 2 1 2 1 The role of the public interest representative 
(a) Nomination and appointment of a suitably qualified representative 
The SALC recommends that the public interest applicant be the one to nominate a 
representative in the matter once obtaining the nominee’s consent.21 The 
representative may be the applicant themselves or another person or organisation. 
The representative can then be appointed by the court after the court is satisfied that 
the action is a bona fide public interest action.22 Should they later appear not to be an 
appropriate representative, the SALC also recommends that the representative should 
be removed and replaced by the court either mero motu or on good cause shown by 
an interested party.23 This is possible at any time before judgment is handed down.24 
 It is worth noting that the SALC speaks of the appointment of a “suitably qualified” 
representative by the court.25 Such a person may not be easy to find.26 This 
qualification raises the question whether courts are in a position to exercise this power 
of appointment exclusively. Although the SALC does not provide detail in this regard, 
it can be assumed that the public interest applicant will have to provide reasons for 
their choice of nominee for representative. However, even if this is not the case, the 
SALC made provision for representatives who later appear not to be the best 
                                            
20 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 90; Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 
1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. Section 2(2) of the SALC’s draft Bill states: “The person who institutes 
a public interest action shall identify the action as such and shall nominate either himself or herself or 
any other suitable person as representative of those on whose behalf the relief is claimed.” 
21 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. 
22 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. 
23 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5. This replacement procedure is also necessary in 
the event of the death of the representative. 
24 Section 3(2) of the Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-
10-1995. 
25 This requirement is not completely new. If more than one plaintiff came forward to institute an actio 
popularis under Roman law, the praetor would elect the most suitable plaintiff. See part 2 2 2 above. 
26 See part 2 3 3 1 above. 
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candidate to represent the public in the matter concerned by suggesting a vested 
power in the court to remove and replace such representatives. A requirement that the 
representative in the matter be suitably qualified was intended to limit unmeritorious 
public interest actions.27 
 The Rules of the Constitutional Court make provision for unrepresented parties to 
apply to the court. In terms of Rule 4(11)(a), the Registrar is expected to refer an 
unrepresented party to “the nearest office or officer of the Human Rights Commission, 
the Legal Aid board, a law clinic or such other appropriate body or institution that may 
be willing and in a position to assist such party.”28 This provision would help to provide 
a solution should the procedure of nomination and appointment of a representative 
come into force. 
(b)  Representative of the vox populi 
The vox populi – or voice of the people – is naturally inherent to the concept of public 
interest standing. Anyone representing the public interest in court when alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened is, by implication, speaking 
on behalf of the public. Standing has traditionally played the role of gatekeeper for the 
courts; a procedural mechanism intended to prevent certain people from gaining 
access to courts.29 When considering the role of the public interest litigant as they 
represent the vox populi, it is desirable to have the most representative of litigants 
before the courts.30 
Section 38(d) of the Constitution signifies an action on behalf of people on a basis 
wider than the class actions contemplated in section 38(c).31 Whilst the ground of 
public interest standing has many merits,32 both the Constitutional Court and the SALC 
have conceded that the words “in the public interest” are difficult to define objectively, 
                                            
27 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.4. 
28 The Constitutional Court Rules, 2003; K Hofmeyr “Rules and Procedure in Constitutional Matters” in 
S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 3 2007) 5–2. 
29 K Schiemann “Locus Standi” (1990) Public Law 342 342. 
30 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
384. 
31 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 15. 
32 See part 2 5 1 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
99 
 
and will depend on the impact of the alleged violation.33 What is clear from the broad 
approach to public interest standing adopted by the courts is that “[t]he public will 
ordinarily have an interest in the infringement of rights generally, not particularly”.34 
The Constitutional Court explains this statement by maintaining that the public has an 
interest in the objective breach of a right in the Bill of Rights.35 This is supported by 
section 7(1) of the Constitution, which states that the Bill of Rights “enshrines the rights 
of all people in our country”.36 Whether or not the public has a sufficient interest in the 
particular relief sought will be up to the public interest litigant to prove.37 
In Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions,38 
the applicants launched an application on behalf of victims of torture against the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions for a decision taken not to investigate alleged 
crimes against humanity.39 As the entire international community has an interest in the 
prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against humanity, there was no doubt that the 
public had an interest in the matter.40 The applicants were granted standing under 
section 38(d).41 From this decision, it is clear that courts should welcome suitable 
applicants who wish to represent the public in cases with greater consequences of the 
infringement of rights. 
 
 
                                            
33 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 68; South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public 
Interest Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.5.2. 
34 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 235. 
35 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 235. 
36 Section 7(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
37 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 168. 
38 Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 
(GNP). 
39 Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 
(GNP) paras 8 – 13. 
40 Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 
(GNP) para 12.1. 
41 Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 
(GNP) para 13. 
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(c) Adequate representation of the voices of the affected persons 
Once a person or organisation has been proven subjectively to be acting genuinely in 
the public interest and that it is objectively in the public interest for the proceedings to 
be brought, and a suitable representative for the matter has been nominated and 
appointed, the proceedings can commence.42 However, the concept of a suitably 
qualified representative has not been expanded by the SALC, the courts or literature 
on the subject. Whereas the term “suitably qualified” may on the face of it refer to 
abilities, experience or resources on the part of the person or organisation concerned, 
it is submitted that this needs to be understood more broadly in the context of public 
interest standing. Due to the potentially large impact of judgments handed down in 
litigation in the public interest, as well as the fact that the representative represents 
the vox populi in these matters, a representative cannot be considered suitably 
qualified if they do not speak on behalf of all people affected by the infringement of 
rights in a particular case. 
Currently, there is a risk that those whose rights are directly affected by a given 
case brought in the public interest will not be given a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard or to participate in the relevant litigation.43 There is no requirement that those 
acting in the public interest must have engaged with those they represent in court. 
Therefore, public interest standing can lead to representatives litigating on behalf of 
those directly affected without the latter’s meaningful participation.44 The courts have 
also displayed a willingness to proceed suo motu if issues that require their 
consideration are raised by a public interest petitioner whose good faith is in 
question.45 Although this mechanism can act as a safeguard against petitioners who 
lose interest in the cases they bring in the public interest, it may undermine the 
judiciary’s impartiality, as well as the relief granted, to proceed without a public interest 
representative at all. 
Susman investigates whether India’s dispossessed have been given an audible 
voice in court by litigants by examining three phases of public interest litigation cases 
                                            
42 See parts 2 4 4 1 2, 2 4 4 2 and 4 2 1 1 above  
43 See part 2 5 2 above. 
44 K Schiemann “Locus Standi” (1990) Public Law 342 349. 
45 Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v State of Maharashtra 2013 4 SCC 465 para 22. 
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in which these people’s engagement may have an impact.46 The first phase starts 
when the suit is initially brought, the second phase comprises the subsequent case 
and the third phase concerns the remedy or remedies ordered.47 
In the first phase, the voices of those represented are only heard if they wish to 
dissociate from the action.48 This is not problematic in South Africa because judgment 
in public interest actions is not res judicata against all interested parties.49 
The second phase has the potential to include greater input from affected persons, 
as it spans the proceedings of public interest litigation.50 Susman refers to two 
examples from case law where the Supreme Court’s investigative commission sought 
input from people with a material interest in the outcome of the case.51 This was 
implemented in order that as many affected people as possible might express their 
needs and wishes.52 However, this became more challenging as the court’s case load 
increased.53  
It is a reality that cases like Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (“Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha”), for example, were brought by petitioners who had little or no contact with 
the actual victims.54 This scenario is also possible in the South Africa context where 
interaction can be hindered by victims’ will to engage, knowledge of the rights 
infringement in question, lack of means of transport or where public interest litigants 
do not speak the same language as those they represent, for instance.  
                                            
46 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 87. 
47 The phases that Susman highlights, and which are discussed in this section, must not be confused 
with the phases pf public interest litigation in India. In this regard, see part 3 3 4 above. 
48 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 87. 
49 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 8 at 2.4.3. 
50 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 88. 
51 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57, with reference to Olga Tellis v Bombay 
Mun. Corp. 1986 AIR 180 and Khatri v State of Bihar II 1981 1 SCC 635. 
52 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 86 – 88. 
53 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 88. See part 4 2 3 1 below for a discussion 
on the appointment of experts and commissions by courts. 
54 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67. See part 3 3 4 2 3 above. 
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In Lawyers for Human Rights, the Court acknowledged that the “illegal foreigners” 
detained at ports under various provisions of the Immigration Act55 may well have been 
deported within a matter of days.56 This afforded the applicant organisation very little 
time to engage with the victims. In this regard, the public interest dictated that the 
constitutionality of the impugned provisions be challenged as soon as possible to 
prevent further rights violations.57 The second applicant in Lawyers for Human Rights 
was a certain Ann Francis Eveleth. As an American land activist and spokesperson 
for the National Land Committee, who had been illegally arrested at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development and detained for failing to renew her residency permit,58 
she was a suitably qualified representative for the “illegal foreigners” in the 
Constitutional Court. Yacoob J did not mention this in his majority judgment and 
instead permitted her involvement because it would have a minimal impact on the cost 
of proceedings.59 However, Madala J, in his minority judgment, did make reference to 
the suitability of the second applicant to the proceedings by stating that she had been 
illegally arrested and detained without trial under the repealed Aliens Control Act.60 It 
is submitted that Madala J’s reasoning shows greater understanding of the importance 
of having a suitably qualified representative in public interest cases, especially if time 
is limited and opportunities for meaningful interaction are few. 
The later decision in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(“Albutt”)61 demonstrates the Constitutional Court’s commitment to affording victims 
the opportunity to engage in matters affecting them. In Albutt, the applicant NGOs 
were granted standing to represent victims and the public where the issue of 
engagement with victims arose. The victims of crimes committed with political motive 
                                            
55 13 of 2002. 
56 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 21. For a case discussion, see part 2 4 4 2 above. 
57 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 22. 
58 Anonymous “Foreign nationals ‘held for months’” (2002) Independent Online. Available at: 
<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/foreign-nationals-held-for-months-95584>. 
59 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 23. 
60 96 of 1991; Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 
SA 125 (CC) para 50. 
61 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC); see part 2 4 4 3 
above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
103 
 
had not been afforded an opportunity to engage in a special dispensation process 
pardoning convicted prisoners, which warranted intervention.62 
The South African Constitutional Court has shown a commitment to including 
victims of rights violations in public interest proceedings. However, it is clear that time 
constraints may in exceptional circumstances warrant the hearing of matters in the 
public interest as soon as possible so as to provide redress and prevent further rights 
violations. This has meant that few (if any) of the voices of affected persons are 
consulted in the proceedings.  
(d)  Issues raised by public interest litigants 
Relaxed standing provisions in India have enabled the courts to hear a range of issues 
in the public interest over the past forty years.63 According to Dhavan, those who are 
most susceptible to exploitation either struggle personally to win their demands and 
receive their just deserts, or otherwise depend on the struggle or support of others for 
their continued existence.64 Peasants, workers, women, children, the elderly and the 
vast number of people “condemned to redundancy” are examples of people who are 
in a constant state of struggle.65 They have benefited from public interest litigation 
because of the opportunities that it creates for the enforcement of their fundamental 
rights.66 This is because public interest litigation requires cooperation between the 
disadvantaged and those in a position to defend them.67 
According to Gauri’s findings, the fifteen percent of public interest cases in India 
that are filed by non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) are more likely to address 
concerns of the poor than the middle class, a statistic that has remained relatively 
                                            
62 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 10. 
63 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 316 – 320. 
64 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 322. 
65 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 322. Dhavan reported that, at the tie of publication of the article, the estimates number of people 
“that the economy does not need” was in excess of 400 million. 
66 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 323. 
67 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 323. See part 4 2 3 below for a discussion of the involvement of third parties to assist in cases 
brought in the public interest. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
 
constant since the relaxation of standing rules.68 Gauri attributes this phenomenon 
partially to the fact that judges are more alert to the concerns of the middle and upper 
classes because of their own social class and ideological dispositions.69 The 
commentator notes, however, that mobilisation by private individuals is the cause of 
the steady increase in the number of Fundamental Rights claims brought on behalf of 
disadvantaged groups.70 
Fowkes notes that these trends show a direct correlation with the success rate of 
advantaged litigants since 1990, which has steadily increased.71 The success rate of 
public interest claims brought by disadvantaged litigants concerning fundamental 
rights, however, is shown to have declined drastically.72 While keeping in mind the 
capability of public interest standing to aid public interest litigation in achieving greater 
access to justice in India, there is clearly evidence to support Gauri’s claim that the 
objective of public interest litigation has been lost.73  
Dugard and Roux suggest that the South African Constitutional Court is less 
accessible than the Indian Supreme Court, based on a comparison of the number of 
cases involving the poor and the considerable difference in population size between 
the two countries.74 There may indeed have been more cases brought and heard in 
                                            
68 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 12. 
69 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 8.  
70 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 12. 
71 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 
27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 442. The author qualifies this observation by offering a 
number of reasons for this trend. 
72 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 16. 
73 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 8; J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to 
Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 437. 
74 J Dugard and T Roux “The Record of the South African Constitutional Court in Providing an 
Institutional Voice for the Poor: 1995 – 2004” in P Domingo, R Gargarella and T Roux (eds) Courts and 
Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? (2006) 111 – 112. The 
authors maintain that the reason for this is the epistolary jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court, which 
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the public interest in India than South Africa in total, but Fowkes observed in 2011 that 
the Constitutional Court was, in fact, receiving 200 to 250 informal petitions per year.75 
This is almost identical to the average of 260 public interest litigation cases before the 
Indian Supreme Court each year. Gauri uses this figure to disprove the claims made 
by critics that public interest litigation drains court resources.76 However, it is not clear 
to what extent Gauri’s findings take cognisance of the resources needed to operate 
the filtering mechanisms put in place by the Indian courts, which deal with the vast 
number of petitions the courts receive but ultimately do not entertain.77 
(e) Relief sought by public interest litigants 
Certain limitations to public interest actions were suggested to the South African Law 
Commission to consider in light of its recommendations.78 Among these were 
suggestions that the relief in terms of public interest actions should be limited to claims 
of declaratory or interim relief, that the public interest action is not suited to actions for 
damages, and that it should be subjected to a certification process.79 However, the 
Draft Bill on Public Interest Actions and Class Actions proposed by the SALC (“the 
SALC’s draft Bill”) thereafter contains no limitations on the relief that could be attained 
through public interest actions.80 Public interest litigants are therefore not limited in the 
relief they seek.  
The Constitutional Court in Ferreira held that the provisions of section 7(4) did not 
limit standing in constitutional challenges to only rights in the Bill of Rights.81 The Court 
found that section 98(2) vests a general jurisdiction in the Constitutional Court to 
                                            
enables the Court to treat letters and petitions as writs launching public interest litigation. See part 3 3 
3 3 for an explanation of the term epistolary jurisdicition”. 
75 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 
27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 441. 
76 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 10. 
77 These filtering mechanisms are discussed in greater detail in part 4 2 2 1 below. 
78 C F Swanepoel “The Public Interest Action in South Africa: The Transformative Injunction of the South 
African Constitution” (2016) 41(2) Journal for Juridical Science 29 36. 
79 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 25 at 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. 
80 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
81 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 167. 
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interpret, protect and enforce the provisions of the Constitution.82 Swanepoel is of the 
view that this helps to pave the way for the SALC’s proposal that public interest actions 
should be introduced by way of legislation into non-constitutional areas of the law.83 
4 2 1 2 2 The undesirable public interest representative 
The adequate representation of the public interest is clearly an important consideration 
linked to public interest standing. It goes without saying that insufficient or mala fide 
representation creates the risk of cases being represented by parties with no real 
interest in the outcome or desire to benefit the public. Of the general categories of 
standing,84 it is necessary here to revisit that of the total stranger and “meddlesome 
interloper” or busybody. Both are undesirable public interest representatives.85  
A busybody – or, in the alternate words of Binch, “an unattached third party” – is an 
example of an undesirable litigant.86 They are applicants with improper or strictly 
private motives, and who consequently should not be allowed to litigate in the public 
interest. Third parties who initiate litigation when they do not have appropriate motive 
or interest in resolving the issues raised in adjudication may overburden court 
resources.87 However, Binch notes that the demands and practical costs of litigation 
help to discourage litigants intending to sue without forethought.88 
The busybody rationale is believed to safeguard personal autonomy. Personal 
autonomy is the idea that private individuals should be given decision-making power 
in matters concerning them. Public interest litigants thus pose a threat to individual 
conceptions of what comprises a “good life”.89 However, “one man’s busybody may be 
                                            
82 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 167. 
83 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 11 para 3.1.1. 
84 These categories are discussed in part 3 3 5 above. 
85 SP Gupta v President of India 1982 2 SCR 365. 
86 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
368. 
87 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
368. 
88 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
369. 
89 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
368. 
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another man’s saviour”,90 affording them access to justice they may not have obtained 
otherwise. This is particularly apt in matters where the litigant is representing the 
interests of disadvantaged persons. 
As has already been noted, public interest litigation in India became the subject of 
abuse by claimants who disguised private disputes as matters of public interest.91 The 
Constitutional Court has developed factors to give content to section 38(d) of the 
Constitution,92 which serve the purpose of excluding undesirable applicants from 
approaching the courts for relief in the public interest. These factors could be 
completed by integrating the SALC’s recommendations that deal with representatives 
who are shown to be unfit to litigate in the public interest.93 
4 2 1 2 3 The preferred public interest representative 
Preferred public interest representatives claim injury as members of the public, and 
not necessarily as a result of any personal loss or damage. Their rights and interests 
are those enjoyed by every member of the public.94 In its recommendations, the SALC 
was of the view that any person should be able to institute action in a court claiming 
relief by way of a public interest action in the interest of the public generally or of any 
particular section thereof, irrespective of whether or not such person has any direct, 
indirect or personal interest in the relief claimed.95.  
The public interest representative may be a person or an organisation. In India, 
approximately four-fifths of public interest litigation cases are filed by individuals.96 The 
                                            
90 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
368. In this article, the author quotes the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on Civil 
Litigation in the Public Interest (Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia, 1980) 61. 
91 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 2. See part 3 4 2 above. 
92 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) 
para 234; Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 
125 (CC) paras 18, 73. See part 2 4 3 above for a discussion of the requirements for invoking section 
38(d). 
93 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 26 at 4.4.5; see part 4 2 1 2 1 (a) above. 
94 M N Chaturvedi “Liberalizing the Requirement of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1984) 26 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 42 43. 
95 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 4. 
96 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 
27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 443. Some Indian individuals have filed and/or argued 
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Supreme Court held that it is the right of a public minded citizen to bring an action for 
the enforcement of fundamental rights of a disabled segment of the citizenry. This 
attitude enabled the applicant in Sheela Barse v Union of India,97 who was a social 
activist, to petition on behalf of children who were illegally detained in jails. The victims 
in this case fall under Dhavan’s sector of the “socially and politically powerless”,98 and 
had no hope of vindication of their rights without someone to act on their behalf.99 
Sheela Barse initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court by sending a report she had 
written which exposed the problem of mentally ill children jailed for “safekeeping”. As 
a result of the findings in her report, the Supreme Court declared the admission and 
detention of innocent, mentally ill persons to jails unconstitutional and illegal. As Iyer 
J stated in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v Union of India (“Fertilizer Corporation 
Kamgar Union”), which is particularly apt considering Sheela Barse’s connection with 
those she represented in court: 
“If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or 
concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the 
door of the court will not be ajar for him. But he belongs to an organisation which has 
special interest in the subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a 
busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him 
is justiciable may still remain to be considered.”100 
Cote and Van Garderen note that in South Africa, institutional applicants (such as 
NGOs) usually represent the public interest. The authors argue that, unlike most 
individuals, these NGOs are able to prevent cases from being lost if clients are no 
longer able or willing to continue.101 Organisations such as Lawyers for Human 
                                            
hundreds of PILs in their lifetimes. See, as an example, H V Nair “PIL warrior Prashat Nhushan: Scams, 
isolation and his beliefs” (2013) India Today. Available at: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pras-hat-
bhushan-coal-scam-2g-radia-tapes/1/321465.html>. There are even examples of university students 
invoking public interest standing. See in this regard Uhinnamma Sivdas v State (Delhi Administration) 
W.P. No. 2526 of 1982; Poola Bhaskara Vijayakumar v State of Andhra Pradesh and another W.P. No 
1822 of 1985; Mohini Jain v State of Kamataka 1992 3 SCC 666. In J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors 
of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 434 444 footnote 45, the author mentions other individuals who have filed hundreds of PILs. 
97 Sheela Barse v Union of India 1986 SCALE 6 230. 
98 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 322. 
99 See part 4 2 1 2 1 (d) above. 
100 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v Union of India 1981 AIR 344. 
101 D Cote and J van Garderen “Challenges to Public Interest Litigation in South Africa: External and 
Internal Challenges to Determining the Public Interest: Current Developments / Case Notes” (2011) 27 
South African Journal on Human Rights 167 174. The authors found that practical considerations, such 
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Rights,102 Dignity SA,103 the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals,104 Black Sash105 and the Psychological Society of South Africa106 have all 
litigated in the public interest in court, the latter three between 2016 and 2017 in the 
Constitutional Court. The Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI), Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) and Section 27 are other notable examples of organisations that are 
dedicated to campaigning for the realisation and enforcement of human rights. 
Evaluating the genuine interest of a public interest organisation will usually involve 
a perusal of its activities. Binch notes that this may be a barrier for more recently 
established organisations, but that it would be difficult to test genuine interest any other 
way.107 Although this judicial scrutiny is necessary to ensure the best representation 
for the public interest, the exercise of that discretion must be sensitive to the barriers 
impairing access to justice for individual members of socially disadvantaged groups.108 
It may seem inequitable that persons may be forced to accept consequences 
without having participated in the process determining those consequences, but this 
is a reality, regardless of whether litigation is brought by an individual or a group.109 In 
India, individual clients, who usually have little interest in longer-term legal positions 
and have fewer resources, can easily be persuaded to accept settlements. The result 
is that precedents favouring wealthier, routine litigators are more likely to become 
                                            
as transport costs and commitment to what can be a very lengthy litigation process, often deter clients 
from remaining on board with the litigation until completion. 
102 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC). 
103 Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Estate Stransham-Ford 2017 3 SA 152 (SCA) para 
76. 
104 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Another 2017 4 BCLR 517 (CC). According to the Court in paras 11 and 40 
respectively, the NSPCA operates in the public interest in combating animal cruelty. 
105 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others (Freedom Under Law NPC 
Intervening) 2017 3 SA 335 (CC). 
106 Psychological Society of South Africa v Qwelane and Others 2017 8 BCLR 1039 (CC). At paragraph 
17, the Court confirmed public interest standing for organisational applicants which are neither parties 
nor amicus curiae to a matter. See Campus Law Clinic (University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban) v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2006 6 SA 103 (CC), which the Court referred to in support of 
this finding. 
107 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
389 – 390. 
108 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
390. 
109 R Binch “The Mere Busybody: Autonomy, Equality and Standing” (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 367 
384. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
 
established in law, and precedents that might assist future non-repeat player litigants 
are less likely to become so.110 Fowkes notes that this occurs in South Africa too.111 
Unless measures are implemented in South Africa to prevent a similar progression as 
the number of cases brought in the public interest increases, access to justice of 
under-resourced South Africans may very well be inhibited. 
4 2 1 3  Recommendations 
The challenges facing South African courts will be to ensure that the disenfranchised 
are given a voice in public interest cases with outcomes that affect them directly, so 
as to be faithful to the public interest. It is submitted that South African courts can learn 
from the generally communally inclusive approach of the Indian Supreme Court, which 
is committed to engineering imaginative remedies that best meet the needs of victims 
of fundamental rights infringements.112 
This would be achieved by requiring public interest applicants to nominate 
representatives, who will act on behalf of the public on court approval. It is also 
recommended that courts should require proof of engagement between public interest 
representatives and those they represent, especially (and at least) those with a 
material interest in the outcome of the case. 
4 2 2   Management of public interest standing cases by the courts 
In line with its recommendations concerning public interest applicants and 
representatives, elements of the SALC’s draft Bill regulating public interest standing 
pertain to the role of courts in managing public interest standing.113 It is submitted that 
management of public interest standing at least to some extent by the courts is 
necessary because of the potential impact on the public (or portion thereof) by cases 
brought in the public interest. 
                                            
110 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 445. 
111 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 445. See S Budlender, G Marcus and NM 
Ferreira Public Interest Litigation and Social Change in South Africa: Strategies, Tactics and Lessons 
(2014) 9 – 10. 
112 G van Bueren “Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court” (1999) 15 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 52 68. This proposal is expanded on in part 4 2 3 below. 
113 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
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The SALC proposed that settlement, discontinuation or abandonment of an action 
brought in the public interest should only be possible with the court’s approval.114 This, 
along with making the identification of Bill of Rights adjudication as a public interest 
action and the appointment of an appropriate representative subject to approval of 
court, shows the SALC’s understanding that the courts should be placed in a better 
position to manage public interest standing cases. It is also a safeguard in the event 
of undesirable representatives attempting to rely on public interest standing with 
motives other than those for which the ground of standing was introduced to serve. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that courts will also be able to manage judicial resources 
more effectively if these provisions are implemented.  
The management of judicial resources and the effect of judgments in cases brought 
in the public interest are two important considerations to keep in mind when 
considering how courts can better manage cases brought in the public interest. These 
two elements discussed in this section aim to provide greater clarity on the 
consideration that must be had by courts when granting public interest standing and 
subsequently adjudicating matters brought in the public interest. 
4 2 2 1  Management of judicial resources 
In the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union, Iyer J displayed boldness in the 
face of the potential influx of public interest cases that could be brought by relaxed 
rules of standing, saying that “some risks have to be taken and more opportunities 
opened for the public-minded citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled 
from it by narrow pedantry now surrounding locus standi”.115 The South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal, too, noted that “[c]ourts are no strangers to floodgates 
arguments” and that this is not something to fear if cases are well-founded.116 These 
statements show the Indian and South African courts’ commitment to developing the 
law without fear. However, practice has revealed that courts also need to consider the 
resources they have at their disposal and how best to utilise them in order to promote 
access to justice in word and deed. 
                                            
114 Section 14 of the Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-
10-1995. 
115 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v Union of India 1981 AIR 344. 
116 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2012 
3 SA 486 (SCA) para 47. 
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Two concerns related to the relaxation of standing rules are that they will cause an 
unmanageable influx of litigation and thereby put strain on scarce judicial resources.117 
These have recently been reaffirmed as a challenge to the South African public 
interest environment.118 One way in which these resources should be managed, 
according to Hogg, is by applying them to real issues, as opposed to hypothetical 
ones.119 Here, it is pertinent to discuss the role the public interest litigation cells play 
in ensuring that only real issues and genuine public interest cases end up in court. 
The Indian Supreme Court relaxed the rules of locus standi to the point that it 
entertained letters from anyone alleging an injustice warranting constitutional 
investigation.120 The Indian courts have since had to introduce a filtering mechanism 
in the public interest litigation cells.121  A public interest litigation cell (sometimes 
referred to in the literature simply as a “PIL cell”) was established in the registry of the 
Supreme Court of India in 1985.122 This provided the Court with a means of sorting 
through all of the letters sent as public interest litigation petitions. These were read by 
judges and administrative staff of the Court alike, and over time guidelines were 
established for determining which letters could be entertained as writ petitions and 
which could not.123 These guidelines list specific categories of rights violations which 
may be entertained as public interest matters, and therefore help the public interest 
litigation cells to operate more efficiently.124  
                                            
117 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 75; P W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3 ed (1992) 1263. 
118 See part 2 5 2 above. 
119 P W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3 ed (1992) 1263. 
120 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 306 – 307; see part 3 3 4 2 4 above. 
121 S Ahuja People, Law and Justice: A Casebook of Public-Interest Litigation vol. II (1997) 774 – 776. 
See part 3 1 2 2 of this chapter above. 
122 S Ahuja People, Law and Justice: A Casebook of Public-Interest Litigation vol. II (1997) 774 – 776. 
123 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications). 
124 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications) 1 – 2. See part 4 3 2 below for a breakdown of the categories contained in 
the guidelines.  
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By 1994, a total of 159 666 letters had been received by the Court, and a total of 
94 832 cases had been lodged.125 Similar cells have since been established in various 
High Courts.126 Due to filtering mechanisms that the Indian Supreme Court has 
implemented, the Court now hears an average of 260 public interest litigation cases 
per year, which is only 0,4 per cent of its docket.127 These measures have clearly 
helped to manage the effect of extreme relation of locus standi allowed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Given the flood of cases brought in the public interest in India that warranted the 
implementation of the PIL cells, it is doubtful that such a measure128 would be 
necessary in South Africa. It is submitted that a “cell stage” would only be more 
burdensome on the judiciary. South African courts do not have the same case load as 
their Indian counterparts.129 A cell stage is also unnecessary in South Africa because 
of the safeguards developed by the courts to manage public interest standing, which 
are sufficiently comprehensive to prevent abuse of public interest standing as in India.  
 The SALC lists the Constitutional Court, High Courts, Land Claims Court, Labour 
Court and Magistrates’ Courts as courts that should be able to hear matters brought 
in the public interest.130 It also proposed that the Minister of Justice be given discretion 
to designate any other courts too.131 A range of courts with jurisdiction to hear cases 
brought in the public interest will help to spread the case load by making potential 
litigants aware of the forums in which they can seek judicial redress. The value of this 
proposal is enhanced by the fact that it is only the Indian Supreme Court and High 
Courts that can hear cases brought in the public interest. 
                                            
125 S Ahuja People, Law and Justice: A Casebook of Public-Interest Litigation vol. II (1997) 775. 
126 S Ahuja People, Law and Justice: A Casebook of Public-Interest Litigation vol. II (1997) 776. 
127 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 452; V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: 
Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank Development Research Group Human 
Development and Public Services Team Policy Research Working Paper 5109 (2009) 10. 
128 S Ahuja People, Law and Justice: A Casebook of Public-Interest Litigation vol. II (1997) 774 – 776. 
129 J Rowlatt “India Chief Justice in ‘Tearful’ Plea for More Judges” (2016) BBC World. Available at 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36125018>. 
130 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 30 at 4.8.2. 
131 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 30 at 4.8.2. 
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4 2 2 2  The effect of judgments in cases brought in the public interest 
The crafting of public interest remedies in India currently lacks involvement by affected 
parties.132 Susman notes that the remedies ordered by the Indian High Courts have 
more accurately reflected the wishes and needs of the victims than the Supreme 
Court.133 This, she notes, is because the High Courts are more inclined to grant 
remedies in line with traditional norms.134 In cases where affected persons in a public 
interest litigation suit are not given a voice in court, the “public interest” is left to the 
courts to determine. Thus, without the involvement of those affected by the breach of 
rights in the Bill of Rights, remedies granted may not be most fitting, and their 
effectiveness may be undermined.135  
In Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa,136 the Constitutional Court 
held that the relief sought in litigation of a public character is generally forward-looking 
and general in its application, and therefore it may directly affect a wide range of 
people. In addition, the harm alleged may be “diffuse or amorphous”.137 This does not 
preclude relief sought from being retrospective in nature. Insofar as the effect of 
judgments in cases brought in the public interest is concerned, Van Bueren recognises 
that the potential of South African courts to uphold human rights is even greater than 
that of its Indian counterparts. Whereas the Indian Constitution contains Directive 
Principles, which the author describes as “weak”, South African courts are called to 
enforce “strong rights”.138  
In South Africa, the SALC proposed that judgment in public interest actions is not 
res judicata against all interested parties.139 This means that the judgment does not 
                                            
132 The involvement of affected parties is discussed in greater detail in part 4 2 1 2 1 (c) above. 
133 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 90 – 93. 
134 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 92. 
135 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 90. 
136 2009 1 SA 417 (CC). 
137 Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 417 (CC) para 23. The Court here was 
referring to Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 
984 (CC) para 229. 
138 G van Bueren “Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court” (1999) 15 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 52 67. 
139 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 8 at 2.4.3. 
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bind the people in whose interest it is brought.140 They would therefore still have 
opportunities to litigate their own claims. This is different to the Indian approach. The 
Indian courts have recognised the need to prevent more than one case being raised 
from the same cause of action and so decided that judgment in public interest actions 
is res judicata.141 
 Whether or not a judgment is binding on the people in whose interest the case was 
brought, it is submitted that the doctrine of res judicata bears less weight if judgments 
handed down in public interest matters take cognisance of the needs and desires of 
the persons concerned and seek to provide relief that is effective. A well-researched 
and sufficiently supported matter142 brought by a suitably qualified public interest 
representative143 will enable courts to make judgments that take into consideration all 
those affected by the impugned conduct or legislation.144 
In Ferreira, O’Regan J noted that litigation of a public or constitutional nature 
generally can be said to affect more people than private litigation.145 In fact, forward-
looking relief is specifically sought so that it may directly affect a wide range of 
people.146 However, relaxed rules of public interest standing pose a risk of prejudice 
to persons who would be affected by a decision, but are not before the court.147 It is 
therefore of great importance that due regard is given to a determination of the public 
interest in each case before the courts, as well as participation of those affected in 
order to do so. 
 One of the ways in which courts can best manage the development of public interest 
standing is by keeping in mind the range of persons affected by judgments handed 
down in matters where relief is sought on behalf of the public. This is because, as 
                                            
140 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 v para 2. 
141 Karam Chand Anr v Union Of India & Ors (24 April 2014) (National Green Tribunal) para 25. 
142 In this regard, see part 4 2 3 below. 
143 See part 4 2 1 2 1 above. 
144 In this regard, see S Budlender, G Marcus and N M Ferreira Public Interest Litigation and Social 
Change in South Africa: Strategies, Tactics and Lessons (2014) 109 – 126. Here, the authors discuss 
seven factors to ensure that public interest litigation effects social change. 
145 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 229. 
146 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 229. 
147 Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 4 SA 125 (CC) 
para 75; P W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3 ed (1992) 1263. 
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mentioned, the relief granted will affect the public, whether at large or only in part. A 
requirement of notice “or otherwise” in event of settlement, abandonment or 
discontinuance, as proposed by the SALC,148 would show consideration and respect 
to the number and range of persons likely to be affected by judgments. Giving notice 
is a way of keeping the public informed.149 Judicial resources could potentially also be 
better managed if courts have warning regarding such changes in the court roll. 
Swanepoel recommends that another significant consideration related to the nature 
of the relief sought should be whether the relief granted has the potential of 
significantly transforming society and reinforcing the constitutional legal order.150 The 
author believes that a public interest action is more likely to be approved by a court if 
the nature of the relief sought is consistent with the crafting of suitable remedies that 
foster the ideals and values of constitutional societal transformation.151 
4 2 2 3  Recommendations 
A danger inherent to a relaxed approach to standing under section 38(d) of the 
Constitution is the influx of litigants that the courts may have to deal with and, in their 
wake, a proliferation of issues allegedly brought in the public interest. However, the 
Constitutional Court has developed safeguards to prevent the flood of litigation 
experienced by the Indian Supreme Court that occurred in the wake of epistolary 
jurisdiction and the relaxation of standing rules.152 
It will not be necessary to introduce a cell stage in future if recommendations 
regarding regulating public interest standing in this thesis are implemented. However, 
public interest litigation cells may in future offer a way in which judicial resources can 
be better managed, especially if key areas of consideration are not implemented. Even 
if the “cautious minimalism” approach of the courts changes, the exploitation of public 
                                            
148 Section 14 of the Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-
10-1995. 
149 Section 14 of the Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-
10-1995. 
150 C F Swanepoel “The Public Interest Action in South Africa: The Transformative Injunction of the 
South African Constitution” (2016) 41(2) Journal for Juridical Science 29 44. 
151 C F Swanepoel “The Public Interest Action in South Africa: The Transformative Injunction of the 
South African Constitution” (2016) 41(2) Journal for Juridical Science 29 44. 
152 See part 3 3 3 3 above. 
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interest standing could be discouraged through punitive cost orders,153 which act as a 
safeguard against meddlers.154 
Lastly, it is recommended that courts require notice in event of settlement, 
abandonment or discontinuance. This is a way of keeping public interest 
representatives accountable to those they represent. 
4 2 3   Involvement of third parties to assist in cases brought in the public interest 
The relaxation of standing rules to accommodate public interest standing has seen the 
disappearance of the direct (or personal) interest requirement. A potential public 
interest litigant in South Africa no longer needs to prove that they personally suffered 
damage as a result of the alleged infringement of rights. The relaxation of standing to 
allow public interest standing and disappearance of the direct interest requirement 
have therefore been linked to the loss of the litigant as a source of facts.155 
In an attempt to promote access to justice and to have the vox populi brought to 
court by public interest representatives, the courts may need to share the fact-finding 
burden with the litigant. This does not mean to say that well-meaning bystanders who 
are completely unacquainted with the facts should be given an expectation that the 
courts will bear the fact-finding burden.156 Rather, those litigants who act genuinely in 
the public interest, but may lack the resources or knowledge to represent the public 
best in the matter, should be supported in their endeavours to benefit the public. 
In India, public interest proceedings entail a cooperative or collaborative effort on 
the part of the petitioner, the State or public authority and the court to enforce 
constitutional rights of the community, and to ensure social justice.157 Third parties 
                                            
153 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 64. 
154 Wildlife Society of Southern Africa v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the RSA 1996 
3 SA 1095 (Tk) at 1106G; T Ngcukaitobi “The Evolution of Standing Rules in South Africa and Their 
Significance in Promoting Social Justice” (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 604. 
155 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 80. 
156 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 80 – 81. The author notes that the 
relaxation of standing rules in India placed a fact-finding burden on the judiciary. The large number of 
cases filed in the public interest increased this burden to an unmanageable level. 
157 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India 1982 AIR 1473 3 – 6; L Seth “Social Action 
Litigation in India” in S Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective 
(1995) 99 – 101. The court sets out a detailed exposition of what this process entails. 
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may therefore have much to offer both public interest litigants and the courts in cases 
brought in the public interest. Some of them have the ability to raise issues that pertain 
to the public interest, whereas others have the capacity to assist public petitioners to 
present their cases in court. Experts and commissions, for example, may also have a 
role to play in the public interest by helping to ascertain the genuineness of matters 
presented, as well as ensuring that those represented are given an audible voice in 
court. 
Public interest standing can facilitate the involvement of more voices and issues 
raised. A key feature of public interest litigation is that, by forming alliances between 
the disadvantaged, academics and professionals, it empowers people to “take on, 
discipline and interrogate power”.158 In fact, Dhavan notes a correlation between the 
efficacy of public interest litigation and intervention of lawyers, judges, informed 
activists and the media.159 Thus, public interest standing is invoked by a person or 
organisation, but requires these third parties to assist in representing the public 
interest adequately. 
It must also be noted that the development of public interest standing in both India 
and South Africa can contribute to the prevention of self-help.160 The Indian Supreme 
Court has noted that failure of the courts to provide relief to persons concerned about 
a matter may encourage such persons to prefer the “streets as dispenser of justice”.161  
4 2 3 1  The appointment of experts and commissions by courts 
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the Indian Supreme Court noted that article 32 of the Indian 
Constitution afforded the Court an “implied and inherent … power to appoint a 
commission or an investigating body” in public interest litigation cases.162 It also has 
the power to appoint investigative commissions163 and commissions to monitor 
                                            
158 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 321, 323. 
159 R Dhavan “Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India” (1994) 36 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
302 324. 
160 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 71. 
161 Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v Union of India 1981 AIR 344 353. 
162 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67 91. 
163 A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833 842. 
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compliance.164 These appointments have the capacity to ensure centrality of the public 
interest in proceedings. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha, for example, the commission was 
able to provide confirmation of the inhumane work environment of stone quarry 
labourers alleged by the petitioner.165 Fact-finding commissions also help to lessen 
the evidentiary burden for underprivileged litigants.166 The National Human Rights 
Commission, too, is responsible for routinely attending to certain types of violations 
once precedent has been set in the Supreme Court, and provides investigative support 
to the Supreme Court.167  
It follows that courts may convene a committee of experts to contribute specialised 
knowledge on the subject matter of the litigation, especially complex socio-economic 
or scientific issues, for example.168 These experts and commissions could provide the 
court with details regarding what would constitute appropriate relief, how many people 
might be directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the court, the degree of 
their vulnerability, the consequences of the infringement of the right or rights in 
question, and whether those persons or groups have been given an opportunity to 
present evidence and argument to the court.169 This, in turn, would enable courts to 
evaluate the genuineness of the public interest applicant. 
4 2 3 2  Amici curiae 
The Rules of the South African Constitutional Court permit a person with an interest in 
a matter before the Court who is not a party in the matter to be admitted as an amicus 
curiae (or “friend of the court”).170 This traditionally occurs at the request of the court 
                                            
164 A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833 842. 
165 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67 at 68. 
166 See Wangla v Union of India 1988 1 Scale 188. 
167 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court – Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 463. 
168 A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833 842. See part 4 2 1 2 1 (c) above. 
169 All of these potential areas of fact-finding pertain to the factors to determine the genuineness of the 
public interest litigant, as listed by O’Regan J in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others 
v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 234. In this regard, see part 2 4 4 1 above. 
170 Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31-10-2003, rule 10; I Currie & J De 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 15 – 16; K Hofmeyr “Rules and Procedure in 
Constitutional Matters” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 
3 2007) 5–4. See also Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 11 BCLR 1235 (CC) para 63, where the 
court defines and describes amici curiae. 
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to represent unrepresented parties or interests or to help the court answer original 
questions of law that may surface during a matter.171 Since the introduction of the 
South African Constitution, a further type of amicus has been introduced, namely, 
amici curiae who wish to intervene in a matter to advance a position of their choosing. 
Budlender is of the view that this type of friend of the court can promote participatory 
democracy in matters of public interest and assist in representing a range of people 
and interests that would otherwise not appear before the court in a given matter.172  
In the case of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,173 the Constitutional Court 
held that, in addition to having an interest, the submissions of the amicus curiae must 
be relevant to the proceedings and must raise new contentions which may be useful 
to the court. Provided the latter two requirements are met, the courts will not refuse 
the application of an amicus purely because of a lack of a sufficient interest in the 
issues of law and policy related to the matter at hand.174 Submissions from amici curiae 
lengthen court proceedings and can also cause delays.175 However, in Ferriera, the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged the “valuable assistance” offered by the amici 
curiae.176 On many other occasions, too, the Court has recognised the importance of 
amici curiae and the way they aid the Court in its deliberations.177 
In India, amici curiae can be appointed by the court to find relevant factual data, 
provide comparative examples from other courts, suggest innovative remedies and 
ensure that the court does not overlook important considerations.178 They can also 
assist in seeing public interest actions through even if the original petitioners are 
                                            
171 G Budlender “Amicus Curiae” in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2 ed (OS 07 2006) 8-1. 
172 G Budlender “Amicus Curiae” in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2 ed (OS 07 2006) 8-1. 
173 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 9. 
174 G Budlender “Amicus Curiae” in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2 ed (OS 07 2006) 8-10. 
175 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children & Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development & Another 2014 2 SA 168 (CC); S Budlender, G Marcus and N M Ferreira Public Interest 
Litigation and Social Change in South Africa: Strategies, Tactics and Lessons (2014) 20. 
176 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 4. 
177 K Hofmeyr “Rules and Procedure in Constitutional Matters” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 3 2007) 5–10. 
178 A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833 842. 
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unable or unwilling to.179 However, the Indian Supreme Court’s choices of amici have 
been criticised for being “extremely ad hoc”, for adding little value to proceedings by 
way of their interventions and, moreover, for generally affording amici too much power 
and responsibility in public interest actions, which undermines the host of other voices 
they theoretically represent.180 If provided for in legislation concerning public interest 
actions, this imbalance can be better avoided in South Africa. 
4 2 3 3  The role of social movements 
Van Bueren notes that the South African public’s interest in using law and litigation to 
alleviate poverty is discouraged by a lack of awareness of legal processes and a 
familiarity with the daily injustices which occur despite constitutional guarantees.181 
Experience in India has shown public interest petitioners the value of public awareness 
and support, as well as the involvement of the media.182 During the Emergency of 
1975 – 1977, the press in India was restricted by government censorship, but reacted 
thereafter by providing widespread coverage on instances of injustice to keep the 
population informed.183  
Cote and Van Garderen have contended that South Africa needs social movements 
to ensure acceptance and support for public interest litigation initiatives.184 This will 
help to relieve pressure on institutions that are currently instituting cases in the public 
interest. It will also aid in addressing the involvement of more voices in these cases, 
which, according to Susman’s findings, is imperative if public interest standing is 
indeed going to serve the public interest. 
In order for public interest actions to be brought timeously and comprehensively, 
taking the public interest into account fully, there is a need for involvement from civil 
                                            
179 A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 
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180 A M Sood “Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India” (2008) 41 
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181 G van Bueren “Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court” (1999) 15 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 52 53. 
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Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833 896 – 898. 
183 U Baxi “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” (1985) 4 
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society, non-governmental organisations and Chapter 9 institutions, such as the South 
African Human Rights Commission.185 There is also a need for the education and 
training of lawyers to embrace not only the narrower traditional means of legal 
education, but to secure the input of community groups and non-governmental 
organisations. This, in turn, will facilitate involvement by affected parties, which has a 
particular impact on the crafting of remedies in the public interest.186 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has recommended that legal 
professionals be encouraged to work with non-governmental organisations to train and 
enlarge their fields of pro bono work in the economic, social and cultural field.187  
Similarly, Van Bueren entreats the legal profession to assume greater compassion in 
its quest for an accessible legal system.188 Lawyers are in a position to champion 
causes on behalf of the people in matters affecting the public interest and should use 
their skills to ensure greater resource allocation and combat systemic injustice.189 
There are many examples in Indian case law of lawyers bringing matters to court in 
the public interest.190 
In the context of both India and South Africa, Fowkes notes that public interest 
standing enables members of the public to act as alarm bells. In other words, members 
of the public are able to institute cases concerning violation of rights that would 
otherwise not have been litigated had it not been for public interest standing. This is 
possible especially in the absence of high costs of approaching court.191 
A central goal of all cases brought genuinely in the public interest is to effect positive 
change for the public in the long run. However, in order for this to be made possible, 
public interest litigants will need support to research the given legal issues thoroughly, 
                                            
185 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 463. 
186 See the discussion in part 4 2 1 2 1 (c) above for a more detailed explanation of the role of the voices 
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to time the filing of their cases well and to coordinate the sharing of information 
amongst the different actors.192 Dugard and Langford note that litigation supported by 
social movements in these ways is more likely to be impactful regardless of the 
outcome of the case, and that civil society will be empowered as a result.193 This point 
is illustrated in the cases of Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg (“Mazibuko”),194 which 
centred on the enforcement of the right of access to water under section 27 of the 
Constitution, and Leon Joseph v City of Johannesburg (“Joseph”),195 which concerned 
the right to electricity. 
Significantly, the applicants in Mazibuko were supported by the Anti-Privatisation 
Campaign’s (“APC”) broader drive for access to water, whereas the applicants in 
Joseph who were applying only for the reconnection of their electricity had no such 
support from civil society.196 Thus, notwithstanding the judicial defeat, the litigation in 
Mazibuko positively impacted water campaigns beyond that of APC, and gave hope 
to other movements against the commercialisation of basic services.197 On a practical 
level, the litigation also resulted in the City of Johannesburg increasing the amount of 
water it provided to the poorest households in the city.198 Despite the judicial victory in 
Joseph on the other hand, the Constitutional Court’s order pertaining to reconnection 
of electricity to the building concerned was impossible to implement because of 
damage caused in the interim.199 These examples illustrate the importance of support 
from civil society in public interest litigation, and the fact that a single case brought in 
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the Dangers of Legal Determinism” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 39 57 – 58. 
198 J Dugard & M Langford “Art or Science? Synthesizing Lessons from Public Interest Litigation and 
the Dangers of Legal Determinism” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 39 58. 
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the public interest can have a great social effect if part of broader social movements 
and campaigns. 
4 2 3 4  Recommendations 
In order for anyone – from the common person with little or no knowledge of the law 
and legal procedures, to a senior advocate – to be able to claim relief in the public 
interest for an infringement of rights, it will not be sufficient merely to act genuinely in 
the public interest and to prove the public’s interest in the relief sought. Litigation in 
the public interest often affects many people and interests beyond the parties before 
the court.200 The voices of these other affected persons may not play a role in the 
litigation process at all, unless public interest litigants rely on the insight and 
involvement of third parties to claim the most meaningful and fitting remedies on behalf 
of the public. In this way, the impact of public interest cases will permeate larger 
portions of the public, irrespective of the judicial outcomes. 
It is recommended that courts encourage public participation, media coverage of 
human rights issues, as well as the involvement of experts, commissions and amici 
curiae in matters brought in the public interest. All South Africans have an interest in 
the infringement of rights in the Bill of Rights generally that affect the public at large or 
in part, and everyone should be informed and assisted if they do not personally have 
sufficient facts to tackle systemic injustices. 
4 3   Public interest standing: Potential legislative interventions 
4 3 1   Current position in South Africa 
At present, there is no legislation in South Africa or India that regulates public interest 
standing. The Indian Supreme Court has found occasion to state that it is “imperative” 
that clear guidelines and propositions be laid down, especially concerning locus 
standi.201 Although the need for such legislation has been expressed in both 
jurisdictions, the respective legislatures have failed to do so. As a result, the 
                                            
200 G Budlender “Amicus Curiae” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2 ed (OS 07 2006) 8-1. 
201 Janata Dal v H S Chowdhary AIR 1993 SC 892 para 61. The Court did, however, take cognisance 
of the fact that this is not a unanimous viewpoint, and that one school of thought believed that laying 
down general rules would not be expedient. In this regard, see SP Gupta v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 
149 para 20. 
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formulation of rules and procedures regarding public interest standing has been left to 
the courts.  
It is a fact that the law of procedure itself is constantly adapted and incrementally 
developed in the course of societal transformation, but that this development must be 
in line with the Constitution.202 The SALC’s draft Bill sought to provide rules and clarity 
regarding these procedures.203 The locus standi provision in section 38(d) of the South 
African Constitution may have been relaxed to enable actions in the public interest to 
be brought even by persons without a direct interest in the matter, but the SALC clearly 
envisaged the assurance of greater access to justice through the implementation of 
enabling legislation.204   
4 3 2   Lessons from India 
The language of article 32 of the Indian Constitution is very broad. It does not specify 
how or by whom the judiciary can be moved.205 Although this has enabled the 
Supreme Court to grant creative remedies in the enforcement of fundamental rights, 
the lack of procedure has led to arguably haphazard development of public interest 
standing in India which, today, traverses far beyond the scope and objective originally 
intended by the initiators of public interest litigation. 
As the Indian judiciary is aware of the problems associated with public interest 
litigation, an attempt was made in 1996 at curbing the misuse of public interest 
litigation in the form of a private member Bill introduced in Indian Parliament.206 This 
Bill noted the purpose of public interest litigation, as well as the fact that the 
mechanism intended to benefit the poor was being misused. It sought to hold the 
judiciary accountable207 for the priority that public interest litigation cases were being 
                                            
202 C F Swanepoel “The Public Interest Action in South Africa: The Transformative Injunction of the 
South African Constitution” (2016) 41(2) Journal for Juridical Science 29 31. 
203 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995. 
204 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 20 at 3.5.1. 
205 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67 12. 
206 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 38. 
207 V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The World Bank 
Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team Policy Research 
Working Paper 5109 (2009) 4. 
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given over a backlog of other cases.208 However, the proposed Bill did not receive the 
support of all political parties and therefore lapsed.209  
The Supreme Court has also compiled a set of guidelines to be followed for 
entertaining letters or petitions that it receives.210 These were introduced to help courts 
to deal with the influx of public interest cases being filed and to determine which 
matters may be brought in the public interest. These guidelines stipulate ten categories 
under which petitions must fall if they are to be classified as public interest litigation 
and specify which matters will not be admitted.211  
The categories under which petitions must fall are: bonded labour matters; 
neglected children; non-payment of wages to workers and exploitation of casual 
workers and complaints of violation of labour laws (except in individual cases); 
petitions from jails complaining of harassment; petitions against police for refusing to 
register a case, harassment by police and death in police custody; petitions against 
atrocities on women;212 petitions complaining of harassment or torture of villagers by 
co-villagers or by police;213 petitions pertaining to environmental pollution, disturbance 
of ecological imbalance, drugs, food adulteration, maintenance of heritage and culture, 
antiques, forest and wildlife and other matters of public importance; petitions from riot 
victims; and family pension.214 Matters that will not be entertained are those that 
                                            
208 A H Desai and S Muraldihar S “Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems” (2000) International 
Environmental Law Research Centre 15. 
209 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 38. 
210 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications). 
211 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications) 3; S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 
Civil Justice Quarterly 19 38 – 39.  
212 In particular, harassments of brides, bride-burning, rape, murder and kidnapping. Supreme Court of 
India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions Received in this Court 
as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and subsequent 
modifications) 1. 
213 Specifically from persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Caste Tribes and economically 
backward classes. Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining 
Letters/Petitions Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 
01-12-1988 and subsequent modifications) 2. 
214 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications) 1 – 2. 
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pertain to landlord-tenant matters; service matters and those pertaining to pension and 
gratuity; complaints against government departments and local bodies other than 
complaints covered in the list of admissible matters; admission to educational 
institutions; and petitions for early hearing of cases pending in High Courts and other 
lower courts.215  
As a result of stricter guidelines in place, the Supreme Court considered around 95 
per cent of public interest litigation petitions to be frivolous in a statement made in 
2008.216 The guidelines, which were put to use by courts and public interest cells, 
helped to give greater content to public interest standing and also provided the public 
with greater certainty regarding the issues for which public interest standing could be 
utilised. 
4 3 3 Potential legislative means through which to develop public interest 
standing  
It is clear that purposive and creative interpretation of section 38(d) of the South 
African Constitution should thus remain on South African courts’ agendas.217 This 
method of interpretation focuses on the realisation of the values in the Constitution, 
and will encourage the further facilitation of access to justice.218 However, this can be 
strengthened by legislation or rules of court giving effect and content to public interest 
standing. Courts and litigants alike need legislation to give meaning to section 38(d).  
When considering future development of public interest standing, Fowkes suggests 
that South Africa should focus on procedural reforms aimed at enhancing access to 
justice, as these will help the courts to hear more people and more issues.219 However, 
the SALC expressly stated that “[i]t will not open the doors of access to justice if public 
interest actions were subjected to complicated and costly procedures and 
                                            
215 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications) 3. 
216 S Deva “Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review” (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 19 39. 
217 N J Udombana “Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights in Emerging 
Democracies” (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 47 47. 
218 J Radebe “Address by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Mr Jeff Radebe on 
the occasion of Access to Justice Conference” (2011), Sandton. Available at: 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/2011/20110708_min_ajc.html>. 
219 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court – Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 436. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
128 
 
requirements.”220 Legislation could also play a role in managing the cost of 
procedures, which would greatly enhance access to justice.221 
There are two ways in which public interest standing can be regulated statutorily, 
namely by Act of Parliament and by Rules of Court. Both of these legislative means 
are discussed below. Owing to the fact that standing has traditionally acted as a 
gatekeeper to the courts,222 more liberalised rules regarding these provisions in both 
India and South Africa generate the fear that courts will become overburdened. 
However, the South African Constitutional Court has recognised that courts must 
facilitate access to justice. The most significant way in which legislation will help in this 
regard is by providing clear rules and procedures for the implementation of actions in 
the public interest. 
4 3 3 1  Regulation of public interest standing by an Act of Parliament 
Swanepoel notes that litigation subsequent to the recommendations published by the 
SALC has fulfilled some of its predictions pertaining to public interest standing.223 This 
calls into question whether the enactment of legislation is necessary to address the 
concerns of the SALC. 
However, the SALC noted in Working Paper 57 that the enactment of a statute 
authorising public interest actions would demonstrate acceptance of the concept of 
litigation in the public interest.224 Statutory law promotes legal certainty, and makes 
the law accessible.225 Procedures in statute aim to ensure that rights and obligations 
are observed.226 Additionally, the legislature can enable the executive to make 
                                            
220 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 25 at 4.4.4. 
221 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 25 at 4.4.4. 
222 S D Susman “Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest 
Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 81. 
223 C F Swanepoel “The Judicial Application of the ‘Interest’ Requirement for Standing in Constitutional 
Cases: ‘A Radical and Deliberate Departure from Common Law’” (2014) 47 De Jure 63 69. The key 
concerns of the SALC are highlighted in part 2 3 3 above. 
224 South African Law Commission Working Paper 57: The Recognition of a Class Action in South 
African Law (1995) 12 at 2.11. 
225 W D Popkin Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (1999) 93. 
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decisions regarding Bill of Rights issues by means of Acts of Parliament that regulate 
complex situations.227  
The advantages of legislation are counter-balanced by the danger of over-
legislating. There is also the chance that legislation will require interpretation of the 
courts to give it meaning. However, as there is currently no legislation pertaining to 
public interest standing, over-legislation is less of a danger in this area specifically. 
The primary concern regarding development of public interest standing in South 
African Bill of Rights litigation is that legislation would be unnecessary, as the courts 
have already interpreted and elaborated section 38(d) of the Constitution. 
4 3 3 2  Regulation of public interest standing by Rules of Court 
The Rules Board for Courts of Law Act228 empowers the Rules Board for Courts of 
Law (“the Rules Board”) to review, amend and repeal rules of court in the Supreme 
Court, High Courts and lower courts.229 The purpose of this Act is “to provide for the 
making of rules for the efficient, expeditious and uniform administration of justice”.230 
It is clear, therefore, that rules of court function to improve the administration of justice. 
According to section 173 of the South African Constitution which confers power 
upon the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the High Court “to protect and 
regulate their own process … taking into account the interests of justice”.231 Section 
165(2) of the Constitution states that the courts are independent except insofar as they 
must comply with the Constitution and the law.232 
 In Glenister v President of Republic of South Africa (“Glenister”),233 the 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether to condone the late filing of the applicant’s 
application for leave to appeal.234 There may be instances where reasons for a 
judgment are only furnished after the date of the order, which is when the 15-day time 
                                            
227 F I Michelman “Separation of Powers” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (OS 6 2008) 12–88. 
228 107 of 1985. 
229 Section 6 of the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985 stipulates the powers of the Rules 
Board. 
230 Preamble of the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985. 
231 Section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
232 Section 165(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
233 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
234 Glenister v President of Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 43 – 50. 
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limit is triggered. The Uniform Rules of Court235 have been amended to provide for this 
dilemma by postponing the commencement of the period within which leave must be 
sought until reasons have been delivered.236 However, there had been no such 
amendment of the Constitutional Court Rules.237 The Court noted that section 173 of 
the Constitution should only be invoked under exceptional circumstances. The use of 
this power to promulgate the relevant rule was found to be justified on the facts 
because there were neither rules nor legislation dealing with the dilemma in 
question.238 The Court found it necessary to adopt a fitting interim procedure.239 
 The decision in Glenister is a concrete example where the Constitutional Court 
found it necessary to amend the Constitutional Court Rules in the interests of justice. 
On the facts, the amendment was necessary to address a dilemma that had arisen in 
practice. There is consequently no reason to prevent the Constitutional Court from 
amending its Rules to regulate proceedings brought in the public interest which are, 
as of yet, not dealt with therein. It is therefore recommended that the Constitutional 
Court codify the guidelines already laid down in Ferreira and Lawyers for Human 
Rights.240 Certain additional recommendations made for the content of legislation or 
rules in this regard already appear in the Constitutional Court Rules.241 The Rules 
Board is statutorily empowered to effect the same changes in the Uniform Rules of 
Court.  
4 3 4   Potential certification of public interest actions 
The SALC decided that it would not be in the interest of access to justice to 
recommend a certification process for matters brought in the public interest. However, 
in light of the abuse of public interest standing in India, as well as considerations raised 
in this thesis for the development of public interest standing,242 it is worth re-
                                            
235 Uniform Rules of the High Court GN R315 in GG 19834 of 12-03-1999. 
236 Glenister v President of Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 46. 
237 Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31-10-2003. 
238 Glenister v President of Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 47 – 48. 
239 Glenister v President of Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 48. 
240 See parts 2 4 4 1 and 2 4 4 2 respectively. 
241 Part 4 3 4 below offers recommendations for the content of legislation or rules of court. 
242 See parts 4 2 1, 4 2 2 and 4 2 3 above for discussions of the key considerations concerning the 
development of public interest standing in South Africa. 
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considering the advantages of including this step for the purpose of refining public 
interest standing. 
 Although creating a barrier to court, a certification process can help to prevent 
abuse of public interest standing. In addition to this, it can serve to protect the interests 
of those who are absent during the public interest proceedings.243 In practice, this 
procedure would entail the public interest litigant approaching the court for relief in the 
public interest. Once an appropriate representative has been nominated and 
appointed,244 the court would issue an order certifying the action as such in order for 
it to proceed. The court could then determine the procedure to be followed thereafter, 
and the case could be heard and decided.245 
 By following this procedure, courts will be enabled to decide before hearing a matter 
whether or not the litigant is approaching the court genuinely in the public interest and 
whether, on evidence presented, the public has an interest in the relief claimed. The 
court is also given an opportunity to evaluate the nominated representative(s) in order 
to ensure that they are suitably qualified before the matter proceeds, thereby limiting 
unmeritorious public interest actions.246  
This proposal may not promise access to justice to the extent that the Indian 
Supreme Court deemed necessary for the Indian population, and may even limit 
access to justice on the face of it in South Africa. However, it can aid the courts in 
managing their resources more effectively and ensuring that the necessary preliminary 
steps are decided (such as ensuring that the voices of those affected are heard), 
before the matter commences in court.  
4 3 5   Recommendations for content of legislation 
4 3 5 1  Determination of an action as a public interest action 
It would be of value to all parties to public interest proceedings to be able to determine 
with certainty whether or not an action should proceed as a public interest action. The 
                                            
243 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 39 at 5.5.5.  
244 See part 4 2 1 2 1 (a) above. 
245 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 40 at 5.5.7. 
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SALC addressed two significant aspects that could assist in this regard.247 The first is 
for the court to differentiate between an action in the public interest and an own-interest 
action based on a public right.248 Legislation is necessary to provide a definition for the 
phrase “in the public interest”, for which there are currently several meanings. This 
definition should take cognisance of the definitions proposed by the SALC and 
developed by the courts.249  
 The definition for a public interest action suggested by the SALC is “an action 
instituted by a representative of the public generally, or in the interest of a section of 
the public, but not necessarily in that representative’s own interest”.250 A comparable 
definition offered by the Indian Supreme Court is “an action initiated in a court of law 
for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public … [has] 
pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are 
affected”.251 
 It is submitted that the definition offered by the SALC focuses on the genuineness 
of the applicant, by emphasising that the action being brought is first and foremost in 
the interest of the public. The emphasis in the definition offered by the Indian Supreme 
Court, however, creates an onus of proof requiring a public interest petitioner to 
demonstrate what exactly it is that the public has an interest in, in order for such 
petitioner to be afforded public interest standing. A combination of these two definitions 
would therefore be most fitting, and would take cognisance of the South African 
Constitutional Court’s approach to public interest standing.252 
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41(2) Journal for Juridical Science 29 37 – 41. 
250 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 24 at 4.3.4. 
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4 3 5 2  Guidelines for potential public interest applicants 
Without the existence of epistolary jurisdiction in South Africa, which enables courts 
to hear matters brought to them simply by letter,253 potential public interest applicants 
require professional legal assistance to launch proceedings in the public interest. This 
dependence on the legal fraternity to approach the courts can be considered 
somewhat of a barrier of access to justice for the common person. Anyone without 
legal training or insight into court procedure will need time, money and an ability to 
employ legalese in order to assemble a case.  
It would therefore be of great value to individuals or organisations contemplating 
bringing an action in the public interest to have access to guidelines regarding matters 
brought in the public interest. In this regard, the user-friendly guidelines drawn up by 
Muraldihar for practice and procedure of public interest litigation in the Indian Supreme 
Court offer much assistance.254 These guidelines deal with the conversion of a 
problem into a case, counselling, preparing a case, drafting the petition, preparing the 
file and the hearing of the case. Such documentation would certainly make public 
interest law more accessible to the average South African, and enable a greater 
number of voices to be represented in public interest matters.  
4 3 5 3  Relief claimed in the public interest 
It is suggested that public interest applicants specify whether the action they wish to 
bring is in the interest of the public generally or in the interest of a particular section of 
the public. This will aid the court in its application of a number of the factors to 
determine the genuineness of the applicant. These factors include the nature of the 
relief sought, whether the relief was of a general or particular nature, and the range of 
persons or groups who may be directly or indirectly affected by a court order.  
According to Swanepoel, the relief sought by a public interest applicant plays a 
crucial role in the court’s decision whether or not to grant public interest standing. The 
courts should welcome opportunities to grant socially transformative remedies that 
                                            
253 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 561 571. 
254 S Ahuja People, Law and Justice: A Casebook of Public-Interest Litigation vol. II (1997) 862 – 875. 
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uphold the ideals and values of the Constitution.255 Applicants seeking relief of this 
nature should not hastily be denied standing under section 38(d) of the Constitution. 
4 3 5 4  Parties to the proceedings 
Due to the broad nature of public interest actions and the relief sought in such cases, 
it is crucial that these matters are correctly represented and that, where necessary, 
the involvement of third parties is facilitated.256 This is where the examination of the 
genuineness of public interest litigants, as developed by the Constitutional Court in 
Ferreira and Lawyers for Human Rights, comes into play.257 Courts already possess 
the power to appoint representatives in matters of public interest. However, legislation 
can oblige courts to appoint the most appropriate representative, which must be 
someone suitably qualified and genuine in their wish to represent the public interest.258 
Legislation or Rules of Court can even oblige prospective public interest litigants to 
afford possibly affected persons or groups opportunities to make representations and 
present evidence to the court as amici curiae.259 If included in legislation, such a 
provision will help to ensure greater access to justice for those unable to litigate, and 
for the public at large. It would also provide greater clarity to all parties involved 
regarding their roles in public interest actions, and thus improving accountability and 
transparency.  
4 3 5 5  Nature of the proceedings 
In India, public interest litigation petitions must be based on constitutional claims, and 
are mostly brought against the state and not private parties. Furthermore, the process 
is technically non-adversarial. The governmental respondents are expected to work 
together with the petitioners to address the issue at hand.260 Emphasising that the 
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government should not look upon public interest litigants as opponents, the Indian 
Supreme Court has explained that public interest litigation is a collaborative effort 
between the litigant, the state and the court to “secure observance of the constitutional 
or legal rights, benefits and privileges.”261  
A useful way to combine many of the aspects highlighted above for inclusion in 
legislation in South Africa could be to require a preliminary action to be brought to 
court by prospective litigants, upon the approval of which a public interest action can 
commence.262 A preliminary action affords courts an opportunity to examine whether 
the action falls within the ambit of Bill of Rights litigation, as well as whether other 
effective measures exist by which the action can be brought.263 It also creates a means 
whereby prospective public representatives can be examined and approved. The 
implementation of this proposal may better equip litigants to approach the courts in the 
public interest. However, this is not guaranteed to increase access to justice, as it 
would add another step to the proceedings. Additional procedural hurdles like this, in 
turn, can result in delays and greater cost. 
 Once courts have made a determination as to the acceptability of a public interest 
action, it will be helpful to consider whether such public interest action has a prima 
facie good chance of success and the potential effect of a successful judgment on the 
public.264 Legislating this area of law in South Africa can offer a change in perspective 
regarding public interest actions and the potential they have to ensure the vindication 
of rights. It is preferable in South Africa, too, that proceedings are a collaborative effort, 
keeping in mind the nature of the relief in public interest actions. 
4 3 5 6  Securing funding for an action in the public interest 
In Working Paper 57, the SALC noted that access to justice is frequently hampered 
by lack of funds.265 This phenomenon has been confirmed recently by Budlender, 
Marcus and Ferreira, who note that, although there are some well-resourced 
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organisations that can support actions brought in the public interest, there is generally 
little funding available to support public interest applicants.266 Furthermore, it is difficult 
to secure funding for an action in the public interest, especially if the cause is an 
unpopular one.267 
 In India, this is far less problematic. Courts exercise epistolary jurisdiction by 
entertaining letters from indigent petitioners and appointing fact-finding commissions 
to provide necessary information in connection with the alleged violation of 
fundamental rights. South African jurisprudence has thus far tended more towards 
finding a representative who can act on behalf of those unable to approach the courts 
for financial reasons. The solution posed in the SALC’s final recommendations for this 
problem was that the Legal Aid Board should be used as a mechanism to provide legal 
aid to financially needy public interest litigants.268 
4 4    Conclusion 
Despite the fact that section 38(d) of the South African Constitution, in theory, strives 
to make the courts and relief for the infringement of rights more accessible to 
everyone, Fowkes holds the view that South African courts are “insufficiently open to 
ordinary people”.269 With this concern in mind, this chapter drew from the previous two 
chapters to offer recommendations for the development of public interest standing in 
South Africa. This was achieved by evaluating the development of public interest 
standing in India together with recommendations made by the SALC that have not yet 
been addressed by the South African courts.  
A comparison of the SALC’s Project 88 and the independent interpretation and 
development by the courts of section 38(d) of the Constitution revealed three key 
                                            
266 S Budlender, G Marcus and N M Ferreira Public Interest Litigation and Social Change in South 
Africa: Strategies, Tactics and Lessons (2014) 10. 
267 South African Law Commission Working Paper 57: The Recognition of a Class Action in South 
African Law (1995) 15 at 3.8. 
268 South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law R 8/1998 ix para 24. The objects of Legal Aid South Africa, as contained 
in section 3 of the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014, are to make legal aid and advice available, to 
provide legal representation at state expense and to provide legal education regarding the rights and 
obligations of South Africans. Section 4 of the Act empowers the Legal Aid Board to do what is 
necessary in order to accomplish these objectives. 
269 J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” 
(2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 434 438. 
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considerations for the further development of public interest standing. Firstly, it is clear 
from South African and Indian jurisprudence that the genuineness of the public interest 
applicant and the appropriateness of the public interest representative is of utmost 
importance in matters where relief is claimed on behalf of the public, especially 
because public interest standing is the ground of locus standi that casts the widest 
net. The second and third considerations, which are closely related and have a bearing 
on the first, concern the role that courts play in managing matters brought in the public 
interest and the involvement of third parties to assist in these matters respectively. 
Owing to the misuse of public interest standing that has occurred in India and the 
negative impact that this has had,270 the focal areas contemplated in this chapter 
offered recommendations by which to reinforce the safeguards laid down by the 
Constitutional Court in Ferreira and Lawyers for Human Rights.  
All that remains is to provide an overview of this study, as well as present key 
findings. These will be offered in the following chapter, along with an identification of 
areas for potential further research. 
                                            
270 See part 3 4 2 above. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5 1   Overview of the study 
The primary focus of this thesis was the evolution of public interest standing in South 
African Bill of Rights litigation and the ways in which it can be further developed. This 
research sought to offer recommendations for the further development of public 
interest standing by examining the evolution of the procedural mechanism of standing 
in the Indian model of public interest litigation. In order to refine the understanding and 
procedures relating to public interest standing in South Africa in this way, this thesis 
sought to determine the merits and pitfalls of public interest standing currently in both 
jurisdictions. 
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1949 (“the Indian Constitution”), and section 
38(d) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the South African 
Constitution), have been interpreted broadly with a view to increasing access to 
justice. Access to justice is essential for securing the protection of human rights, 
regardless of the socio-economic circumstances of any given case, and constitutional 
standing provisions make this enforcement possible. This research has emphasised 
that public interest standing, in particular, is seen to have the widest potential reach in 
this regard. 
The primary contribution of this thesis is the recommendations it offers, which are 
aimed at addressing the problems identified with public interest standing in South 
Africa today.1 The key findings of this research, as well as the considerations 
necessary for the further development of public interest standing in South Africa, are 
summarised below. 
5 2   Key findings 
5 2 1   Public interest standing in South Africa 
The first research aim of this thesis was to analyse the incremental, casuistic 
development of public interest standing in South Africa, both prior and subsequent to 
the adoption of the South African Constitution, paying attention to both the advantages 
                                            
1 These recommendations are outlined in parts 4 2 1 3, 4 2 2 3, 4 2 3 4 and 4 3 5 above. 
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and disadvantages of this form of standing in the context of human rights-related 
litigation. 
The actio popularis under Roman law fell into disuse under Roman-Dutch law and 
was declared completely defunct under South African common law. The only notable 
exception to the personal interest requirement for invoking the right to approach a 
court for relief was the decision of Wood & Others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority & 
Another.2 
 Public interest standing was explicitly introduced in section 38(d) of the South 
African Constitution. Regardless of recommendations offered by the South African 
Law Commission (“the SALC”), which culminated in a proposed Draft Bill on Class 
Actions and Public Interest Suits,3 there has been no legislation implemented to 
regulate public interest standing. Development of public interest standing has 
therefore been left to the courts. The cases of Ferreira v Levin4 and Lawyers for 
Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs5 have gone the furthest in giving meaning to 
section 38(d), and have set the precedent for public interest actions today. These two 
judgments highlighted the importance of the genuineness with which anyone seeks to 
rely on public interest standing for the enforcement of rights in the Bill of Rights. They 
also demonstrate the need for it to be objectively in the public interest for a matter to 
be adjudicated. 
 Today, a public interest applicant need not have a direct or personal interest in the 
matter at hand. However, there must be an objective breach of rights in the Bill of 
Rights and the public needs to have a sufficient interest in the relief sought. This 
relaxed approach to locus standi permits litigants to act on behalf of sections of the 
public whose human rights have been infringed, whether or not the victims are aware 
of these violations or able to approach the court for relief themselves. Conversely, 
public interest standing enables litigants to represent people without any prior 
engagement and results in mala fide applicants wasting judicial resources.  
                                            
2 1975 2 SA 294 (A). In this case, the court found that anyone could apply for an interdict on behalf of 
victims of human rights infringements by state authority, but only when such victims were not in a 
position to bring the application themselves. See part 2 2 5 1 above for a more detailed case discussion. 
3 Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act (draft) in GN 1126 GG 16779 of 27-10-1995, found in 
South African Law Commission Project 88: The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions 
in South African Law R 8/1998 87 – 104. See part 2 3 3 4 above. 
4 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
5 Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and other 2004 4 SA 125 (CC). 
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5 2 2   Public interest standing in India 
The second research aim of this thesis was to analyse the development of public 
interest standing within the broader framework of public interest litigation (“PIL”) in 
India in order to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses.  
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution permits individuals to seek redress for violations 
of their fundamental rights. This provision has been interpreted in line with the 
Directive Principles of State Policy in order to increase access to justice. Sparked by 
a desire to increase access to justice for the vast number of underprivileged people in 
India, and facilitated by judicial activism, creative interpretation of article 32 – which 
later included article 226 – saw a major expansion of the rule of standing in India. The 
result was that anyone could approach the courts on behalf of those unable to as a 
result of social and economic disadvantages, provided that such petitioner acted in 
good faith and not for personal gain or profit. The Supreme Court also interpreted the 
phrase “appropriate proceedings” to allow letters addressed to the court in the public 
interest to constitute writ proceedings for purposes of article 32. 
 The broadening of locus standi under article 32 of the Indian Constitution has 
developed over three broad phases.6 The scope of public interest standing today has 
extended beyond the objectives for which it was intended originally, and poses the 
threat of over-taxing judicial resources and flooding the courts with litigation. Although 
not every petitioner approaching the courts for relief in the public interest acts with 
ulterior or improper motives, it is easy for matters of personal gain or private profit to 
be disguised as public interest actions. 
Like South Africa, India has no legislation regulating public interest actions. 
However, where the South African Constitutional Court has laid down a number of 
factors to determine whether or not public interest standing should be granted in any 
given case, the Indian Supreme Court shied away from developing a concrete test. 
Nevertheless, the Indian courts are aided by guidelines7 and public interest litigation 
cells, which help them to sift out a large number of frivolous petitions.8  
                                            
6 See part 3 3 4 above, which analyses each of these phases individually. 
7 Supreme Court of India Compilation of Guidelines to be Followed for Entertaining Letters/Petitions 
Received in this Court as Public Interest Litigation (Based on full Court decision dated 01-12-1988 and 
subsequent modifications). 
8 See part 4 2 2 1 above. 
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5 2 3   Preventing the abuse of public interest standing 
The third research aim was to evaluate the possibilities for further interpretation and 
application of section 38(d) of the South African Constitution by drawing on the merits 
and pitfalls of public interest standing in India. The final aim of this research was to 
offer proposals for the development of public interest standing in South Africa which 
address key areas of consideration identified in this study.  
Owing to the flood of public interest actions filed in the Indian courts, it is vital that 
South African law creates further safeguards to prevent abuse of the relaxation in the 
rules of standing to the same extent as seen in India. One of the ways to achieve this 
is the implementation of legislation regulating public interest actions. Another way to 
regulate public interest standing in South Africa is to codify the existing guidelines in 
court rules. These measures will provide greater legal certainty and content for section 
38(d) and enable public interest actions to be brought efficiently.  
With a broader approach to standing come the needs to filter cases to ensure that 
public interest applicants raise constitutional issues, that the best representatives act 
on behalf of the public and that those affected by the alleged rights violations are 
afforded opportunity to make submissions. Cases brought in the public interest are 
community-orientated, and their remedies affect the public. This is why public interest 
litigants require involvement from a range of actors, from non-governmental and non-
profit organisations to commissions and, naturally, the public. This will in effect 
enhance access to justice for those unable to approach the courts for the vindication 
of human rights. 
5 3   Areas for potential further research 
This research would be complemented by further research in a number of different 
areas. The development of public interest standing in other jurisdictions (for example, 
Canada) would be valuable in considering further development of section 38(d). It 
would also be of great interest to consider the possibilities for public interest standing 
to launch non-Bill of Rights litigation proceedings, as per suggestion of the SALC. 
Public interest standing is a procedural mechanism enabling public interest litigation, 
which is an area of South African law that this thesis has not discussed in detail. 
However, considering the importance of securing greater access to justice for all, there 
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is scope for exploring the relationship between public interest standing, access to 
justice and legal aid strategies. 
5 4   Concluding reflections 
The right to approach courts in the public interest is the widest ground of standing 
available in South Africa. No longer must potential litigants prove a personal interest 
in the relief they seek in such cases: their rights need not have been affected at all. 
This creates great potential for anyone to seek access to justice on behalf of those 
who cannot. 
In India, public interest standing has been used and abused, with justifiably mixed 
results. The courts have had to battle with frivolous petitions brought by people and 
organisations not acting in the public interest at all, whether well-intended or not. The 
flood of public interest imposters has meant that fewer true public interest proceedings 
are launched, and genuine petitioners are discouraged from approaching courts. 
To act in the public interest is a high calling. The relief of public interest proceedings 
is not enjoyed purely by the litigant, in the event that they derive benefit therefrom at 
all. Shouldering the burden of representing the public interest requires true social 
conscience. However, the record of the courts shows that these genuine litigants need 
not act alone, and should be enabled to draw on the insight and expertise of experts, 
amici curiae and society in general. All of these third parties play a part in fostering a 
culture that promotes transformative constitutionalism. 
It is clear then why the Allahabad High Court said that “[t]here must be real and 
genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight 
errant or [poking] one’s nose in for a probe”.9 Public interest standing holds great 
potential for constitutional democracy – for holding the state accountable for its 
obligations to the people of South Africa, for vindicating the rights of those who are 
disadvantaged by their socio-economic circumstances and for securing access to 
justice for all – but should not be invoked without due regard for the weight of 
responsibility of representing one’s known and unknown compatriots. 
  
                                            
9 Mahanagar Ghaziabad Chetna Munch vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2007 2 AWC 1113 para 8. 
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